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THE
THEOLOGY OF ALBRECHT RITSCHL

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THE THEOLOGY OF ALBRECHT RITSCHL

BY

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Professor of Church History in Oberlin Theological Seminary

TOGETHER WITH

INSTRUCTION IN THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION

BY

ALBRECHT RITSCHL

*TRANSLATED BY PERMISSION FROM THE
FOURTH GERMAN EDITION*

BY

ALICE MEAD SWING, A.B.

LONGMANS, GREEN, AND CO.

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PREFACE.

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THIS little volume is the result of an attempt to answer as concretely and yet as briefly as possible the question, What is Ritschianism from the point of view of Ritschl himself?

It is a common boast of modern teachers of history that more attention is now being given to the use of sources. This desirable method can hardly be said to have been used in introducing Albrecht Ritschl to English readers. While more has been written about him than about any other German theologian of our period, we have been presented with criticisms more than with translations and expositions.

In this brief historical introduction to the study of his theology, an attempt has been made to put into the hand of the English reader some of the most important of Ritschl's theological conceptions, in such form as will enable him to come to his own judgment as to their merits or demerits. Quotations in all cases have been made from the latest improved editions, as it seems but fair to give an au-

thor any advantage to be derived from his own modifications of his work.

Ritschl's important little book, *Instruction in the Christian Religion*, which is here presented for the first time to English readers, is a handbook of biblical theology, biblical ethics, and divine worship, in which Ritschl has given a practical illustration of what he believed to be the true method of approach in theological teaching. The translation has been undertaken with the hearty approval of Dr. Otto Ritschl of Bonn. In the difficult task of rendering so condensed a work into English, it has seemed best, in the judgment of the translator, to hold as closely as possible to the original.

ALBERT TEMPLE SWING.

OBERLIN, O., January 8, 1901.

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THE
THEOLOGY OF ALBRECHT RITSCHL.

CHAPTER I.

GENERAL INTRODUCTION.

§ I. FOREWORD.

I. To the student of modern movements and trends in religious thought few men are likely to be of more personal service than Albrecht Ritschl. Especially to the student of theology earnestly engaged in analyzing old systems that he may discover what is vital in them for a theology of his own, will the work of Albrecht Ritschl prove particularly suggestive. He has probably done more than any other theologian to prepare the way for a fundamental and yet conservative reconstruction of the theology of the Church.

The followers of Ritschl have themselves had less to say publicly in direct praise of his theology than they have in the way of modifying his individual statements. They have shown their greater appreciation in the silent but more effective way of mak-

ing his best thoughts their own, and using his method in their own life-work. But unpartisan historians and even hostile critics have borne their direct testimony to Ritschl's importance as a theologian. Stählin said of him,¹ "No German theologian has a larger following than Albrecht Ritschl." Dr. Stuckenbergs has expressed the judgment² that Albrecht Ritschl is "the most prominent name in German theology at the close of the nineteenth century." Professor Scott says³ that "it must not be overlooked how much stimulus of a good kind Ritschl gave to theology and historical study." And Philip Schaff in a letter to Dr. Mann just after Ritschl's death said,⁴ "So Ritschl is dead; but not his school. I do not have so unfavourable an opinion of it as you have. It is a reaction against the Hegelian much-knowledge and all-knowledge. It once more leads away from the realm of speculation and up to the sources of revelation, and from confessional ecclesiasticism to biblical Christianity. At any rate, Ritschl has *started a movement* in theology."

II. And that this general movement has been one of some significance is also to be seen in the fact that Ritschl has fallen heir not only to such high appreciation, but, I might almost say, to a more

¹ *Kant, Lotze and Ritschl*, p. 1.

² "The Theology of Albrecht Ritschl" in *The American Journal of Theology*, April 1898.

³ *The Nicene Theology*, p. 315.

⁴ *The Life of Philip Schaff*, p. 393.

noted depreciation from the long list of his distinguished opponents. In Germany, without mentioning the Mediating Theologians, Ritschl always stood between two other opposing parties. The Confessionalists, with Luthardt at their head, may be thought of as having constituted the right wing of modern German thought. The Liberals, represented by such able theologians as Biedermann, Lipsius and Pfleiderer, composed the left wing; while Ritschl with those won to his method formed the new centre. Ritschl's position, then, must, from the very fact of its being at all, be considered by both the other parties as hostile. To the rationalistic Liberals its success could mean nothing less than the destruction of their influence, which had been deep and widespread in the German universities. To the scholastic Lutherans it would mean the reconstruction of a theology which they were exerting their influence to preserve sacred as ultimate truth in the form in which it had been transmitted to them. Frank, being both a unique kind of Liberal and an earnest advocate of Lutheran orthodoxy, combined in himself the distrust of both these parties.

Stählin undertook by a process of logic to prove Ritschl's philosophical attitude inconsistent. After looking into Stählin's method of argumentation one is ready to grant that by it he could prove anything he set out to establish. Professor Simon, in the preface to his English translation of Stählin's work, gives a mild approval of its general positions.

Professor Orr, however, has done more than any other critic to discredit Ritschl in the estimation of the English public. He has gone through the subject with such thoroughness and evident sincerity, that his fundamental misunderstanding of Ritschl's views has been accepted as historical truth. Especially is this seen in his continually representing Ritschl as subjective in his theory of knowledge and judgments of worth, and in his asserting that Ritschl does not hold to the objective reality of sin, and therefore of redemption, and that with Ritschl the very resurrection of Christ is discredited. And yet Professor Orr continually takes up and appropriates in his own treatment the good which he finds in Ritschl, but without calling it Ritschlian after it comes into his service. Dr. Denney in his general attitude toward Ritschl may be thought of as a very literal follower of Professor Orr. Dr. Van Dyke also drops into the view that Ritschl is subjective, and thinks that with him sin has no objective reality.¹ Professor Mead sees in Ritschl's theology the dangers of a new Socinianism. Lichtenberger, after a very fair résumé of Ritschl's views, says² that Ritschl "cannot escape the accusation of trying to throw dust in the eyes

¹ *The Gospel for a World of Sin*, p. 24 (note). "Schleiermacher and Ritschl, among theologians, present a theory of the sense of guilt as a purely subjective feeling, which makes it amount, in effect, to a result of ignorance, or an illusion ordained by God for a good end."

² *A History of Modern German Theology*, p. 584.

of his readers," so as to appear more mediæval than he really is. While Professor Wenley takes a humorous view of the whole situation, treating Ritschl as a subjectivist, but withdrawing from the field just as the questions become serious.

In these pages I shall have nothing to do with controversy. So far as the critics are concerned, I shall content myself with an occasional quotation from their criticisms,—simply placing their statements about Ritschl side by side with Ritschl's own words, in a sort of literary pillory. But I confess to an interest in Ritschl for the very reason of these many serious misconceptions which have been given such publicity in the United States and in England. As a result many of the common second-hand opinions have been as ridiculously hostile as they have been absurdly unfounded. If it is true that the honest Ritschlian is a dangerous teacher in so far as he follows Ritschl's leadership, it should certainly be recognized. But if this is not the case, it is a serious injury to our common Christian fellowship to have ungrounded fears disseminated against a large and active company who may be deserving of our hearty confidence.

But I have a deep interest in Ritschl also for his own sake, because his historical method is more suggestive than that of any other modern writer on the subject of doctrine. He has introduced a method of analysis which is revolutionizing historical and doctrinal study.

III. The reader will understand that I am not to

speak of Ritschlian theologians in general, of Herrmann or Harnack, of Kaftan or Kattenbusch, of Loofs or Reischle, and certainly not of the so-called Ritschlian school as a school. Much confusion has been brought into this field by mingling the conceptions of different members of the Ritschlian school and applying the peculiarities of one to any or all of the others. Even if there were a closely united Ritschlian school, the simplest key to its understanding would be, not the many pupils, but the one master himself. The correct way, therefore, to find what is Ritschlian in a Ritschlian, is to be familiar with Ritschl himself. It is with forethought, therefore, that I urge the study of Albrecht Ritschl upon those who would understand the vital elements in the Ritschlian movement in Germany, and the most effective force in those who are interested in the reconstruction of theology on a thoroughly evangelical basis in England and America.

IV. The reader will also understand that I am not proposing an apologetic treatment, but only to see the truth, whatever that may be. We need not defend all that Ritschl has taught. We do not expect to find the perfect in any human product. But what does interest us profoundly is the question whether Ritschl's great thoughts and aims are evangelical, and whether they are also reconstructive and, therefore, give promise for a larger future. For this task we need not only the analytical spirit, but we need it sympathetically directed, not toward the production of a criticism, but of a general expo-

sition. This, as I understand it, will call for a large use of our author's own words. It will mean less said about him, and a real attempt to let him speak for himself, and so far as possible interpret himself. A valuable exposition should call for the large and comprehensive views, if there be any. It should certainly avoid the petty technicalities which have done so much to bring controversial criticism into disrepute. An exposition clears the way for valuable criticism, and there is no place for such criticism earlier. We are to seek what Ritschl stood for in his own thought and purpose, to sketch him as nearly as possible as he is. The true student of history—and may we not say of theology also?—can never write for a party.

But I shall quote a great deal for another purpose, that the English reader may get the atmosphere of Ritschl himself, and I shall attempt to bring out with especial fulness those views of Ritschl's which have been misrepresented, or obscured by foreign ideas. As the enthusiastic devotee of art removes the old plaster from a newly discovered picture, that he may get back to the original as the great artist painted it, so shall we need to do for the subject before us. From the point of view of the critics, therefore, I shall seem an advocate, while from Ritschl's own point of view I shall be attempting to do only the work of a sympathetic expounder.

V. But we are not only to maintain a historical spirit in our exposition, we are also to hold very

closely to the legitimate sphere of the historian. The historian of dogma has a very definite task. He is not a teacher of systematic theology, but he prepares the way for theological construction. He is to reveal persons, what they taught, and their vital relations to each other. He indicates valuable conceptions, but he does not himself proceed to the actual work of theological construction.

The historian, therefore, is not a supplanter of the theologian, but his invaluable servant and companion. He does not settle dogmatic questions nor close theological doors. As our historical exegesis proceeds to its conclusions the reader will not find the theological questions settled. The theologians are going to settle them for us. But they will remain settled only just so far as they have been built on correct historical foundations. It will be our privilege to traverse very important ground, and to come into the presence of some very important theological problems. Just this, and not the solution of these problems, however interesting and significant they may be, is to indicate the success of our historical work together in these pages.

Some of the specific doctrinal subjects which are to come into consideration, and on which we are to seek Ritschl's conceptions, are such fundamental ones as, The Christian Bible; The Person of Christ, and the Holy Spirit; The Work of Christ for His Community; Sin and Guilt; The Forgiveness of Sin; The Wrath of God; Christian Mysticism and Pietism. Although we shall not be able to treat

any one of these subjects as fully as it could be desired, enough, it is hoped, will be brought out to show what Ritschl's conceptions really are.

Before coming to these doctrinal subjects, one chapter is to be devoted to the consideration of the Historical presuppositions for an understanding of Ritschl's theology as these shall appear in a brief analysis of certain doctrinal conceptions to be found in the church theologians who especially influenced Ritschl, namely, in Bernard, Luther, Calvin and Schleiermacher; by which I shall seek to indicate in advance some of the particular conceptions which we are to find in Ritschl himself. This chapter on the history of doctrine will be followed by another devoted to the Philosophical presuppositions, in which we shall seek to understand Ritschl's position in reference to philosophy in general, the particular conceptions of Lotze's which influenced him, and especially the Theory of Knowledge, and the Judgments of Worth, about which so much has been said that is not true.

If this general procedure shall seem like expending on the veranda what belongs to the house, the reader will at least understand that it has been done with forethought, because I believe in Historical verandas. It is my strong conviction that the most valuable time bestowed on any subject is likely to be that given to its historical beginnings. In my attempt to reverse, in some important particulars, the common judgment as to Ritschl's philosophy and theology, I have sought to fortify my inter-

pretation of Ritschl himself by that of others upon whom he built.

§ 2. BIOGRAPHICAL OUTLINE.¹

I. Albrecht Ritschl was born in Berlin, March 25, 1822, and died in Göttingen, March 20, 1889. On his father's side he came of ministerial stock. His grandfather was a pastor and professor in Erfurt. His father, Dr. Karl Ritschl, became pastor of the Marienkirche in Berlin in 1810, and was made bishop of the Evangelical Church and General Superintendent of Pomerania in 1827.

II. There seems to have been at no time any other thought in Ritschl's own mind or in that of his parents but that he should make theology his calling.

In 1839 he began university life in Bonn, chiefly because he had relatives living there, but also because Nitzsch was then a distinguished theologian in Bonn. Bleek was teaching exegesis. Curiously enough, however, the first book which Ritschl bought on going to Bonn was a copy of Hegel's *Logic*.

When in 1841 he went to the University of Halle he still retained his belief in the supernatural, which he had received from the strong religious faith of

¹ Derived chiefly from the very full and scholarly Biography by his son, Dr. Otto Ritschl, of Bonn (*Albrecht Ritschl's Leben*, two volumes, 1892 and 1896).

his father's home. But he had also become possessed of a deep longing to know the grounds of religious belief and to lay hold of them for himself in clearness and certainty. It was to him the beginning of a time of transition from his inherited faith to a faith of his own. He rejected the line of thought of Hengstenberg, and turned hopefully to Tholuck and Julius Müller. But he did not find his former faith so easily re-established. While he had no inclination toward the worn-out rationalism of the time, he was won by the attractiveness of the Hegelian philosophy which pervaded the atmosphere of his student circle. In his first year at Halle, Tholuck, Müller, and Gesenius influenced him less than Thilo, and especially Erdmann, with whom he elected the Philosophy of Religion, and Logic. It was in such conditions as these that he formed the particular desire to know all about the doctrine of reconciliation. Indeed it was Baur's treatment of reconciliation which not only aroused a peculiar interest in the Hegelian philosophy, but furnished him with his first knowledge of the history of dogma which it was later his pleasure to master. So enthusiastic did Ritschl become in his new acquisitions that the year seemed short to him, and he thought he saw his way open to the acquiring of dogmatics through the mastery of several dogmatic monographs. And yet the first attempt at a comprehensive treatment of the doctrine of forgiveness was sufficient to reveal to him the need of the Old Testament conception if he was

to come to any fundamental knowledge of the subject.

In these days of transition his father's counsel was always wise and kindly. Although he would gladly have seen his son postpone the perplexing questions until better prepared to take them up, he realized that the questions awakened on the one hand by Hegel's *Categories* and on the other by Strauss's *Life of Jesus* must be worked through sooner or later, and he only cautioned him to proceed without intermission to make himself acquainted with the sacred Scriptures in whole and in part, assuring him that light would be given for the content and relation of dogma itself, such as could not be found by speculation alone. "There is no blame to attach to you," he added,¹ "that you seek to work out the doctrine of Reconciliation speculatively. But the right *intellectus* will only for the first time be attained when you have laid hold of the dogma concerning sin—not by itself—and also livingly experience it in your own heart."

In the summer of this year Ritschl threw himself into the consideration of dogmatic questions, studying Dorner's *Christology* and Tholuck's *Hebrews* and being especially interested to get hold of definite knowledge as to the personality of God, creation, the person of Christ, and redemption. During this last year of his university life in Halle, he used enthusiastically the speculative and scientific meth-

¹ *Leben*, I. p. 58.

ods of the Critical school in his earnest pursuit of "the knowledge of history, the world, and God." He sought to do more work by himself with only such personal guidance as he received from his teachers, who were now Schaller, with whom he elected philosophy, and young Schwarz, with whom he pursued the history of dogma. He had come to consider Baur the leading theologian of Germany, and gave appreciative attention to his *History of the Christian Gnosis* and his first volume on the *Doctrine of the Trinity*. His brother also sent him his private notes on Vatke's *Theism and Pantheism*. In the mean time he began the study of Augustine, the results of which he wished to use for his thesis in taking his Ph.D., which degree he received in May 1843. (122)

III. From Berlin, whither he had gone to continue his theological studies, he went to his father's home in Stettin, where he spent most of the following year. Here, in April 1844, he passed his examination for licensure to preach. But with no specific work in hand upon which to centre his whole strength, he thought of the year as not particularly fruitful. But he was more clearly gaining his direction. Notwithstanding the strong Hegelian influences under which he had completed his university course, he was not turned from his chosen field of theology, but led rather to give to it his whole thought. He finally began graduate study in Heidelberg, where Richard Rothe was the attracting personality. Here Ritschl at once began writ-

ing an Introduction to Biblical Theology, which he soon gave up because he found himself unprepared for carrying it through as he desired. Instead of this he turned to the questions awakened by Baur, especially as to the value of his Ebionitic suggestions. Indeed he began working through *pro* and *con* the positions of both Strauss and Baur. But in Heidelberg Ritschl missed the association with young students of theology, and in August 1845 he left that university and took up his abode in Tübingen when the critical school, under such able leaders as F. Christian Baur, Schwegler and Zeller, was at its highest point of prosperity.¹ By Christmas he had completed in the Tübingen spirit the manuscript for a three-hundred-page book, which appeared from the press in 1846 under the title of *The Gospel of Marcion and the Canonical Gospel of Luke*, in which the theory of an original Luke occupied a prominent place. But in Tübingen he found himself after all not pleased with the student fellowship, and soon longed to be away at his life-work.

IV. After much deliberation Bonn was settled on as the place where he should make his eventful and also anxious beginning of university lecturing. In May 1846 Ritschl passed his examinations in Bonn as licentiate in theology, and there began his work as *privatdocent*. In preparation for his final teaching of dogmatics he now set to work in the

¹ The flourishing period of the Tübingen school extended from 1835-1848, when disintegration began.

New Testament field, from which he did not again turn until he had made the New Testament and its history his own possession. The first work which he did at Bonn in the way of testing his positions for himself began to lead him away from the Tübingen conclusions, and indeed to a distrust of the whole Hegelian method of speculation. In a review of Baur's new book, *Paul the Apostle of Jesus Christ*, which Ritschl published in the *Theological Year-book* of 1847, he showed his own independent development by calling attention to the fact that Paul was not only a theologian but a man, and an Apostle. And Ritschl already found more in the minor epistles than Baur could allow. Ritschl's next attempt at book-making was *The Rise of the Old Catholic Church*, which was finally completed and brought through the press in November 1849. In this work he gave expression to many views in opposition to Baur and to Schwegler. In the preface Ritschl declared historical criticism to be "a pure art, which cannot be made a servant to any dogmatic object, be that a conservative or a negative one."

Ritschl not only lectured on the New Testament but also on the history of doctrine, and for one semester he gave a course of lectures on modern theology. Instead of at once undertaking a new book, he began a fundamental study of Old Testament history. In 1851 he gave a course on symbolics, in which in a practical way he emphasized the spirit of union between Protestants, by

which also he himself gained a clearer view of what constitutes the Protestant Church. This year he came out in a magazine article against his own former view of an original gospel of Luke, which view he had abandoned several years before. Curiously enough, just at this time Baur appeared in print in support of the theory which Ritschl had abandoned, and wrote Ritschl that he was a better advocate of his view than was Ritschl himself.

Ritschl had now for six years been toiling away in Bonn as *privatdocent*. It was a long time to wait for official recognition as a member of a university faculty. This delay, however, was felt more keenly by his parents and a few personal friends than by Ritschl himself. For it was not because his abilities had not been recognized abroad, but the appointing powers were punishing him for his wrong start in the field of negative criticism, which punishment Ritschl himself accepted as not altogether undeserved. But these first years of probation were among the most fruitful for himself in his chosen calling. He had worked his way through and out of the Tübingen influence, while step by step gaining for himself his own strong, religious faith, together with the skill which would be called for in working out the elements of his dogmatic system. This experience with his own doubts gave him sympathy with others who were in doubt, and his training had been such as to prepare him to be their leader into a life of practical religious faith.

V. The long-waited-for appointment as "Profes-

sor Extraordinarius" came at last in December 1852, and to a position in the faculty of Bonn itself. His first public exercise as Professor chanced to be the delivery of an address upon the "Mysticism of the Fourteenth Century, Especially in Germany." He began his dogmatic work in 1853, into which he entered as into an entirely different world from that which as a student he had seemed to see before him.

The second edition of *The Rise of the Old Catholic Church* was brought through the press in 1857, after it had been almost wholly rewritten. In this edition he sought to soften the polemic against Schwegler and Baur, and to make the work more impersonal and objective. In his treatment of the New Testament Canon he accepted, with only one exception, all the epistles which Baur had left out. And he emphasized the view that there could be no external reconciliation of early church parties except upon the basis of a real internal agreement, which he found in the common apprehension of Christ's activity. "The fact which breaks through the old Covenant, namely, that Jesus is the Christ, is the content of the gospel, which is identical in all the apostles. Only on this presupposition, and not on that of a double gospel, is the reconciliation of opposing tendencies in Christian faith as demanded by the Tübingen school to be regarded as at all possible. For a union is only brought about through external causes when there is working at the same time the common internal cause."¹

¹ *Leben*, I. p. 287.

While the second edition of his *Rise of the Old Catholic Church* was going through the press, he began to set about the great work which was to engage the most of the remaining years of his life, *The Christian Doctrine of Justification and Reconciliation*. He had already done work on the relation of mysticism to the Reformation, and he now proceeded to a fundamental study of Luther and Melanchthon, and afterwards of Osiander. This same winter also his lectures on Hebrews led him to a fundamental study of this book, which resulted in a new view of the Old Testament sacrifices.

Ritschl's heart was deeply touched by the death of his father in 1858. But this was also the year of his engagement with Ida Rehbock of Frankfort, to whom he was in the following year happily married. It was just five years after he began his lectures in dogmatics that he gave for the first time a course on what he always called Theological Ethics, in distinction from Theological Dogmatics, which, in conformity with Schleiermacher, he distinguished as follows:¹ "Theology in the narrowest sense, or dogmatics, has for its subject divine action; the ethical has human action, which is grounded upon the divine." "Ritschl's ethics," says the writer of his Life,² "stands in complete agreement with his dogmatics, which is presupposed as theological apparatus. On the other hand, however, his religious convictions were essentially determined by his ethi-

¹ *Leben*, I. p. 346.

² *Leben*, I. p. 362 f.

cal view of the world and of life. . . . He saw himself placed in the praxis of life for a faithful fulfilment of duty through the calling which he strove after and fulfilled. From this standpoint he gained his vital understanding of the Christian religion, which he was able to make clear only in agreement with his ethical ideal. So the Christian religion became to him the foundation of his ethical ideal, his ethical ideal only the necessary working out of the Christian religion."

In the winter semester of 1860 he once more gave his course on New Testament Introduction, which he now however worked over from a point of view very different from that of thirteen years before. Then he thought to solve all the hard problems by the fullest evidence. Now he realized that in the most difficult problems it is only the reasonable degree of probability which must decide. He followed in general the same line of thought which he had brought out in his second edition of the *Rise of the Old Catholic Church*.

VI. In 1864 he consented to break up the pleasant associations at Bonn by accepting the position of "Professor Ordinarius" in Göttingen, where he spent very happily the remaining twenty-five years of his busy life, and where he completed his most important books. In his letter of acceptance he declared his religious and theological convictions to be "in harmony with the Evangelical Lutheran Church," and that for the wider church circles he had "no other thought than the unity of the spirit

through the bond of peace." It was when taking up his teaching of dogmatics in Göttingen that he received much suggestive help from Lotze's *Microcosmus*, the third volume of which work had just appeared. He used one of his first opportunities to call the attention of the students to what he considered the very important suggestion that "whoever would understand the *conception* [Begriff] of revelation must be philosophically trained."

In giving his fourth presentation of dogmatics he criticises for the first time the custom of making the two so-called principles of Protestantism—the Bible the formal, and Justification by faith the essential, principle—valid as criteria for dogmatic theology.¹

It was not until 1870 that the first volume of *The Christian Doctrine of Justification and Reconciliation* came from the press. This volume presented the history of the doctrine, and could be considered complete in itself. In fact it appeared in English in 1872 from an Edinburgh press² under the title of *A Critical History of the Christian Doctrine of Justification and Reconciliation*, the translation having been undertaken at the suggestion of W. Robertson Smith. It was four years later before Volume II, containing the Biblical Material, appeared, followed in the same year by Volume III, containing The Positive Development of the Doctrine. In the

¹ *Leben*, II. p. 22.

² Edmonston and Douglas. Translated by John S. Black, M.A.

same year Ritschl published his monograph on Schleiermacher's *Discourses on Religion*. In 1875 he gathered the results of his previous study into the valuable compendium entitled *Instruction in the Christian Religion*, which was intended for use in the Gymnasium. But the large editions of this work have for the most part been used by more advanced students.

While preparing his one remaining great work, *The History of Pietism*,¹ the first volume of which appeared in 1880; and after he had published in 1881 his *Theology and Metaphysics*, which was his only defensive writing, he busied himself, in a literary way, chiefly with the revising of his former works and in critical reviews. In 1888 he made the final changes in the third improved edition of *Justification and Reconciliation*. The fourth edition of Volume II, which indeed included only a few alterations, appeared in January 1889, and with these last touches upon The Biblical Material, of which he had always made so much, his life-work was done.

His home life had been beautiful, and his association with his large circle of friends always hearty. Even with critics who persisted in misunderstanding and misrepresenting him, he had been almost universally patient and dignified, regretting severe

¹ I. *Pietism in the Reformed Church*, 1880.

II. (Part I.) *Pietism in the Lutheran Church in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries*, 1884.

III. (Part II.) *Pietism in the Lutheran Church in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries*, 1886.

words. Indeed at heart he was always a lover of peace, and became ever more anxious to further the feeling of universal good will.

The origin and development of the so-called Ritschlian school has been described as falling into three periods: 1874-1880; 1880-1889; and 1889 to the present time. But any consideration of the Ritschlian school would lead beyond the scope of the present pages.

§ 3. RITSCHL'S AIM AND METHOD.

I. Our first attention is to be directed to an inquiry as to Ritschl's aim and method. This we shall find to be the most important subject of all, more important even than his conceptions of individual doctrines. His method and aim will appear consciously and unconsciously at every turn. In a certain sense Ritschl's treatment of concrete doctrines will be found to be but so many individual attempts at the illustration of his aim and method. And these individual doctrines, when worked out in form, might even prove in some important respects to be inconsistent with his own most serious and fundamental purposes, and not invalidate the principles themselves. At least we are interested to know not only what Ritschl was able to perfect, but what he thought of himself as trying to accomplish.

II. Ritschl's method will be found to have been pre-eminently historical. Although his professorship was that of dogmatics, one looks in vain for

the indications of a systematic theology as commonly understood. His historical and his exegetical work were preliminary and progressive toward dogmatic results, but these were always in process of development. When he would write three volumes on the fundamental doctrine of Justification and Reconciliation he devotes only the third to the more direct presentation of his own theology. But his aim and method appear almost equally in all the volumes. The historical truth which he found in the doctrines—and which no theologian of our modern period has studied with more acumen—had only a regulative value for him, but a regulative value they did have. He was an earnest student of the holy history, seeking the best light that had been shining, least of all was he a subjective theorist, egoistically telling us only what he himself was able to conceive. In his historical work his aim in general terms was to make divine revelation positively normative for everything in Christian theology. By historical exegesis he would search for the objective realities of revelation, and make their proper arrangement and estimation his task as a Christian theologian; and the great reality of all is Jesus Christ. Professor Porter is certainly correct when, following the lead of Kattenbusch, he says,¹ "Ritschl stands then in this school not for definite views, critical or doctrinal, but for a certain starting-point and method. . . . The danger of subjec-

¹ *Andover Review*, 1893, p. 445.

tivism belonging to Schleiermacher's method had shown itself in conservative, liberal and mediating theologies alike, both in the direction of speculation and in that of mysticism. Ritschl in the view of his school has his main significance in the fact that he broke with this method, that he started not from the 'pious consciousness,' but from an objective fact, the gospel, or, more definitely, the historical person of Christ Jesus, as the one thing supernatural, the only and sufficient revelation of God."

Attention needs to be called to two very important characteristics of his historical method.

III. We shall find his historical method to be fundamentally analytical. This of course means that it could not be mystical or sentimental; neither could it be merely imitative, and it could not be confessional and dogmatic. He sought the component parts of a doctrine or a system that he might know what these stood for, and especially that he might compare these elements under his lens, with others like them which he had discovered elsewhere. And if Ritschl had done nothing more than to make this analytical method fundamental in dogmatics, he would have made one of the most valuable of all contributions toward the reconstruction of theology. Indeed any wise and permanent theological construction will depend on the thorough mastery of doctrinal analysis. The study of doctrine is no longer a mere task of memory, a simple acquaintance with thought objectives by centuries. Doc-

trinal faith is not a mere assent of the intellect to the historical systems of the church. Too much has been said of faith as a merely passive virtue, the virtue of assent. With Ritschl faith could only be a very active principle. It is the first practical business of historical analysis to discover concrete truth in the man or the system. A second equally important task is to see this in its vital relations to other truth before and after it. But in order to the accomplishment of this kind of work the doctrinal student needs a criterion of values. He must know what he is seeking, and be able to tell it concretely when he sees it. He does not ask himself how he feels, but what he sees, its value, its relationships. Here will be his opportunity for rational insight and comprehension, and for an all-absorbing rational faith. Later we shall see what Ritschl as a historical and doctrinal student was seeking to find.

IV. But Ritschl's historical method was not only analytical, it was also constructive. He is therefore to be thought of as a positive, and not a negative, theologian. In his early career he was analytical and destructive. Beginning as he did, a pupil of Baur, and doing his first historical work in the spirit of the destructive criticism at Tübingen, he worked himself completely out of this negative spirit. He turned the very skill of analytical acumen which he had learned from Baur against the results of that school. This fact appears to have been overlooked by some who have always seemed to see the old Tübingen in the new Ritschl. But it

is certain that the negative school itself never made this mistake. And not many of the old elements could have clung to one who has become one of the most effective forces in counteracting the Tübingen influence. We may hold this therefore as one of the strongest presuppositions for the positive and the constructive which we are to find in Albrecht Ritschl. If his analytical method is to break up any old systems of the church, it must probably be charged to the nature of the systems themselves. In setting about the work of analyzing the later Catholic and the earlier Protestant doctrines, he was not seeking to destroy the life in them, but to reveal it as a new constructive force. Because Ritschl did not himself set about the construction of a cut-and-dried theological system, he has seemed to many to be an elusive theologian. He has been confusing to those who are troubled unless they find the old churchly doctrines expressed in the old familiar forms. But Ritschl's turning away from the externality of form, however artistically constructed, certainly must be considered as one of his merits, if there is to be any new life in the field of theology. The Catholic Church has made the mistake of considering the dogma of one generation as ultimate truth. This is the means by which it was able to hold all conservative reformers in check, until these learned a way of appeal from the consensus of opinion in the church, to the undogmatized truth of the gospels. And this the reader will note was not undertaken in the interest of a feebler

but of a fuller religious life. Old reformations did not come to pass by any patchwork upon exteriors, but from a new life of genuine Christian experience within. And new reformations must not be looked for through externals, but by means of a new constructive life.

In making constructive life the vital thing, and the objective forms only the circumstantial manifestation of it, Ritschl has, of course, struck a blow at historical confessionalism, and Lutheran confessionalists have not forgiven him. But Ritschl has simply made fundamental the life which produced the creed instead of the creed produced, a life which can produce another creed according to the new artistic power at hand, and can go on ceaselessly struggling toward an ever fuller and truer expression, which will yet not be perfect in form, not divine dogma. For only principles and life itself can be essential and decisive. Religious life and doctrinal life in the thought of Ritschl must be one and the same.

V. But Ritschl's method was not only historical, analytical and constructive, his aim was also fundamentally practical. I am aware that many false changes have been rung on the word practical, as if only that is to be used which is purely utilitarian. Ritschl himself has been supposed by not a few persons to turn against theology itself in the interest of the practical.

Ritschl's practical aim will be seen in what he sought to shut out by his negatives. He turns

definitely away from the whole speculative field. He discourages curious questions as to how things come to be what they are, or as to what they are in their own mysterious selves. This is why he chose for Christian theology a theory of knowledge which shuts out metaphysical inquiries. He not only cuts off by means of it the great world of the unknown back of the known, and draws such a distinct line of agnosticism between the two that he is easily able to confine his attention to the known, but his practical aim leads him to the consideration of only so much of the known itself as has come into vital expression in divine revelation. And to him revelation itself has to do only with the very practical work of human salvation. This, it will be seen, is an intensifying, but it is also a very significant narrowing, of the sphere of theology as a result of Ritschl's interest in the practical.

Positively stated, then, Ritschl had a fundamental interest only in what had direct relation to human salvation. This furnished his only vital content for Christian theology. Dogmatics is to do its work in such a way that the results when completed shall reveal this in its true light. Only the things vital are to be made to seem vital in the actual service of the church. Otto Ritschl calls attention to his father's words, "In dogmatics one should take up nothing that cannot be used in preaching and in the intercourse of Christians with one another."¹

¹ *Rechtfertigung und Versöhnung*, III. p. 573.

The content which Ritschl seeks to bring out will be found in the person of the Redeemer and in that which is to be wrought in the lives of the persons redeemed. Ritschl's work is characterized by his choosing for his chief task the proper conception and representation of the purpose of God in human salvation as historically revealed in Jesus Christ; in that which is essential and real in the process of reconciliation; and in the activities of the Christian community in the exercise of its divine calling. It is because Ritschl has made redemption the key to his theology, and sees in the person and work of the historical Christ the complete revelation of the purpose of God Himself, that the followers of Ritschl in particular have raised the cry, "Back to Christ!" Kattenbusch says¹ that "Ritschl's opponents, if they are consistent, always take their stand in subjective momenta, in order to reach Christian objectivity. Ritschl just the reverse. He shows what objective arises in the knowledge of God from the view of the historical Christ, and holds Christian subjectivity bound to measure itself and to decide thereby." And Kattenbusch thinks that "one follows the path of this great teacher of evangelical theology if, while independent of him in detail, one accepts from him the task of forming the Christian system from the starting-point of the conception that God is to be thought of as Christ [$\omega\delta\pi\epsilon\rho\lambda$ $X\rho\sigma\tau\omega\hat{\nu}$], God's historical self-witness the be-

¹ *Von Schleiermacher zu Ritschl*, p. 82.

ginning, not the concluding, point of dogmatic reflection,—to have made this prominent is the significance of Ritschl.”¹ And Kattenbusch closes his pamphlet with these enthusiastic words: “ Not what the Lutheran Church already understands of Christ, not what it has already appropriated in spiritual experience is its glory, but the fact that it knows that for the Christian the gospel of Christ alone is of value, and that it knows therefore where we can learn more than we now know, where we can become richer than we now are.”²

VI. Ritschl, instead of using religion as a valuable means for the development of ethics and morality as ends in themselves, employs ethics and morals as worth-elements in coming to a test and an appreciation of religion, and even in the supreme estimation of Christ Himself. He devotes his whole power of presentation to the exaltation of the world-conquering morality of the kingdom of God, to be displayed in the most practical ways of patience, honour, loyalty, helpfulness and the like. But these in themselves are not ends. They are rather evidences of the reality of a fellowship which finds these the natural and necessary expression of its world-conquering life. We shall see that with Ritschl practicality means the actual realization of the deepest religious experience in the most vital of all personal relationships.

The general significance of this distinctly con-

¹ *Von Schleiermacher zu Ritschl*, p. 81.

² *Ibid.*, p. 84.

scious purpose in Ritschl appears more evident when we place it side by side with the common method and aim of Liberal and Rationalist, in which the individual reason is made the point of departure, and even when compared with that very different conception which appears in the line of thought advocated by such eminent men as, for example, Professor Edward Caird.¹ We are all familiar with the theory of progressive development in Christian civilization, in which the ideal rules the historical in such a way that Christianity as a religion may even come to be superseded by the ethical ideas which it has itself suggested, so that the religious community of Christ may pass into the broad social organism, to be regenerated by the ethical refinements of intellectual culture. I do not say that there may not be a new rationalism that shall steep itself in the most devout religious spirit, or that a new Hegelian influence is not to be made of new and fundamental service in the church of the future. I am setting forth how alive Ritschl was to the importance of the historical and the practical in the treatment of the deep problems which present themselves to every earnest student of Christian thought and life.

VII. But I also wish to call attention to the fact that Ritschl's method was scientific. And here what has already been said negatively might well be taken up and repeated positively. While hav-

¹ Christianity and the Historical Christ," in *The New World*, 1897.

ing the most absolutely practical aim, he has a great deal to say about what is and what is not scientific. In Ritschl's view "Whoever would understand the *conception* of revelation must be philosophically trained."¹ But to use philosophy is a very different thing from having philosophic ends, and Ritschl used his philosophy and his metaphysics in the very interest of practical results. If Ritschl's theology shall seem to be cut too close by his scientific method, at least it has been brought about by the use of a very practical theory of knowledge. The results will certainly seem severely plain when placed in comparison with our eclectic theologies, whose authors by a shrewd method of selection have succeeded in gathering a great wealth of theological lore, but without a vital organism from which it has legitimately sprung. Ritschl's theology on the other hand not only has a life of its own, but it bears witness to the control of an exact scientific method. In many quarters there is a purely sentimental way of treating religious truth, which by imitation decries scientific dogma, and thinks for this reason that it has caught the secret of the great theological reformers. Such teachers generally discredit theology because they are without a real knowledge of it for themselves, and have neither the philosophic training to form a conception of Christianity as a whole, nor the power of historical analysis to discover the material for new construction. Ritschl

¹ *Leben*, II. p. 17.

not only understood the positiveness of Christianity as a revealed religion, but by a definite scientific method he could clearly distinguish his conception of it from others which he did not hold. If any one has been led to suppose that Ritschianism is only a trifling, sentimental affair of practical life, illuminated here and there with poetical quotations, let him try working through Ritschl's three volumes on *Justification and Reconciliation* and he will change his mind, and probably be more confident than ever that there is no need of having a theology! But to the earnest student Ritschl's scientific analysis of doctrine will be a revelation of the freshest and most fundamental views. Ritschl has just as little satisfaction in dogmatic denunciation as he has in mystical or sentimental affirmation. He does not denounce; by a scientific method he analyzes, and truth and error appear. If he would advance a truth he does not ransack the literary scrapbooks for fine phrases; but by his scientific principle he is able to discover and point out true values. Even if this scientific principle should not prove to be the ultimate one, it is still his great excellence that he at least had such a principle which he continually used to build up as well as to pull down.

If the working theology of the immediate future is to be concretely and vitally practical, and therefore a controlling power for its own age, it cannot wisely be less historical, less analytical and constructive, less severely scientific than the theology of Albrecht Ritschl.

CHAPTER II.

PRESUPPOSITIONS FOR AN UNDERSTANDING OF RITSCHL FROM THE HISTORY OF DOC- TRINE.

§ 4. BERNARD.

Of all the Western theologians of the old church, Bernard seemed to Ritschl to be the most suggestive and helpful, because of his emphasis of the historic Christ. Ritschl did not choose Augustine, because he thought of him as making Christ only the way to the mystical God of the Neo-Platonists. However we may agree with this estimate of Augustine, we have no difficulty in seeing why Augustine was not selected. He did not choose Aquinas, the greatest of the schoolmen, because Aquinas seemed to argue from the top downward, and made as much of God unrevealed as of God revealed in His Son. But Ritschl sees Bernard turning, with all the mystic love of which his soul was capable, to the historic Jesus. Here was the revealed God in the person of the humble Jesus, and Bernard loving Him as directly and personally in His humble divinity as ever earthly lover in the sphere of the holiest human

passion. The God whom Ritschl here sees worshipped, even though He be worshipped mystically, is the revealed God, and this worship is not concerned with His divinity metaphysically considered. But this will be seen more clearly as we proceed.

§ 5. LUTHER.

I. The relation which Ritschl sustains to Luther is the most important of all for the understanding of our subject. It is Luther who is Ritschl's greatest helper, and he seeks to turn the young men of Germany from the later scholastic Lutheranism to the earlier religious Luther. Ritschl has been criticised as being too narrowly a Lutheran, and also as claiming to build on Luther while in fact differing fundamentally from him. Of course both these charges cannot be true. And yet there may be ground for such an apparent contradiction, for Ritschl finds Luther especially suggestive before the reaction set in which checked the development of the new Reformation spirit. According to the Ritschlian view of the matter the conservative and reactionary work of the Reformation from 1525 onward was probably necessary to establish and to preserve the Reformation which had been won, but it was the earlier period beginning with 1513 which made the Reformation itself. It is this early period which has especial bearing, therefore, on the position of Ritschl. And we shall need a clear view of this part of the Reformation as furnishing one of

the chief historical presuppositions for the understanding of Ritschl.¹

II. The early steps of Luther's development, as seen in his writings from 1513 to 1516, show that practical Christianity was to him not the acceptance of an authoritatively given knowledge of God and the world, and side by side with this the ethical virtues, but the *being rooted in religious faith*. This practical Christianity was therefore only attainable through personal experience. In comparison with this confidence in God's grace the whole realm of ethics in a narrower sense fell into the background as that which is conditioned in comparison with that which conditions. So that what we find in Lutheran Christianity at the end of 1516 was primarily this religious understanding of the gospel. Luther did not see at first, says Loofs, that church custom, dogmatic tradition and the hierarchy made this religious understanding of Christianity difficult and almost impossible. That it was necessary to set aside these hindrances to right Christianity Luther saw only gradually in his controversy with them. This may be seen in Luther's Commentary on the Psalms; his first lectures; and in 1516 his Pauline thoughts; also in his religious interpretation of the mysticism of Tauler, and the *German Theology*.

¹ I shall here follow the lead of Frederic Loofs, who is one of the most conservative and independent of Ritschl's pupils and one of the best representatives of the Ritschlian method in doctrinal study—*Leitfaden zu Studien der Dogmengeschichte*, 1890.

III. (1) During the Indulgence Controversy certain principles became clear to Luther: True interior contrition can only proceed from the consideration of divine goodness and love. "True contrition must be begun by the kindness and mercies of Christ, that one may come first to his own ingratititude by the vision of the divine goodness, and from this to a hatred of himself and a love of the kindness of God." In other words, what Ritschl would find here is that the philosophical contemplation of God as First Cause does not lead to true penitence. It is when we turn from the philosophical to the ethical conception of God and discover His love to us that we are won to Him.

(2) In Luther's *Commentary on Galatians*, Preface, he says: "In my heart reigns that one article, namely, faith in Christ, from which, through which, and into which all my theological cogitations flow and reflow day and night." That is, here is the revealed love of God as we find it in the very person of Christ to which we see Luther turning, as he exclaims: "*Summa summorum*—to him who believes everything is advantageous, nothing is injurious: to him who believes not everything is injurious, nothing is advantageous. There is no greater sin than not to believe the article on the forgiveness of sins." It was from this that came the necessary conclusion as to the difference between the Lutheran and the Catholic view, namely, the conviction that the true faith and the assurance of salvation are inseparable. *Misericordia* is the keyword

which Loofs sees in Luther. Luther *believed in the compassion of God in Jesus Christ for him*, and Luther knew that he believed in this compassion. This was the faith and this the knowledge which made the Reformation. It was not a credal but a religious faith. It was not an intellectual but a religious knowledge. And these rested on no cosmological or metaphysical conceptions of God as found in philosophy, but on the ethical and religious revelation of God as found in the person of Jesus Christ. This religious conception was the heart of Luther and of Ritschl.

(3) To Luther the best penance is "to sin no more." The main thing to him in the sacrament of penance was the priestly absolution, *which is to be believed* as God's promised word: the sacrament cleanses, not because it is performed, *but because it is believed*. The sacraments are nothing more than special forms of the offer of the gospel, and "it is better to omit the sacrament than not to proclaim the gospel." Here, then, faith is to be no intellectual act but a vital confidence in the very gospel itself, which is a religious and not a theoretical proclamation.

IV. You will not be surprised that these views became significant for Christology in Ritschl as well as in Luther. The one thing of importance, says Luther, is "to live in the bare faith in God's compassion," so that the historical Christ comes to include the whole ethical and religious knowledge of God, and Augustine's central point of "the Word

who was in the beginning with God" was lost sight of in another found in the humility of the Incarnate One. The development introduced by Anselm and Bernard found here its conclusion. As Loofs says here, "God is to be known only in Christ, and to know Christ is to accept grace from Him." This point of view may seem to include a negative as well as a positive conception. But I believe that what we are to see here is only the attempt at the right centring of theological thought and not the dogmatic shutting up of all thought to Christ alone. Such a religious centring of all upon Jesus Christ is certainly not supposed to be the characteristic of a heretic. And if this be true for Luther, why not for Ritschl? Certainly no historian of dogma would for a moment think of charging Luther with intending to emphasize merely humanitarian views of Christ, for no one could think of Christ "according to His divinity" any more strongly than Luther. And yet he says, in an Ascension Day sermon early in 1517, "Turn thine eyes away from the majesty of God and direct them towards His humanity lying on His mother's bosom." Here, then, to him was the focal point, in this visible incarnation, the climax of which was to be seen upon the cross. And again, Luther declared in the Heidelberg Theses: "It is of no value to any one to recognize God in His glory and majesty except one recognize the same in the ignominy of the cross. . . . Thus when Philip, John xiv., in accordance with the theology of glory, says, Show us the Father, with

difficulty Christ calls him away and brings his volatile thought of seeking back to himself by saying, He that hath seen Me hath seen the Father. Therefore in Christ crucified is true theology—the theology of the cross—and the knowledge of God." This is the Luther whom Ritschl follows, and Ritschl seizes upon this conception as fundamental for theology. And it may be thought of as furnishing a key to Ritschl's method and aim.

And now I come to the fullest Lutheran expression in illustration of all this early trend of Luther, in which Luther speaks negatively as well as positively, and is seen consciously turning away from metaphysics. In commenting on John xvii. 3, he said: "Mark how in this passage Christ weaves and binds together the knowledge of Himself and of the Father, or that one knows the Father alone through and in Christ. For this I have often said, and still say, that it may be remembered when I am dead, and that one may guard himself against all teachers whom the devil rides and leads, who begin to teach at the top and to preach of God apart and separated from Christ, as in the universities till now there have been speculation and playing with His works up in heaven as to what He is and thinks and does by Himself." Ritschl wonders that when Luthardt quotes this passage in his *Compendium* he yet makes no further use of it.

The important thing in these quotations is that the line of agnosticism for theology is drawn at the historical Christ, that is, at God in the point of His

highest and fullest personal revelation of Himself. Here we have the personal made fundamental, and from this point we are to expect our religious and ethical morality to develop. But it is not morality and it is not ethics which is being presented, but religion throughout.

V. We shall find the same line of thought brought out in Luther's conception of the Trinity. In criticising the Homoousions he emphasized the fact that the words Unity and Trinity are mathematical terms, and that the word Trinity does not occur in the Bible. And, because the word has a cold sound, he considered it much better to say God than the Trinity. But all this does not mean that he did not hold to the truth of the Trinity. To him the doctrine of the Trinity was "The first great incomprehensible chief article" which was to be believed unmastered. In 1521 he wrote, "Even if my soul hate the word Homoousion and I will not use it, yet I shall not be a heretic: for who is he who compels me to use it if only I hold the thing which is defined in the council through the Scriptures?" And in 1525 he said in a sermon on Exodus: "Thus the sophists have painted how He is man and God; they count His legs and arms and mix His two natures wonderfully together, which, after all, is only a sophistical knowledge of the Lord Christ. For Christ is not called Christ because of His two natures. What do I care for that? But He bears this glorious and comforting name because of the office and work which He has

taken upon Himself: that gives Him His name. That He is by nature man and God—that He has for Himself: but that He has so exercised His office and set forth His love and become my Saviour and Redeemer—that is my comfort and blessing. It concerns me that He will save His people from their sins."

Two of Ritschl's ideas are found illustrated here in Luther. First, the line of agnosticism is drawn at the historical Christ. Second, the ethical and religious are consciously placed above the metaphysical, for without using the phrase, judgment of value, Luther has shown that the practical conceptions should stand out at the centre of Christian teaching in preference to the speculative and metaphysical. Certainly, to apply the term subjective to these estimates of worth, as has been done by several critics in the case of Ritschl, would render Luther incapable of being understood.

Luther in his treatise against Erasmus, Dec. 1525, opened up even more clearly the distinction between revealed and unrevealed. "This learned man," says Luther, "deceives himself, in that he makes no distinction between God revealed and God unrevealed: that is, between the Word of God and God Himself. God wills many things which He does not show in the Word that He wills. He does not will the death of the sinner, that is, in His Word. But He wills it in His inscrutable will. But now we must observe the Word, and leave that inscrutable will, for we are to be di-

rected by the Word, not by the inscrutable will." And as late as 1542 he points more decidedly away from the concealed God: "We look at the revealed God as we sing in the Psalm: 'His name is Jesus Christ. . . . Jesus Christ is the Lord of Sabaoth, nor is there any other God.' "

Here then we find Luther turning from the puzzling questions that arise from a philosophical conception of monotheism in connection with human evil, to the worth value of the gospel, which shows us the revealed purpose of God to establish fellowship by the forgiveness of sins.

VI. I need hardly pause here to show that Luther in his early views thought of the Scriptures as religious means and not as a formal authority, and the church as not a school, a *Lehrkirche*, but a religious congregation, every one of whom is a member of the church who possesses justifying saving faith. And yet Luther did seem to hold also to the conception that in the church there must be a public doctrine, the recognition of which should condition church membership. Of course these two conceptions cannot be held without determining which shall be decisive. If the belief conception rests on the compassion of Jesus Christ for us, it cannot be merely an ethical and legal belief, which is always dominant in formal confessionalism. The more Luther himself rejected the commandments of men and turned against the fanaticism of the times, the more we find him emphasizing the objective authority of the Scriptures. By 1525 this

appeal to the Scriptures can be recognized as the formal principle of the Reformation, alongside of justification by faith as the essential principle; which however, as I shall show later, are not considered by Ritschl as the fundamental elements of the Reformation in such a sense as to be the constitutive principles for dogmatics. But after all this has been said, the Word of God with Luther was primarily the gospel, expressed both orally and in writing, and was closely connected with his new central ideas, and held within itself the germ of a new purely religious view of the Word of God. "Thou askest what is this Word," says Luther, ". . . since there are so many words of God. I answer, 'Paul in Romans i. makes it plain: namely, the gospel concerning the incarnate, suffering, rising Son of God.'" And in the preface to the New Testament: "If I must come short in one or the other, the works [miracles] or the preaching of Christ, I would rather come short in the works than the preaching. For the works [not His death and Resurrection] are of no help to me, but His words they give life. . . . This is the right touch-stone by which to try [these] books, whether they study Christ or not." In his *Table Talk* he says: "What matter is it whether Moses wrote Genesis or not. . . . All the Prophets of the Old Testament bear this name especially because they prophesy of Christ, much more than because they now and then foretell concerning kings and concerning worldly events, which they did of them-

selves, and often made mistakes. . . . But the foundation remains."

In this conception of the Scriptures as religious means, we find the idea also of Ritschl. But Ritschl nowhere in his writings uses such strong negatives as we have found Luther using. When we come to Ritschl's individual doctrines we shall see what was his treatment of the Bible. Enough has certainly been made clear as to Luther's earlier method, as to the central place given to faith in God's compassion, as to the historic Christ, the Trinity, and the Scriptures, to prepare the reader for Ritschl's positions on these points. He will find these ideas of Luther's appearing everywhere in Ritschl.

§ 6. CALVIN.

I. I now ask that we may do with Calvin what we have been trying to do with Luther, that is, find what it was which Ritschl sought and seemed to find in him. The kinship between them is hardly less close than that between Ritschl and Luther himself. Ritschl studied Calvin fundamentally, and he has not been backward in quoting him with approval. It has practically remained for Ritschl to rediscover him. Little or nothing apart from what Ritschl has done has been made of Calvin's practical employment of the inductive method, of his caution in going beyond the substantial content of revelation in Jesus Christ, and his emphatic shutting out of speculative questions concerning that

great realm which God has not made known to us.

II. We may begin by noting how Calvin in his completed theological system proceeds from a purely religious and not a cosmological or metaphysical conception of God: "By the knowledge of God I intend not merely a notion that there is such a Being, but also an acquaintance with what we ought to know concerning Him conducive to His glory and our benefit. . . . Cold and frivolous then are the speculations of those who employ themselves in disquisitions on the essence of God, when it would be more interesting to us to become acquainted with His character and to know what is agreeable to His nature. For what end is answered by professing with Epicurus that there is a God, who, discarding all concern about the world, indulges Himself in perpetual inactivity? What benefit arises from a knowledge of a God with whom we have no concern? . . . Nor can you have any clear view of Him without discovering Him to be the fountain and origin of all good. . . . He who thus knows Him, sensible that all things are subject to His control, confides in Him as his Guardian and Protector and unreservedly commits himself to His care. . . . Persuaded of His goodness and mercy he relies on Him with unlimited confidence, nor doubts of finding in Him clemency provided for all his ills. Knowing Him to be his Lord and Father he concludes that he ought to mark His government in all things, revere His majesty, endeavour to promote His glory, and obey His commands.

. . . He restrains himself from sin, not merely from a dread of vengeance, but because he loves and reveres God as his Father, honours and worships Him as his Lord, and, even though there were no hell, would shudder at the thought of offending Him. "See then," Calvin exclaims, "the nature of pure and genuine religion." ¹

In this one passage we have three elements which we are to find brought out clearly in Ritschl. First, the turning from the cosmological and metaphysical to the ethical and religious. Second, the use of the ethical as the measure of values. Third, the recognition of the fact that only in this way can we come to the possession of a religious life.

III. These conceptions will appear very clearly if we take a glance at the way in which Calvin treats of saving faith. It is not mere intellectual belief in God or knowledge about God. It is not a mere yielding to objective authority. "This is the true knowledge of Christ," he says,² "to receive Him as He is offered by the Father, that is, invested with His gospel: for as He is appointed to be the object of our faith, so we cannot advance in the right way to Him without the guidance of the gospel, . . . comprehending under this term the new kind of teaching by which Christ since His appearance as our Master has given a brighter display of the mercy of the Father. . . . Knowledge of the divine

¹ *Institutes of the Christian Religion* (6th American Ed.), I. pp. 49-51.

² *Institutes*, I. p. 493 f.

will indefinitely, ought not to be accounted faith. But suppose instead of will, the declaration of which is often productive of fear and sorrow, we substitute benevolence and mercy. This will certainly bring us nearer to the nature of faith." And he says again definitely in this connection: "The apprehension of faith is not confined to our knowing that there is a God, but chiefly consists in our understanding what is His disposition towards us. For it is not of so much importance to us to know what He is in Himself as what He is willing to be to us."

Here under Ritschl's guidance we discover the same conceptions we have already found in Luther. We are not to be interested in seeking to find what God is in Himself and for Himself alone, but in what He has openly made known in the historical revelation which comes to us through the gospel. And at the same time we find Calvin's argument based absolutely on a judgment of worth as clearly as we shall ever find it in Ritschl. And yet the very thing which is here being emphasized, as the reader will observe, is not subjectivism, but the very real and objective historical revelation. If this whole procedure is not objective, it would be difficult to conceive of anything which could be so.

IV. Observe again how the same principles are applied when we come to Calvin's treatment of the Christian life. He consciously turns from legal to psychological motives in a way that could hardly be more fundamental. "In the recommendation of righteousness the Scripture uses a great number of

very excellent arguments. . . . With what better foundation can it begin than when it admonishes us that we ought to be holy *because our God is holy?* . . . And as a further incitement to us, it shows that as God the Father has reconciled us to Himself in Christ, so He has exhibited to us *in Him* a pattern, to which it is His will that we shoud be conformed. . . . What can be required more than this one consideration? Indeed, what can be required besides? . . . The Scripture derives matter of exhortation from all the blessings of God which it recounts to us, and from all the parts of our salvation. It urges that since God has discovered Himself as a Father to us, we must be convicted of the basest ingratitude unless we on our part manifest ourselves to be His children. . . . These, I say, are the best foundations for the proper regulation of the life, such as we cannot find in the philosophers who in the recommendation of virtue never rise above the natural dignity of man.”¹

And the personal and psychological method is also just as consistently applied in the direction of man as we shall find it in Ritschl’s ethics. “There cannot be imagined a more certain rule,” says Calvin, “or a more powerful exhortation to the observance of it than when we are taught that all the blessings we enjoy are divine deposits committed to our trust on this condition, that they shall be dispensed for the benefit of our neighbours. . . . Let

¹ *Institutes*, I. p. 615 f.

this then be our rule for benignity and beneficence—that whatever God has conferred on us which enables us to assist our neighbour, we are the stewards of it and must one day render an account of our stewardship: and that the only right dispensation of what has been committed to us is that which is regulated by the law of love."

This personal emphasis is just that which Otto Ritschl thinks is the most important characteristic of his father's theology.

V. But I wish to give a fuller illustration of Calvin's caution in going beyond that which God has clearly made known to us in Jesus Christ, for which Ritschl has been so severely criticised because misunderstood. Beyond what is the revealed will of God Calvin is persistently agnostic, and he is never equivocal in the exposition of these views. With him the will of God is not God, but God in the process of actively revealing what is in Himself. When Calvin says that "the will of God is the highest rule of justice, so that what He wills must be just for this very reason, because *He* wills it,"¹ if the emphasis be placed on will this can only be done because it reveals God Himself. In other words, it is not the conception of God as power which is fundamental in Calvin. Cosmologically we can get no farther than will as first cause. But we must turn from philosophy to ethics and religion as revealed in the gospel. "What stronger reason," he says,

¹ *Institutes*, II. p. 165.

"can be alleged than when we are directed to consider who God is?" Here then is Calvin again consciously turning from the consideration of God as Cause to the ethical and revelation character of God as He can be discovered in Jesus Christ.

VI. The conception of God as First Cause is, it is true, treated at some length by Calvin. But I wish to call attention to his predestination doctrine in order to show how, instead of emphasizing the philosophical, as many Calvinists have done, he turns as completely from philosophy to revelation, as we have seen in the case of Luther. "We shall observe the best order if, in seeking an assurance of our election, we confine our attention to those subsequent signs which are certain attestations of it."¹ Would any critic venture to assert that Calvin does not actually find predestination revealed in these subsequent signs? Is he to be thought of as denying the objective reality of election because he asserts that attention is to be directed to these signs, or are these signs to him but empty phenomena? But we shall see that Ritschl has been condemned for the use of just this method which we may very well consider valuable in Calvin. "Satan never attacks believers with a more grievous or dangerous temptation," continues Calvin,² "than when he disquiets them with doubts of their election, and stimulates them to an improper desire of

¹ *Institutes*, II. p. 182.

² *Ibid.*

seeking it in a wrong way. I call seeking it in a wrong way when miserable man endeavors to force his way into the secret recesses of divine wisdom and to penetrate even to the highest eternity, that he may discover what is determined concerning him at the tribunal of God. Then he precipitates himself to be absorbed in the profound of an unfathomable gulf: then he entangles himself in numberless and inextricable snares: then he sinks himself in an abyss of total darkness!" That is Calvin, and Calvinists will hardly wish to repudiate him. But Albrecht Ritschl never stated with anything of this impetuosity of language his turning from philosophy and metaphysics, from the consideration of what God is in Himself, to what He has revealed Himself as being in the holy history.

VII. And now Calvin, in the most positive way, turns as did Luther before him, and Ritschl after him, to Christ as the revealer of God; and it comes with added emphasis from the fact of his having already shown the futile way of seeking God. "If we seek the fatherly clemency and the propitious heart of God, our eyes must be directed to Christ, in whom alone the Father is well pleased. If we seek salvation and life, and the immortality of the heavenly kingdom, recourse must be had to no other; for He alone is the Fountain of life, the Anchor of salvation, and the Heir of the kingdom of heaven. . . . The persons whom God has adopted as His children He is said to have chosen not in themselves, but in Christ. . . . But if we are

chosen in Him, we shall find no assurance for our election in ourselves; nor even in God the Father considered alone abstractedly from the Son. Christ, therefore, is the mirror in which it behooves us to contemplate our election. And here we may do it with safety.”¹ This is the climax then of Calvin’s theology, which has been missed by so many of his followers, and which it has remained for Ritschl to point out in its significance for theology.

VIII. And just here I wish to introduce one of Ritschl’s fundamental observations as to the central thought of both Luther’s and Calvin’s theology. It was when Ritschl was giving his dogmatics for the fourth time that he criticised the custom of making the two so-called principles of Protestantism valid as criteria for dogmatic theology, namely, Scripture as the formal principle, and justification by faith the essential principle. He points out, says Otto Ritschl,² “that the systematic, fundamental idea of Reformed or Calvinistic theology is not justification by faith, but eternal election in Christ: and that in Lutheran theology not all the other doctrines, such as the Lord’s Supper, for example, can be deduced from the doctrine of justification.” To Ritschl the fundamental doctrine of Lutheranism “is the absolute value of the person of Christ as the Revealer of God, in contrast to the secret will of election.”

Both Luther and Calvin will be found to be indis-

¹ *Institutes*, II. p. 183.

² *Leben*, II. p. 22 f.

pensable historical presuppositions to the understanding of Ritschl. And in the light of such a personal history it will be more difficult to misunderstand, and certainly more unsafe to misrepresent, those conceptions of Ritschl's which are so thoroughly evangelical in his most noted predecessors.

§ 7. SCHLEIERMACHER.

I. The unique position occupied by Schleiermacher, and the influence which he has exerted on the thought of Germany in general, can but make him of importance to the student of Ritschl. And yet Ritschl, after all, has differed from Schleiermacher in so many important respects that these variations are more significant than the points of agreement. How unlike Ritschl is that interest in Greek thought which made the deepest and most lasting impression on Schleiermacher's mode of thinking! Philosophical and æsthetical ideals were really the shaping moulds for all that he wrought. He has been called the Plato and Origen of Germany in the nineteenth century. Before preparing his epoch-making *Discourses on Religion*, his first theological work, he had "diligently pursued Kant and Aristotle, Fichte and Schelling, Spinoza and Plato, and had deeply felt the fascination of German Romanticism." When he became a teacher of theology and a popular preacher in Berlin, it was not to throw off philosophy, but to be led by it into the deeper elements of religion where all could be

unified and redeveloped. With him religion was as broad as the consciousness of man.

If Schleiermacher may be said to have had one predominant ideal, it was to establish a vital religious faith by means of a true scientific method. Any one at all familiar with the magnificent effort of the Middle Ages to employ the philosophy of that day in the expounding and establishing of church doctrines will remember the final breaking down of the effort, and the resulting confusion—after the Reformation, as well as before it. Such a one will realize that Schleiermacher's attempt to inaugurate a new Reformation by the use of a new scientific method must result in something very different from what was aimed at in the Middle Ages, and even different from what had been thus far accomplished on Reformation territory. Instead of beginning with the external doctrines, or with the realities of revelation, as we shall find with Ritschl, Schleiermacher struck into the vital elements at the heart of all religion. Only afterward did he come to Christianity. Those who have read into Ritschl the subjectivity of Schleiermacher have failed to give due weight to this fundamental difference between them.

II. When Schleiermacher comes to Christianity he finds, in harmony with his conception of religion, that the mediatorial element is that which is distinctive in it. "The deepest sense of the finite as it strives to reach the Unity of the Infinite Whole finds its solace in the mediatorial work of Christ." Here

then it is a philosophical ideal, and not one of revealed religion, which animated Schleiermacher. To be a Christian is to gain the consciousness through Christ that we are one with God, and to have the religious consciousness made superior to the carnal consciousness. This is certainly a valuable scientific explanation of what it is to be a Christian. But it is more in the spirit of Augustine than of Bernard and Luther. That is, the attention is directed toward the unrevealed God, and Christ is the means of becoming joined to this Mystic Whole; while in Ritschl God is really seen in the revealed Christ, toward whom the attention is drawn.

It is true that to Schleiermacher Christ is the only Mediator of the life in God and of the revelation of God, and in his scientific statement what distinguishes Christ from all other men is that "In His person the ideal type and the historical realization are absolutely blended and become identical. In Christ alone the consciousness of the ego has always been determined by the consciousness of God: in Him alone has the supreme Being dwelt in a perfect manner." Schleiermacher sees the divine nature of the Man of Nazareth in this perfect communion with God. Here is where the supernatural comes into his system. Ritschl holds to the same conception of Christ, but his method of thinking, as we shall see, is different. As to ordinary miracles, Schleiermacher does not need them, and miracle as a breach of natural law does not for him exist. But the resurrection of Christ is the ground

of the hope of an immortality for all. Ritschl positively affirms miracle, but not as a violation of natural law,—the resurrection of Christ is not a violation of natural law. But the resurrection of Christ has more meaning in Ritschl's theology, as we shall see, than Schleiermacher gives to it.

III. That which in the view of Schleiermacher is to establish the church and keep faith burning in the world, is the realistic presence of Christ Himself in the church, which is made into a fellowship by the one common Holy Spirit. This idea of the community of believers animated by one Spirit is one of the greatest of Schleiermacher's conceptions, but he does not make of it what is made by Ritschl, who expressed himself as disappointed with Schleiermacher's *Glaubenslehre* because when Schleiermacher had seemed to hold this fundamental view in his possession he made no fundamental use of it. The documents of the New Testament with them both are not formal, but normative authorities, because these documents are themselves the products of the early Christian community. But Schleiermacher's view that the Old Testament has nothing for the Christian community is very different from the estimate we shall see put upon it by Ritschl. They both agree that it is only in the community and in its service that the activity of man acquires a truly moral value, so that Christian morality and Christian ethics are both the products of religious faith.

IV. Otto Ritschl has very well said that Schleier-

macher, above all others, has opened up numberless new points of view by means of which the understanding of Christianity has been essentially advanced. And that he was able to do this for the reason that he never so far lost sight of practical Christianity as to allow his theories to become resultless in meaning for practical life. And he adds:¹ "So far as persons have allowed themselves to be led by the Hegelian philosophy into speculations which are connected only by slender threads with the concrete realities of Christian praxis they have lost, to a greater or less degree, the firm foothold of facts, which one never loses without suffering for it." It is just this concrete praxis which we shall find pre-eminent in Ritschl, in distinction from the speculative tendencies and the subjectivism of those whom Ritschl always thought of as only superficial followers of Schleiermacher.

Both Schleiermacher and Ritschl then were positive and constructive. They sought to re-establish a living faith. Schleiermacher by a method of philosophic assurance, Ritschl by revealed relations. Schleiermacher was dominated by philosophical ideals even in his treatment of the realities of revelation. Ritschl was always a student of the holy history and sought his companionship among the leaders in the church rather than among the disciples of Greece and Rome. Ritschl was not without inspiration from Schleiermacher's fundamental

¹ *Leben*, II. p. 181.

and vitalizing thoughts, and yet he is so much unlike him in the sphere in which he has done his work, that we may practically leave Schleiermacher out of our consideration when we are not speaking of unconscious development. Ritschl is a church theologian and must be judged by what we find in the theologians of the church. If the student of Schleiermacher finds it difficult to state in concrete terms the many-sided influences that have come from him, the student of Ritschl will find a simpler task. And it will prove simpler in just so far as one turns from an attempt to find in Ritschl the subjectivism of Schleiermacher and seeks in him the religious lines already indicated in Calvin, Luther and Bernard.

CHAPTER III.

PRESUPPOSITIONS FOR AN UNDERSTANDING OF RITSCHL FROM PHILOSOPHY.

§ 8. RITSCHL AND PHILOSOPHY.

I. So much has been said about Ritschl's relation to philosophy that it will be important for us to see just what his position is. It is certainly true that Ritschl conceives of the supernatural revealed in the kingdom of God, as so completely superior to the testimony from cosmology that a merely philosophical view of the world has for him no place in Christian theology. Not cosmos or the natural world, but ethics and the kingdom of God, are to establish the greatness of Christianity. It is not philosophy as philosophy, about which he is concerned, but philosophy when occupying a place in Christian theology; or, in other words, the changing of theology from the sphere of the revealed to that of the unrevealed. "Theology," says Ritschl,¹ "performs its task in showing the Christian view of the world and of human life, under the direction

¹ *R. u. V.*, III. p. 24.

of the Christian idea of God, and according to the purpose of the salvation of man in the kingdom of God, and doing this completely and clearly, in whole and in part, and in the reciprocal relation of the parts. It will appropriate neither a direct nor an indirect proof of the truth of Christian revelation by seeking to show that it is in agreement with any philosophical or legal view of the world. For Christianity stands in direct contrast to these, and however often in the systems of Monistic Idealism their agreement with Christianity has been asserted and its leading conceptions have been worked out from the philosophical point of view, nevertheless the contrast of Christianity even to these has always appeared anew."

Understand here, that Ritschl is not wishing to throw away really valuable demonstrations of the truth of Christianity, but he is earnestly seeking for what he considers the highest possible demonstration. For he sees that the highest proof for the truth of Christianity can only be found in the line of thought already pointed out by Spener, that he who will do the will of God shall know that the message of Christ is true. In other words, to Ritschl Christianity is to find its proof only where the knowledge of it is put on a different plane from nature and its laws. "The subordination of ethics to the conception of cosmos," he declares,¹ "is always the characteristic of a heathen view of the world, before

¹ *R. u. V.*, III. p. 25.

which Christianity does not receive its fair right and never succeeds in justifying itself. Even when such an explanation of the world is undertaken from a conception of God it carries no assurance of proving the truth of Christianity." Has he then a feebler or a richer view of Christianity, if this is his line of argument? Evidently a richer, for he says, "Christianity involves the placing of ethics upon a different plane in respect to worth from the natural world, for the reason that blessedness, as the highest and dominating conception of worth for men, is connected with *participation in the kingdom of God and dominion over the world.*" No one who gains a conception of what Ritschl means by the kingdom of God and dominion over the world, can doubt the significance of his line of thought, or will fail to agree with him "that the Christian ideal of life, and no other, will satisfy the human spirit in its demand for knowledge." And the kind of knowledge which Ritschl here emphasizes will have meaning only to those who themselves have experienced something of its deep meaning. Ritschl, therefore, in turning from the presentation of God as He is found in philosophy is not seeking to get away from the God of nature. But he sees in the kingdom of God and the Christian citizenship in that kingdom, in its ethics and religion, the points from which, and from which alone, the incontrovertible proofs are to arise. He turns away from the old philosophies, not because the results for theology found there are too full of God to meet his purpose, but

because he finds them practically useless according to the best measure of values.

II. To Ritschl, metaphysical inquiry applied to nature and to spirit, as things, to be analyzed for the purpose of finding out what they are in themselves, can, from the nature of the case, have no great value for Christian theology. Ritschl, indeed, freely grants that metaphysical conceptions do aid in the classification of knowledge. But what he objects to is the ranking of metaphysics above experimental knowledge. For he cannot grant that through these metaphysical inquiries we are able to obtain a more fundamental and valuable knowledge of spiritual forces than is obtained through the ethical judgments. Only this psychological and ethical kind of knowledge reaches to the actuality of the spiritual life, for, as he urges, the purely metaphysical determination of a spiritual force is not able to distinguish it from a natural force; just as human consciousness itself cannot perceive the Divine Spirit directly, but only indirectly through the results discoverable in the moral and ethical fruits of the Spirit. And so Ritschl seems wisely to say that the metaphysical knowledge of the nature and peculiarity of spirit, is not what we are after in theology, and therefore this knowledge must be "insufficient and to this extent valueless."¹

"The Aristotelian God is similar only to the fate which ruled also over the gods themselves; and

¹ *Theol. u. Met.*, p. 6.

while this thought has a monotheistic appearance, it is really the negation of religion. Where it attained to validity among the Greeks it expressed despair as to the religion practised by them; that is, the inevitable premonition that the gods, who were part of nature, had not the power to fulfil the expectations cherished of them by their worshippers.”¹

Ritschl’s estimate of metaphysics in the study of God then is just this, that if by the term God a conscious personality is meant, then the thought of God does not belong to the field of metaphysics as it has been defined. For to Ritschl “The proofs for the existence of God conducted by the purely metaphysical method do not lead to the forces whose representation is given in Christianity, but [merely] to conceptions of a world-unity, which conceptions are neutral as regards all religion. This application of metaphysics must therefore be excluded from theology if its positive and peculiar nature is to be maintained.”² In other words, Ritschl sets aside the cosmological argument as resultless in presenting a Christian view of the world, for the reason that the cosmological argument consists only in this, “that it conceives of things as causes and results apart from their distinction as nature and spirit,” and for the reason that “the cosmological argument as a metaphysical line of thought actually leads only to the idea of the *world as the substance*

¹ *Theol. u. Met.*, p. 8.

² *R. u. V.*, III. p. 17.

of all things, the one thing in all phenomena." So that Ritschl concludes that "If a Christian goes into the metaphysical knowledge of God, he gives up in so doing his Christian point of view and takes a standpoint which in general corresponds to the plane of paganism, for paganism makes divine beings out of forces which according to the Christian measure belong to the world."¹

III. But Ritschl not only states his dissatisfaction with the supposed religious results obtained by philosophy, he also explains very clearly what he finds in the content of the Christian view of the world. In his *Theology and Metaphysics* he recognizes what he had earlier set forth,² "that the assertion of the personality of God only completely grounds the world-view which belongs to the Christian community, when it contains the content of love, and implies the direction of this will toward the kingdom of God, or to the eternally loved Son of God. Within these limits everything else which is important in the conception of God is to be found."³ Ritschl says that he had confidence "that every one would recognize in the conception of love to which this relation, this world-embracing purpose is ascribed, that content which suitably fills out the name of God: . . . I have declared that God is love, in so far as He makes His self-end in the forming of the human race into the kingdom

¹ *Theol. u. Met.*, p. 9.

² In *R. u. V.*, III. p. 242.

³ *Theol. u. Met.*, p. 14 f.

of God, as the supramundane end of man himself. . . . The kingdom of God, to be formed from men, is thus the correlation of the divine self-end, and is the end of the creation and the direction of the world.”¹

Here, then, Ritschl gives us a glimpse of what he means by the kingdom of God for which the worlds are made and conducted. He is not treating of love as hidden in the Divine Being, but revealed in the very concrete objective kingdom of God. And if it be love, it must come from a concrete, objective personality with all that such a kingdom of God presupposes. “For love,” says Ritschl,² “is only thinkable in connection with an object, and personality only in peculiar relations of the spiritual life to the world and to other persons. If the Absolute, which is the isolated thing without quality, is to be thought of with such predicates, either the subject [that is, God as the Christian thinks of Him] is denied by them, or it is not possible to maintain these predicates for the accepted subject [that is, for the Absolute as seen in philosophy]. Of course,” he adds, “one can say anything, even that a thing that has no relations to anything else has or is love to others. But this talk has no meaning.” Now take these words of Ritschl concerning God and the kingdom of God—than which you will hardly find in literature more significant ones for the establishing of confidence in religion—and place these side

¹ *Theol. u. Met.*, p. 18.

² *Ibid.*, p. 27.

by side with those of Professor Wenley's criticism of Ritschl: "With Ritschl God exists only when he is recognized as an ethical starting-point. He need have no personality, nor need he possess any attribute save love."¹ And again: "On the Ritschlian principles God is not even a source of power, for the assumption is that nothing is known of Him: there is no attachment of reality, yet He is treated for the moment as if He were real."² It is not surprising that Professor Wenley should find that the difficulty of fairly estimating Ritschl's standpoint, to use his own language, "becomes serious."

Having now taken this glance at Ritschl's attitude to philosophy in general, and by these quotations from him seen something of his method of treatment, we are to examine somewhat more minutely into the subject, through the consideration of the theories of knowledge and judgments of value, found first in Lotze, and then in Ritschl himself.

§ 9. HERMANN LOTZE.

I. As Ritschl and Lotze have been yoked together in a common condemnation as to certain points, we may examine them together in this exposition. An attempted criticism of the philosophy, or the theories of knowledge, used by them will not be

¹ *Contemporary Theology and Theism*, p. 102.

² p. 122.

called for any further than to determine whether for the religious student they are theologically dangerous. The question whether Ritschl and Lotze are dangerous theological teachers concerns us more than whether they have presented us with the ultimate philosophy in every respect. We probably await such a philosophy.

To understand Lotze is to have a valuable key for the understanding of Ritschl's theory of knowledge, and what have been called his judgments of worth.¹ Let it be clearly grasped from the outset that Lotze is not a subjective Idealist. His theory of knowledge cannot be twisted into subjectivism. He is too clear and too forcible here to be misunderstood. According to Lotze we not only know phenomena, but we know reality in phenomena. "The attempt," he says,² "to regard the image of the world as a native production of the mind alone has always been speedily given up again by scientific instinct." But he declares that³ "though limited in this way to phenomena, yet knowledge is not devoid of all connection with what really exists. For we are not justified in complaining as if it were so elusive that a mere appearance only is shown to us. . . . Or, to speak plainly, every appearance presupposes as the necessary condition of its appearing a real being, in the inner relations

¹ *Leben*, II. pp. 20, 145. Compare also p. 389. See especially Dr. O. Ritschl's pamphlet *Ueber Werthurtheile*.

² *Microcosmus* (4th Eng. Ed.), II. p. 347.

³ *Mic.*, II. p. 348 f.

of which lie the grounds that determine the form of its appearing." And again he declares that "to establish by arbitrary conjunction relations which have no foundation in the content of the things conjoined would be not thought but mental aberration: even a relation of comparison must in so far as it is correct have its root in the actual condition of that which is compared. If we compare things as contrary, or greater, or smaller, it is not our comparison that makes them contrary, greater or smaller, but the things compared actually had these relations to one another before we came to consider them, and the relations are found, not invented by our thought."¹

And yet note here Professor Wenley's estimate of Lotze in which he very strangely represents him as asserting "that we cannot know reality."² And he declares that Ritschl does not clearly perceive that for Lotze "things are no more than phenomena." It hardly seems credible that Professor Wenley should be unwilling to give due weight to what Lotze certainly makes emphatic, that reality is just what we do know, *but not apart from phenomena*.

II. While Lotze emphasizes the fact that we know things in their phenomena, he is no less positive in his insistence that we do not know things as they exist in themselves apart from phenomena, that is, apart from what in some way is objectively revealed to us. So that we are to become scientific,

¹ *Mic.*, II. p. 587. Compare pp. 354-357.

² *Contemp. Theol. and Theism*, p. 90.

not by attempting to push metaphysical analysis into the realm of the unrevealed, but in directing it to the consideration of that which is historically given us. We shall find very clearly brought out in Lotze where he draws his line of agnosticism and the use he makes of judgments of worth.

What is good or evil in itself apart from phenomena Lotze declares "remains just as incapable of being reached by mere thought as what is blue or sweet. It is only when we have learned by immediate feeling what is the presence of worth and of unworth in the world, and the gravity of the difference between them, that our thought is able from the content thus experienced to develop signs which subsequently enable us to bring any particular case under the one or the other of these two universal intuitions [of goodness or badness]."¹ For he says "the question as to what any particular object is, is always answered by us in the first place by a description, which further reflection, however, very soon shows to contain mere indications of what the object does or undergoes. Nay, all the supersensible attributes by which we later try to define the nature of things, when examined more closely, invariably transform themselves into propositions as to what they do under certain conditions, or as to events that take place between them. However clear any theory may make the whole tissue of these natural relations between things, they them-

¹ *Mic.*, II. p. 357.

selves, the fixed points which enter into this network, or from which its threads proceed, remain wholly unknown as to what they are in themselves.”¹ And then by way of illustration he proceeds to assert the reality of our knowledge as seen in the study of the soul’s manifestation of itself. “If the nature of the soul as it is, prior to all development by means of external influences, eludes our knowledge . . . our knowledge does not in consequence suffer much loss. For . . . in what the soul becomes in the course of its development lies its essential content, with which alone we are concerned. . . . In fact we could not have looked for a clearer comprehension of the soul’s essential nature from a revelation of what it is before this life. . . . The question then as to how existence and action come to be, we pronounced absurd. The desire, on the other hand, to know what the soul is apart from its development, appeared to us superfluous. . . . As regards the second point no insight into what the soul performs in its development would wholly satisfy us unless we had some guarantee that in the part of its development which we know, the whole depth of its being is displayed.”

There seems, then, to be no ground for even a suspicion of subjective illusion in Lotze. He affirms historical reality in the most positive terms. If, therefore, Professor Wenley had said that Lotze and Ritschl hold that common *scientific* knowledge

¹ *Mic.*, I. p. 543 f.

is confined to phenomena, it would have been a correct representation of their position, and also an incontrovertible one. But to say that according to Lotze "we cannot know reality" is to state a historical untruth. It must therefore be pronounced a false interpretation that seeks to explain Lotze and Ritschl on the basis of Platonic idealism instead of in the light of Aristotelian science. For it was Plato who held that in the individual thing we have only the picture of the idea, that is, only a phenomenon without reality, while Aristotle built solidly upon the individual as that in which we learn to know the idea.

III. I wish now to call attention to Lotze's conception of the meaning and order of the world, that we may see his judgments of worth in his explanation of the good. "There can be no body of facts, no arrangement of things, no course of destiny apart from the end and meaning of the whole from which each part has received not only existence but also the active nature in which it glories." "After all, what satisfaction could the theory [of the unbroken causal chain of mechanism] afford if it were unable to unite the two great contrasting parts that together make up the world-nature and the sphere of ethics? . . . If we will not . . . either externally ground the moral world on a nature originally given or assume that the two separate roots [of nature and ethics] coexist without any bond in a supreme Being that we call One, no other choice remains than to include the good in the cycle of

natural phenomena, or Nature in the accomplishment of Good. I cannot for a moment doubt," he says, "that the latter alternative is alone permissible. That is, to conceive of Nature in the accomplishment of Good. All beings, all that we call mode and form, thing and content, the whole sum of Nature, can be nothing else than the condition for the realization of good, can be as it is only because thus in it the infinite worth of the Good manifested itself."¹

Here in this emphasis of the worth meaning of the natural we have no undervaluation of the natural, but we are prepared to see it in a new relation to the more glorious good. Nature is more than the mere going round of the wheels. But Lotze's ethical and moral have nothing more of the visionary in them than has the physical.

¹ *Mic.*, I. p. 396. See also before this (pp. 244-250) where he shows that even in theoretical judgments it is the *worth elements which give the sense of reality*:—"If we are equally unwilling to attribute to the universe either the finitude of a fixed quantity, or absolute infinity; if we require that its conception be that of a whole and an essentially complete unit, and at the same time that it should include all individuals, we follow in this and other requirements no longer the mere inclination of an uninterested *understanding* to which an object would be unthinkable without these conditions, but the *inspirations of a reason appreciative of worth*, that rejects even the thinkable so long as it is only thinkable, and does not, besides, by the inherent excellence of its content, win recognition of its worth in the world."

IV. It only remains, in one or two brief quotations,¹ to trace the development of our subject in Lotze's full presentation of the psychological as we see it in the sphere of personal spirits. "Actions are not good simply as events that occur, nor their results simply as facts that have been accomplished—it is only the will from which the actions proceed that is good. . . . Good and good things do not exist as such independent of the feeling, willing and knowing mind: *they have reality only as the living movements of such a mind.* What is good in itself is some felt bliss: what we call good things are means to this good. . . . The only thing that is really good is that Living Love which wills the blessedness of others. And it is just *this* that is the good-in-itself for which we are seeking. . . . No kind of unsubstantial, unrealized and yet eternally valid necessity, neither a realm of truth nor a realm of worth, is prior as the initial reality: but that reality which is Living Love unfolds itself in one movement, which for finite cognition appears in the three aspects of the good which is its end, the consecutive impulse by which this is realized, and the conformity to law with which this impulse keeps in the path that leads toward its end." "If this eternal sacredness and supreme worth of love were not at the foundation of the world, and if in such a case there *could be* a world of which we could think and

¹ *Mic.*, II. pp. 720-728.

speak, this world, it seems to me, would, whatever it were, be left without truth and order.”¹

The true reality then, according to Lotze, “is not matter and is still less idea, but is the living Personal Spirit of God and the world of personal spirits which He has created. They only are the place in which Good and good things exist.” These are certainly sober and noble words, and the goal to which they have brought us is just that to which we have already found ourselves brought by other means in Luther and Calvin. But the task which I have set before myself does not require the defence in any smallest measure of Lotze as a theist or a philosopher. Our present inquiry has only to do with whether he affirms or denies reality, and whether his judgments of worth are subjective or objective. And is it not clear that, although love and good have no objective existence, *apart from* living persons, the student of Lotze will find it impossible to give them a merely subjective or visionary definition? *Being inseparably connected with living persons* they are as real and objective as the persons themselves. And in the same manner we are able to see that judgments of worth are just as valid determinations of reality in the world of spirits as

¹ In closing his third book on *Metaphysics* he says:—“When, now several decades since, I ventured on a still more imperfect attempt, I closed it with the dictum that the true beginning of Metaphysic lies in Ethics. . . . I still feel certain of being on the right track, when I seek in that which *should* be the ground of that which *is*.”

are the decisions of the groceryman in the material world when he parcels out his merchandise by the use of iron weights.

And Lotze, let it be observed, is just the one with whom Ritschl has declared himself in agreement as to his theory of knowledge. To this subject we are now ready to proceed.

§ 10. RITSCHL'S THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE.

I. Ritschl has been criticised for proposing to reject metaphysics while yet advocating a special theory of knowledge for theology. I wish to show just what he thought of the necessity of having a theory of knowledge, and what his own theory of knowledge came to be. And certainly no one will be disposed to deny that the theory of knowledge employed will have a great deal to do in determining not only the value of the method, but also the value of the concrete, doctrinal results which can be brought logically into dogmatic use.

Note here two things by way of preliminary remark. In the first place, Ritschl declares a theory of knowledge to be necessary for scientific theology. For he says emphatically that "Every theologian as a scientific man is under necessity or obligation to proceed according to a definite theory of knowledge of which he himself is conscious and which he must justify." And note second, that Ritschl recognizes the fact that in using a theory of knowledge he is using a metaphysical aid. "It

is an inconsiderate and incredible assertion," he says,¹ "that I exclude all metaphysics from theology. . . . I follow a theory of knowledge which, in the determination of the objects of knowledge, is governed by a conception of the thing, and consequently it is metaphysical. Consequently the controversy between Luthardt and myself when rightly formulated is only as to what metaphysics is justified in theology." How, therefore, is Ritschl to justify his own consistency when he asks for the rejection of metaphysics from religion? His position is simply this: He considers a theory of knowledge to be a matter for the scientific theologian in arranging his material, but it is not of fundamental relation to religion itself. Indeed, to Ritschl "Christianity as a religion is neutral as regards all the different theories of knowledge by which its content of thought may be scientifically arranged."² Otto Ritschl says that his father's theory of knowledge may be understood as a protest against the custom of fixing *a priori* distinctions as if they were final differences. "In all the scientific apparatus of theology the theory of knowledge is, according to Ritschl's view, farthest removed from the content of Christian and theological conviction."³ It is because it is a regulative factor that it becomes of special didactic value. And his father was fond of using it in making clear certain didactic points

¹ *Theol. u. Met.*, p. 38.

² *Ibid.*, p. 43.

³ *Leben*, II. p. 185.

of controversy. But he thinks it absurd to consider its rules as constitutive principles of theology "when, after all, it is only the *primal law of knowledge which is in force in all science.*"

II. Let us now see what Ritschl's theory of knowledge is as he uses it negatively and positively. He emphasizes, just as we have seen done by Lotze, the fact that we do not know things in themselves apart from phenomena. He therefore objects to what he considers a mistake in the common view. For he says:¹ "The popular view draws the conclusion that the things which exist can, by the subsequent exact representation and investigation, be so conceived as they are in themselves. This fixed distinction between things as they are in themselves, out of relation to our sensation and perception and *their existence for us*, is a mistake in the popular view. For here that is separated which, according to the origin of the process, belongs together. To the relations in which we recognize the existence of things at all belongs necessarily and infallibly also their relation to us as the subjects of the sensation, perception, representation." And he uses illustrations very much after the manner of Lotze. "When we affirm of an apple that it is red, round, sweet, the meaning is that we know the subject of this proposition only in its predicates. If we could leave these out of consideration, or could forget them, then the thing also which we have learned

¹ *Theol. u. Met.*, p. 31.

to know under these characteristics would fall out of our knowledge." And he proceeds to an important application of his theory. "If God belongs to the objects of knowledge for *scientific theology*, every claim that we can learn something of God in Himself, which is recognizable for us apart from a revelation which He has in some way made and which is perceived and experienced by us, is without sufficient ground."¹ But what is this but a scientific way of saying exactly what we saw in the religious method of Luther and Calvin?

But observe now on the positive side that while we do not know things in themselves apart from their manifestations, we do know them in their manifestations. Nothing would be more fatal to a right understanding of Ritschl than to suppose that he does not hold to the reality of the things themselves. He says very clearly that "The sensations mediated by our senses are the first and last proof of the fact that *the things* which we perceive in the sensations which they excite *exist or are actual*."² Deliver us from the petty exegesis which would throw this very plain and significant statement into nonsense by trying to make it say that there is no thing in existence except what is shut up in the subjective sensation in our own mind. And Ritschl in this same connection quotes Lotze and says:³ "Metaphysics has not to make reality but

¹ *Theol. u. Met.*, p. 36.

² *Ibid.*, p. 30.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 37.

to recognize it, to investigate the inner arrangement of that which is given, not to derive that which is given from that which is not given." And in another place he says:¹ "For the doctrine of things it is presupposed that our ego is not of itself the cause of the impressions, perceptions, etc., but that these peculiar activities of the soul are awakened in connection with things to which also the human body belongs." These are the fundamental and universal views of Ritschl on this subject, and one can rest his weight upon them. With them Ritschl is consistent with himself, or, as Otto Ritschl has said, "aus einem Guss." Without them you have the mysterious enigma of the critics.

III. Ritschl's own theory becomes very clear when he distinguishes it from several others which he finds in common use. He shows us how, in European thought, we have to do with three forms of the knowledge of the thing. "The first arose from the suggestion of Plato, and is at home in the circle of scholasticism. So far as its influence reaches [and he thinks the Platonic theory has the general right of way with most of us], we have the representation that the thing *works upon us* indeed, by its changing characteristics, and arouses our sensation and perception, but that the thing as a constant unity of properties is *at rest behind* the characteristics. The simplest example of this view in scholastic dogmatics is the explanation of the

¹ *R. u. V.*, III. p. 18.

being and properties of God, and of the workings of God upon the world and for the salvation of humanity. Here we see the peculiarity of this knowledge that one assumes to know the thing in itself before its workings. . . . The mistake of this determination of the thing or of this object of knowledge is evident in the contradiction . . . that the resting thing is represented in a portion of space back of that in which its assumed characteristics appear. So that it is made impossible to understand these phenomena as characteristics of the thing itself, which by this theory is separated from them.”¹

“The second form of the theory of knowledge is that which is made use of by Kant, in which, while he limits our intellectual knowledge to the worldly phenomena, he yet declares the thing in itself, or things in themselves, in whose mutual changes the changes in the world of phenomena are grounded, to be unknowable.” But, says Ritschl, “A world of phenomena can be made the object of our knowledge only when we accept at the same time that in them something actual, namely the thing, is manifest to us, or is the cause of our sensation and perception. Otherwise the phenomenon would have to be treated as only an appearance.” Here, then, is Ritschl actually in the very positive business of rejecting what he supposes to be Kant’s theory, for the very reason that it would make the real things unknowable. And yet, not to mention

¹ *R. u. V.*, III. p. 19 f.

Professor Wenley again, we have Professor Scott in his *Nicene Theology* anathematizing Ritschl because when Ritschl takes us back to Christ "we are met at once by a theory of knowledge which makes him but a phenomenon."¹

The third form of the theory of cognition is that set forth by Lotze, which we have already examined. We know things in their phenomena, so far as these phenomena can express them, "with which theory," says Ritschl, "I agree."

IV. And now I wish to give an extract or two for the purpose of illustrating how Ritschl applies his theory of knowledge in the practical psychology of the Christian life. "Weiss and Luthardt," he says,² "proclaim their inclination to metaphysics in the proposition that the reality of the human spirit is not found in willing (which of course includes its knowing and its self-consciousness), but that we have to think of the real, actual being behind, or under, or over these functions, in a form of objectivity which is peculiar to its nature." Now, says Ritschl, "They have not made this idea clearer: neither have they proved . . . that this idea which they have of man, that this hovering conception is reality, and a more convincing reality than the function in which every one in part experiences and in part manifests his own reality. They think that they are only asserting an unquestioned fact of tradition. But the proof I ask for [that is, that

¹ *Nicene Theology*, p. 20, note.

² *Theol. u. Met.*, p. 44 f.

the phenomena and the thing belong to each other] they will not be able to furnish. . . . The elementary conception of the spiritual life as a real thing, is only a preparation for recognising the *peculiar reality of the spirit in the peculiar functions of feeling, knowing, willing*—and especially willing. Further, we can point out no operations of others upon the human spirit except within the circumference of the active and conscious sensation which is the material for the expressible self-consciousness of the ego—the directing line for all knowledge and the occasion for the recognition of the motives of willing. In this circumference of the reality of the spiritual life alone can the operations of God which religion establishes also be understood. But as we can understand even God only in His operations upon us, which correspond to His open revelation, *so we recognize in these operations the presence of God for us.*" But this emphasizes the objective history of revelation as it is hardly emphasized by any other theologian.

V. And now, at the risk of anticipating what is to be seen in Ritschl's treatment of special doctrines, I conclude this part of the subject with another illustration. "Thus," says Ritschl,¹ "what we constitute religiously as the operation of God or of Christ within us is not guaranteed to us by the distance but by the presence of these authors of our salvation. For God punishes me in repentance:

¹ *Theol. u. Met.*, p. 47.

Christ comforts me, encourages me, in that I experience the value of His example or am governed by the motives which, gathered together in His person as it is present before me, make Him the author and finisher of my faith."

Here, then, truly is the emphasis not on the distance and the non-reality of God in Jesus Christ, but their reality and their presence. Would you have supposed that this absolute realism could have ever meant to any critic nothing but the subjective work of the individual memory? How superficially must one have pursued Ritschl's theology and with what lack of profit, to have left out of it this "person of Christ, present before me," and found in it nothing but the ordinary mental machinery engaged with an idea of its own production!

CHAPTER IV.

RITSCHL'S CONCEPTION OF PARTICULAR CHRISTIAN DOCTRINES.

§ II. THE BIBLE.

I. To attempt to explain Ritschl from the point of view of philosophy alone, or even from the point of view of theological method in itself considered, as if Ritschl were like Schleiermacher unique in this respect, would be to get but a partial view of that very method. Ritschl, of all theologians, has most fundamentally emphasized the historical. His theory of knowledge itself implies, as we have seen, just this emphasis of the historical over the metaphysical. To attempt, therefore, to explain Ritschl apart from the objective content of historical revelation would be about as successful as to try to estimate Darwin without the fact of species, or the geology of Lyell without the earth. Ritschl is not only one of the foremost students of historical theology, he is pre-eminently a Biblical theologian. This ought to be reassuring to those who have been made to believe that Ritschl would lead them astray

from the objective facts of historical revelation into a world of subjective illusions.

Let us now see what, according to Ritschl's view, is the Christian Bible. We shall find that for him the source-point in history from which the study of Christianity must be directed is the New Testament. He says quite conclusively here that "The theology which is to set forth the authentic content of the Christian religion in a positive form"—and you will observe that the positive character of Christian theology is that about which he is always deeply concerned—"has to obtain the same from the books of the New Testament and from no other source."¹ And just before making this statement he had declared that the authentic knowledge of the Christian religion and revelation, which theology is directly called upon to gain for the purpose of directing the instruction of the church, "can only be obtained from original documents which stand near the foundation epoch of the Christian church."² Now, this foundation epoch of Christianity embraces "not only the personal work of Christ, but also the first generation of His community." And Ritschl makes this position fundamental because without this definite result "the purpose of the Founder could not be recognized as effective." The original documents of this effective revelation are the books of the New Testament, "for the reason that the oral tradition of Christ and His Apostles

¹ *R. u. V.*, II. p. 18.

² *Ibid.*, p. 13.

is either laid down in the Gospels and stands in accord with the Epistles, or we should have to regard it as having died away and been lost." And he further adds that "The exclusive validity of these books as authentic documents of the Christian religion might have been established by the very fact that the first authors of the following generation actually and fundamentally recognised the standard authority of the books of the New Testament by the reproduction of ideas of apostolic origin, and that succeeding theology cannot do otherwise." If this is some of the dust which Lichtenberger says¹ Ritschl would throw into the reader's eyes, one must certainly confess that it comes in masses of the size of the planet Jupiter.

II. But now what of the Old Testament, which cannot be left out of some kind of consideration by the modern theologian? And here we find that Ritschl has just as positive views as on any other subject. To him the Old Testament is necessary to an understanding of the New Testament. For he finds Christ going back of Pharisaic legalism, to the living religion of the prophets of the Old Testament. The religious element in the Old and in the New he finds of a piece, so that Christ's historical continuity with the past is here made clear.

Ritschl's correlation of the Old and New Testaments is very clearly stated by Otto Ritschl. "The comprehensive method of Ritschl," he says,²

¹ *History of German Theol. in Nineteenth Century*, p. 584.

² *Leben*, II. p. 169.

“deals, on the one hand, with the relation of the New Testament to the Old Testament, and, on the other, with the different lines of thought existing in the New Testament. In both respects such an understanding of original Christianity is supposed to be obtained by this method that in the picture gained by it there appears at the same time a reliable view of the Christian revelation of God [that is, in the New Testament], of which systematic theology has imperative need as something fundamental for its ends. Thus the canonicity of the New Testament is presupposed and established by the theory which was earlier advanced—that the New Testament writings differ from later Christian literature in possessing a *homogeneous* comprehension of the Old Testament. For the classic form in the Israelitish religion is the religious soil presupposed by original Christianity. From this follows the proposition that the New Testament is to be expounded by the Old. ‘He who neglects to perfect himself in the theology of the Old Testament,’ says Ritschl, ‘is not fitted to expound the New.’ . . . Christianity stands in continuity with the line of thought of Old Testament prophecy and a corresponding piety of which the Psalms are the expression.” Along with this I give another quotation of similar import. It is the same view of history which determined Ritschl’s judgment as to the connection of the canonical Testaments. “For if the New Testament is to be understood by means of the Old, the ground of this demand is only the

religious similarity of the original Christianity with the religion of the prophets, to which Christ referred back in order to invalidate the ruling Pharisaism of His time. Thus in the agreement in piety is evident the historical continuity of the religious development.”¹

Here is certainly a vital and fundamental connection indicated between the Old and New Testaments. And yet the author of *Nicene Theology* says² that the extreme Christocentric view of Ritschl’s theology “leads this school of necessity to reject the Old Testament as a revelation—in spite of Christ’s own words to the contrary.” Which seems to be exactly the reverse of Ritschl’s argument and his own conclusions drawn from it.

III. It is important to note also how Ritschl’s method will lead him to handle the Scriptures. While he will explain the New Testament from the Old, it is by no means his purpose, as we have already seen, to carry out this principle in an external and mechanical way. As we shall later see, he clearly draws the limit within which the agreement between the two collections of documents moves, in order also clearly to indicate the change which the Old Testament conceptions experienced in Christianity.

And when Ritschl comes to the formation of a theological system from this early historical material he considers the doctrinal norm of the Lutheran

¹ *Leben*, II. p. 170.

² p. 18.

Church as presenting still another special standard: that is, "It pledges theology to the Holy Scriptures in so far, as Luther says, as this deals with Christ, and therefore in the *complex of the direct presentation of human salvation.*"¹ But it does not pledge it to take into the theology devoted to the service of the church all the convictions and social arrangements of the oldest Christian community which any one presumably, or actually, finds in the New Testament [for example, double predestination because thought to be recognized by Paul; communism founded on the first community at Jerusalem; the near appearance of Christ and the beginning of the millennial reign, etc.]." So that Ritschl understands that, according to the Lutheran point of view, "All the necessary doctrines of salvation must be grounded on the Holy Scriptures as regards their material, but that not all the original Christian hopes and social forms are to be considered as necessary parts of Christian theology." In other words, the vagaries into which objective literalism would logically lead are, by his religious view, very effectively avoided, and always left easily behind in the natural course of ethical development.

When we come to later doctrinal delineations in the church, we are to find them "only the buoys which mark off the right channel, not the barriers which cut off free movement." But the movement is not away from, but ever nearer to, the deepest

¹ *R. u. V.*, II. p. 19 f.

spirit of the historical revelation. For Ritschl's objection to the unjustifiable influence of church tradition is for the reason that Biblical theology is not to be subordinated to the interest of any dogmatic schemes.¹ Nothing dogmatic is to be determined in advance, but everything is to be brought out in Biblical theology. And this discipline, in its historical sense, is the Holy Scripture expounded by its own context, or, at least, this is the goal at which it aims. And that not systematic but Biblical theology was practically fundamental with Ritschl is seen in the fact that Ritschl's Biblical theology was concluded much earlier than his dogmatic system. Although the dogmatic system was later modified, the Biblical theology did not in like manner call for alteration.

IV. Let us proceed a step further in our exposition and see why Ritschl does not assert or seek for an objective, infallible authority. For when it comes to the establishing of an infallible principle of interpretation Ritschl remarks in advance that "Neither for such a principle nor its application can we be assured of infallibility, inasmuch as these are sought, or supposed to be found, by weak human beings. Since the exposition of Holy Scripture according to the positive standard of church tradition is not accepted within the church since the Reformation, there is no appeal left which can claim even an illusion of an infallible understanding of Scripture. . . . Therefore," he says,

¹ *R. u. V.*, II. p. 21.

“I pay no attention to those who are not clear-sighted enough to perceive where alone the thirst for an infallible exposition of Scripture, or an errorless decision of doctrine, can be satisfied,”—that is, in the spirit and bounds of the Roman Catholic Church. But “For the evangelical theologian it is merely a question of the exposition of Scripture from its own context and the approximate consummation of the task.”¹

Ritschl therefore considers the theological exposition of the Bible to be both a question as to logical ability in the understanding of the individual parts in connection with the whole, and also especially a question of æsthetic skill. In other words, that it is “the art of reproducing the extent, the relation and the lofty position of the religion of the Old Testament in their correct view, so as to be able to understand the documents of Christianity in their original and historical sense.”² And this is certainly an up-to-date view of the Bible and the relation of theology to it, while being at the same time sober and conservative. In a word, under Ritschl’s treatment Scripture and theology become living organisms, full of the freshness and vigour of life.

V. Before leaving this special subject I wish to show one other of Ritschl’s fundamental observations bearing upon it. He sees in the Apostles the representatives of the first community of Christians,

¹ *R. u. V.*, II. p. 20.

² *Ibid.*

and considers this a point of significance for the theology of the New Testament. He makes this observation, primarily, because of the Catholic position. "For the Catholic view places the apostles as unconditionally above the community as is the Founder Himself. In like manner also, it places the successors of the apostles—the bishops and priests—above the community."¹ Ritschl believes that this view has partially ruled even in the common historical treatment by Protestants. And also in Biblical theology it has been customary to distinguish between Christ and the apostles "only as between two graded legal authorities for the Christian doctrine of the community." Ritschl's point is that, under the influence of this principle which we have inherited from the Catholic Church, "It has not been made clear that the apostles, *as being the disciples of Christ*, are themselves pre-eminently the *first community*, and are therefore only set apart for the spreading of the gospel [Mark iii. 14] because they, as the first generation, had to care for the second. The early validity of the gospel accounts, so far as after-generations are concerned, is established by Christ as the founder of the community, and by the apostles as the speakers of the founded community." Ritschl considers this observation necessary to assure Biblical theology against the error which continually creeps in, "that the doctrine of Christ and of the apostles, which it is desired to mediate in a purely historical way,

¹ *R. u. V.*, II. p. 21.

is more or less of the nature of theological doctrine," that is, of scientific theology. But to Ritschl "A theological, that is, a scientific purpose, is not the fundamental form of the apostolic line of thought, even though in argumentation an element of a scientific nature enters in, for the refutation of deviating opinions."¹ That the fundamental thought-form in the epistles of the New Testament is that of religious discourse Ritschl finds borne out by the fact that these epistles regularly begin with thanksgiving and petition, and close with exhortation. And he broke with the wide-spread view that the Apostle Paul is essentially a theologian. Even the Epistle to the Romans he considers less "argumentative and didactic than prophetic and dithyrambic,"² the key to which he finds in i. 16 f.: "For I am not ashamed of the gospel of Christ: for it is the power of God unto salvation to every one that believeth; to the Jew first, and also to the Greek. For therein is revealed a righteousness of God by faith unto faith." And iii. 21–26: "But now apart from the law a righteousness of God hath been manifested, being witnessed by the Law and the Prophets; even the righteousness of God through faith in Jesus Christ unto all them that believe; for there is no distinction; for all have sinned, and fall short of the glory of God; being justified freely by His grace through the redemption that is in Christ Jesus: whom God set forth

¹ *R. u. V.*, II. p. 22.

² *Leben*, II. p. 177.

to be a propitiation, through faith, by His blood, to show His righteousness, because of the passing over of the sins done aforetime, in the forbearance of God; for the showing, I say, of His righteousness at this present season: that He might Himself be just, and the Justifier of him that hath faith in Jesus."

This, to Ritschl, is the Apostle's great task, which he sees him performing in a religious way. We have found, then, that Ritschl's view of the Scriptures is that they are a divinely appointed human means to a divinely appointed human end, to be interpreted historically and religiously. The proof for their validity is historical proof, and their appeal is made, not to ignorance and a belief to be established by a church dogma, but to the highest and most comprehensive intelligence.

§ 12. THE PERSON OF CHRIST.

I. When we come to consider what it is which the gospel history pre-eminently presents, we are at once brought to the person of Jesus Christ. And if the Ritschlian method is worth anything to us, it will not simply throw us upon a dogmatic authority as to what we should believe about Him. We shall rather find in it a serious attempt to point out the elements of deepest worth in the kingdom of God. If to Ritschl Christ is a unique person, he will give the reasons from an internal point of view. And he will use this internal analysis, this judg-

ment of value, to determine our estimate of Christ.

Ritschl finds the uniqueness of the person of Christ made clear in a special manner in the New Testament record. As the Son of God or the Anointed, Christ connects Himself with the analogy of the Israelitish king, who, as the representative of the chosen people, is the Son of God. But this predicate is not only filled out by Jesus with a different content, but is also united by Him to God in a peculiar way. "As the one who reveals God, He alone recognizes God as His Father in order to share this knowledge with others," that is, to make the Fatherhood of God the basis of the new community. But even superior to this relation of Jesus to God and to the community, in Ritschl's view, "is the reverse thought that the Father alone knows the Son, Matt. xi. 27."¹ To Ritschl this proposition indicates, but does not explain, the secret of the person of Christ which lies at the foundation of His work as revealer, and which mystery must still remain for those who recognize this thought. To try to illumine or explain this mystery by formulas of any sort, Ritschl considers a vain effort. To Ritschl, then, this mutual knowledge of Father and Son means the knowledge of the mutual relationship of the Father and the Son, "which," he says, "is equivalent to saying that the predetermination of this solidarity exists through the love of the Father to the Son, in which love he recognizes His own na-

¹ *R. u. V.*, II. p. 96.

ture as grounded, just as he refers the existence of His own community to His exercise of love toward them." So that Ritschl can say elsewhere¹ "that Christ in representing Himself now as the one sent of God who has seen and heard God, and now as the Son of God who works the works of God and who exercises in His own person God's rulership over the world, judges the coherence of his life as *the means of God's complete revelation of Himself*. And this," says Ritschl, "is the thoroughly religious method of self-judgment. But the peculiarity of it is that Jesus does not withdraw from this standard a single relation of His spiritual life. For even when He expresses Himself in the form of an independent human purpose, it is always measured according to the divine final end."

II. The concrete conclusions which Ritschl draws from this line of argument I give also in his own words:² "Since, now, as the founder of the kingdom of God in the world, or as the bearer of God's moral authority over men, He is the unique one [der Einzige] in comparison with all those who have received from Him a similar purpose [Zweckbestimmung], thus is He that power in the world in whose self-end God primordially makes His own eternal self-end effective and evident—whose entire work in His calling thus forms the material of the complete revelation of God present in Him, or in whom the Word of God is a human person."

¹ *R. u. V.*, III. p. 411.

² *Ibid.*, p. 425 f.

In other words, the Ritschlian argument is this—and it is not often surpassed in apologetic literature: There is one kingdom of God for which God has made the world. Jesus Christ, as the conscious founder of this kingdom in the world, is the one person to whom God looks, and to whom the members of this community look as head of this kingdom. Thrown upon the cosmic background of physical forces, He becomes the revealer of the purpose and character of the supramundane spiritual God, for the one divine purpose of making men free and independent of the world. Between God's self-end and Christ's self-end, there is a solidaric unity, by which men are to discover their own true self-end, and be won into its accomplishment through fellowship.

III. Having noted Ritschl's estimate of the person of Christ, let us see more particularly how he will treat this theologically. And here we may expect to find him discouraging metaphysical efforts, in the interests of the ethical and personal. According to him, the problem set for theology is solved first in pointing out the absence of contradiction between Christ's ethical judgment, in which He has to do with men, and His religious judgment, which is exercised in the direction of God; and second, in the necessity of completing the ethical by the religious. But "How the person of Christ came to be," says Ritschl,¹ "and how it came to be what it is for ethical and religious appreciation

¹ *R. u. V.*, III. p. 426.

[Schätzung], is not a subject for theological investigation, because the problem lies beyond every kind of investigation." "The theological solution of the problem of the Godhood of Christ," he elsewhere declares,¹ "is to be found in an analysis of the work of Christ for the salvation of humanity in the form of His community." "Jesus can be distinguished from no other human being in the fact that He was born."² And elsewhere he says:³ "The victory over the world which Christ indicates as His life-work is the proof of the fact of His solidaric unity with God as actual in His will, and that He maintains this solidaric unity even under the opposition of the world." In other words, the ethical and religious is the highest kind of proof, and indeed, to Ritschl, the only kind of proof that can have a real bearing on the subject. Until this is understood the fundamental nature of his conceptions will not be appreciated. We worship Jesus, not because we see in Him a control over cosmic forces, but because in Him we see the same ethical and moral self-end which belongs to God. So that while Ritschl turns from the attempted explanations to be found in church tradition "as unclear, and therefore not calculated to explain," he says that "Christ as the bearer of the completed revelation is given that we may believe on Him." And he declares that "in believing on Him we do understand Him as the re-

¹ *R. u. V.*, III. p. 393.

² *Ibid.*, p. 315.

³ *Theol. u. Met.*, p. 28.

vealer of God. But the union between Him and God, His Father, is capable of no explanation of a scientific nature. And theologians may know that through the vain seeking after such an explanation the recognition of Christ *as the completed revelation of God* is only obscured.”¹

IV. In order to show how Ritschl on his theory would treat the formalized doctrine of Christ’s pre-existence in the Trinity, I quote here from a letter on this subject which he wrote to Frederic Loofs.² “In the sense in which you speak [as to the proof for the pre-existence of Christ] I explained, when I touched the point in my last lecture on dogmatics, the difference which results for us between God’s decree and its fulfilment in Christ, by the proposition that *for God* Christ exists eternally. So far then, I believe that I meet your claims. But then the formula denotes also something which is *for us* a mystery, and is no ground of explanation *for the value of Christ* which can be clear to us without this [completed formula]. . . . The understanding of the Rule of Faith, and thus of all the necessary predicates of Christ, has reference to the purpose of the removal of sin. To believe in Christ is to recognize or to assert His divinity. I understand this when I understand the *establishment of the common reconciliation through Him*. For all Socinianism consists in denying this latter truth, and only in this sense no longer recognizing His divinity. Be-

¹ *R. u. V.*, III. p. 426.

² *Leben*, II. p. 409.

cause I see this connection I am assured that I assert the Godhood of Christ, although I reject the old method of its presentation, which never shows the humanity and divinity to be identical in the historical person, and does not give expression to the close relation between the divinity of Christ, and the common reconciliation through Him, which I represent or strive after."

V. As to Christ's eternal relation to the Father, Ritschl in his exposition of John x. 30 and xvii. 11, 21, 22, affirms positively the reality of their oneness. "The unity of the Son with the Father, or the dwelling in one another of the two, must designate something real."¹ And yet he thinks that we are in no better condition to determine the special conditions of the relation between Christ and God than we are to determine the relation of our own freedom to God when it is said: "It is God that worketh in you." Our scientific explanations are limited in all such problems.

He recognizes the fact that it is difficult to free our temporal view of things "from the contrast between the eternal will of God and the temporal realization of the same which is open to our experience." But we must remember, he says,² "that this relation does not exist in this way *for God*: that to Him there is no lack, but an eternal satisfaction of his self-consciousness [Selbstgefühl] in that which to us in the long line of preparation seems

¹ *Theol. u. Met.*, p. 28.

² *R. u. V.*, III. p. 442.

the expression of need. Thus the eternal Godhood of the Son of God is perfectly clear only as the object of the divine knowing and willing, that is to God Himself. But since we reckon an interval between willing and accomplishing even in the case of God, there results the formula that for God Christ exists eternally as the one who to us is revealed within time-limitation. But it is for God that He exists thus eternally—for us His pre-existence is a hidden matter. And since we cannot occupy the divine point of view, it is well for us to be satisfied with the concrete proof found in our *religious* estimate of Christ." This religious estimate, which Ritschl uses to establish the Godhood of Christ, he has made so full and weighty in his thought that few historical writers of any time have surpassed him in this respect. It is almost a new human-divine person whom Ritschl causes to stand out in clearest light before us. Only those who have made these ethical and religious features insignificant will find Ritschl's presentation alarmingly meagre.

§ 13. THE HOLY SPIRIT.

I. Ritschl's method, as I have already had occasion to indicate, is nowhere more clearly recognized than in his treatment of the Holy Spirit,¹ by which, as Ritschl says, God eternally knows Himself and

¹ See *R. u. V.*, III. pp. 260, 444, 571; also *Instruction in the Christian Religion*, §§ 2, 46.

His purpose to be present in His community. But the life of the Holy Spirit which exists in the community is not directly discernible by any power of subjective consciousness. We are to think of ourselves as having a life in the Holy Spirit "in the fact that believers recognize the gracious gifts of God; that they call upon God as their Father; that they act with gentleness and joy, with meekness and self-control; that they especially guard against a haughty spirit, and exercise the spirit of unselfishness. In these propositions the Holy Spirit is not denied, but is recognized and comprehended."¹ And Ritschl quotes Henrici with special approval, because he points out the fact that "If the Holy Spirit is not to be perceived in the concurrent and associated movements and activities of believers, his transcendental presence is fruitless and worthless." And, in this, Ritschl is absolutely consistent with his emphasis of the historical and concrete, as over against either the metaphysical or the mystical.

In what supreme way can the Holy Spirit reveal Himself to our highest intelligence? Are we to think of some special combinations of cosmic glory, as the more appropriate sphere for that Spirit of God which in divine revelation is termed Holy Spirit? Where, after all, but in just those concrete embodiments of righteousness and peace which we have revealed to us as characteristics of Christ and as fruits of the Spirit? We should certainly

¹ *R. u. V.*, III. p. 22 f.

not consider the moral-ethical and moral-religious sphere the special place where the Holy Spirit should not be recognized. And yet, says Ritschl,¹ "Weiss has the presumption to assert that I simply remove the Holy Spirit from the body of Christian doctrine. Yet I have, as he himself admits, conceived of the Holy Spirit as the ground of the common consciousness of sonship with God, as the motive and divine power of the supramundane religious and moral life in the community, and thus as the necessary form-determination of Christian personality!—But this is, for Weiss, much too little, and he misunderstands the significance of these propositions. . . . What in his sense is to be real must be *asserted before and apart from* all special activity. . . . In this mist of his, made up of metaphysics and physics, we are expected to realize the reality of the Holy Spirit *apart from* the evident functions of the Christian life in which the Holy Spirit is perceived as efficacious and real."

II. Here then we have had several things made very clear: First, Ritschl's theology does not ignore the Holy Spirit, by which, as he says, God eternally knows Himself and His purpose to be present in His community. Second, the Holy Spirit is recognized, not by His distance from us, but by His presence. Third, the proofs appealed to, being experimental and concrete, are knowable by every earnest soul. Luther could no more surely and rationally know that he believed in the compas-

¹ *Theol. u. Met.*, p. 42.

sion of God for him in Jesus Christ than the humblest Christian may know whether he has the presence of the Spirit. And last, but not least, we have here as strong a proof as could well be given that Ritschl's theory of knowledge when he applies it to the doctrine of the Holy Spirit does not in his thought deny reality, but affirms it in a most positive and realistic way. So that, in any historical exegesis of Ritschl's theology, his theory of knowledge cannot be treated as subjective without doing violence to historical truth.

§ 14. THE WORK OF CHRIST IN BEHALF OF HIS COMMUNITY.

I. There is no understanding of Ritschl's view of the work of Christ apart from Christ's own person. He always objected to any apparent separation of Christ's work from His person. He emphasizes the idea of reconciliation, and this reconciliation is mediated, not *by* Christ, and not *by* what He did, but in Christ, and in the work of Christ which is the expression of His purpose to save men. Ritschl gave the most serious thought of his life to this subject. I wish to indicate what he considered some of the important elements in what we may term the work of Christ objectively considered. We shall be helped to understand him by noting what he rejects, as well as what he takes up with approval.

II. He considered it a fundamental error that

the forgiveness of sins should be thought of in any so-called naturalistic way, *as a matter of course*. For this reason, therefore, he distinctly discredits Socinian and Rationalistic views on this subject of justification and reconciliation. "The Socinians make equity, the theologians of the Illumination make the love of God, to be the established ground for their expectation that the forgiveness of sins exists as a matter of course between God and man."¹ Ritschl considers this positive assertion of the Socinian and this natural presupposition of the Rationalist as "entirely out of relation to a moral arrangement of the world, and in opposition to all historical conditions under which religion exists." And he makes his whole conception of the nature of revealed religion decisive here. "There are no religions and there never have been any which are not positive. So-called natural religion is an illusion."²

Ritschl also rejects any merely legalistic view of Christ's work, and calls attention to the importance of emphasizing the religious conception, if theology is to perform its true function; that is, he turns from the legal view of justice, and the mere remission of penalty, to the personal relations in the forgiveness of guilt. "Catholicism, by alternating between two views, has given expression to its endeavour to understand and realize Christianity, in a swaying balance between law and redemption.

¹ *R. u. V.*, III. p. 508.

² *Instruction in the Christian Religion*, § 39.

Orthodox Protestantism made the significance of Christianity as redemption superior to its significance as law." Socinianism, on the other hand, did just the opposite. "Thus in the Socinian system the principle holds that man maintains his relation to God and his hope of salvation by the fulfilling of the Christian law. Accordingly, the forgiveness of sins . . . is necessary as a remission of punishment, in order to make up the imperfection of moral conduct and to maintain the arrangement by which salvation is the consequence of moral conduct." Upon which Ritschl adds this significant judgment:¹ "When once Christianity has been conceived as essentially an ethical school of wisdom, or a legal mode of life, it is a matter of chance how much or how little attention is given to the characteristic of its original form in which it presents itself as a religion." In other words, Ritschl here makes the personal element fundamental. And he elsewhere said of himself² that he had been learning "that the most important thing is the forgiveness of guilt and not the remission of penalty."

III. Understanding, then, that with Ritschl redemption is the great thing, that redemption means the forgiveness of guilt, that it is personal, and to be thought of only in personally grounded relations, we are prepared to go further and see how he conceives this work to be accomplished in and through Christ. Men are separated from God by

¹ *R. u. V.*, III. p. 457.

² *Leben*, II. p. 81.

their sin and consciousness of guilt. The great thought of Ritschl, therefore, is the mediatorial work of Christ as Priest, in which Ritschl thinks of Christ not only as having a value for men alone, as Abelard represents Him, but as having a value for God also, as in Anselm's view. Only Ritschl rejects the legal stamp in Anselm's line of thought.

What now does Ritschl mean by a value for both God and man? One will need to be guarded here against hasty inferences. First, Ritschl rejects the penal view very conclusively. "The view that Christ by the vicarious endurance of the punishment deserved by men propitiated the justice or wrath of God, and thus made possible the grace of God, is not founded on any clear or distinct passage in the New Testament. It rests rather on a presupposition of natural theology, clearly of Pharisaic and Hellenic origin."¹ But, second, he rejects the idea that the conception of Christ is sufficiently filled out by the fact that he is our Prophet. "Redemption or forgiveness of sin, is not assured to the Christian community by Christ's making, as Prophet, and thus as revealer of God, a *universal promise* to that effect, which is just what He did not do."² And, third, he emphasizes, as one of the essential elements, in Christ's mediatorial work, what he considers as fundamental in the Old Testament conception of sacrifice. What Ritschl sees in the ministering sacrifices of the priest is "that which

¹ See *Instruction*, etc., § 42.

² See *Instruction*, etc., § 40.

covers the people, or the individuals, before the presence of God. The gift, brought according to the divine order, is the covering or protection under which those in covenant with God are in thought brought into His presence. . . . In the sin-offering there is no rite which could signify any different conception from that of the burnt-offering and the peace-offering. . . . When God thus suffers the national community which is conscious of sin, to draw near Him in prescribed ways, in these acts the separation from Him resulting from sin is done away. This bringing near to a gracious God thus accomplished, is the ground of the fact that sins are forgiven, that is, that they no longer separate from God.”¹

“All the writers of the New Testament, except James and Jude, agree in giving to Christ’s death the value of sacrifice, and in making this thought one of pre-eminent value for the formation of the Christian view.”² “That the death of Christ,” he says again elsewhere,³ “results for *the benefit of*, for *the salvation of* believers, is another point in which the expressions of Peter and Paul touched the words of Jesus.” That the preposition *υπερ* has the meaning “in our behalf” and not “in our stead” Ritschl considers evident from II. Corinthians v. 15, “Who for their sakes [*υπερ*] died and rose again.” For, “Even if it might be a pos-

¹ See *Instruction*, etc., § 43, 2.

² *R. u. V.*, II. p. 161 f.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 166.

sible conception that Jesus died instead of believers, in order to spare them from death, yet the analogous assertion that He rose instead of believers is completely contradictory to Paul."

But, fourth, as Jesus is Himself the subject of this sacrifice, "there results His attribute as Priest as well as sacrifice, recognized by Paul, but particularly brought out in Hebrews. Ritschl expressly missed in Schleiermacher the sufficient appreciation of this High-priestly office of Christ. "The death of Christ has the value of a covenant-offering and a universal sin-offering, not because of the fact that His enemies put Him to death, but because of the fact that He obediently yielded Himself to this fate as in the providence of God a certain result of His special mission."¹ "This significance of the death of Christ is also expressed in the double fact that in the completing of His life-work He represented both the priest and the sacrifice. Therefore, we may regard His death as a sacrifice offered for the purpose of bringing forgiveness to His community only in so far as we connect Him with the offering of the sacrifice, or with the priestly self-devotion which fills His whole life-activity."

IV. Ritschl, therefore, consistently recognizes that there is an essential relation existing between the resurrection and exaltation of Christ and the value of His death. And Ritschl says² distinctly

¹ See *Instruction*, etc., II 41.

² *R. u. V.*, II. p. 158.

that, "For all the apostolic explanations of the sacrificial death of Christ the circumstance must be considered that this appreciation of this event has, as its presupposition, the certainty of the *resurrection* of Jesus and His present divine dominion over the community. This background is, in many respects, significant for the understanding of the apostolic view of the death of Christ. In the first place, the experience of the resurrection of Jesus freed the disciples from their first false impression of His death-fate: by the resurrection He was established for them as the Son of God, and thereby for the first time the complete knowledge and value of His death was made possible.

"Further, it will appear that in the case of many of these writers, for example, the writer of the Epistle to the Hebrews, the significance of Christ's death as a sacrifice appears not only from the circumstance of His death, but is grounded also in the fact of His elevation to the right hand of God. And finally, the objective accomplishing of salvation which is connected with the sacrificial death of Christ is only assured to the community as permanent by the fact that it is also asserted as the attribute of the Exalted One." The resurrection, then, is seen to hold an absolutely vital place in Ritschl's thought.¹

¹ And yet Professor Orr, in *The Christian View of God and the World* (p. 454), says that he cannot but regard the Ritschlian position "as the virtual surrender of faith in Christ's resurrection"!

V. Now let us turn to the community and take a glance at the subject of Christ and His work from that point of view. Ritschl calls attention to Peter's interpretation when he says (in speaking of Christ, that thereby believers are led to God, are brought near to Him in the sacrifice): "This bringing near of men is necessary in the case of the community to be founded by Christ, because they are originally separated from God by their sin and feeling of guilt. Therefore, the sacrificial act of Christ's priestly completion of His life-work seems to bestow upon the new community the divine forgiveness of sin just in so far as He, as their intentional representative, changes this separation of men from God into fellowship with Him as their Father."¹

Ritschl finds that "in the Epistles, especially the Epistle to the Romans, the point from which Christ's death is rightly appreciated is that of the community. But in so far as results are witnessed to and not purposes merely, this result can only be expressed in the fact that sinners and worldlings are reconciled and justified in the community. Now it is a matter of course that the community consists of its individual members. But the individual who experiences the saving work of Christ can," from Paul's point of view, "only be represented perfectly as one who belongs to the community."² And he says again, "Thus Paul makes evident that he conceives of no justification apart from, or previous to,

¹ See *Instruction*, etc., ¶ 43.

² *R. u. V.*, II. p. 159 f.

belonging to the community.”¹ Ritschl declares here emphatically, however, that he is not speaking against individual justification. “The designation Community-justification, or Individual-justification,” he says, “I do not accept.” And Ritschl thinks that he has said often enough that “in the very community the individuals are correspondingly designated, inasmuch as the community consists of its members.”²

This great idea of the Christian community Ritschl brings out in accord with Schleiermacher’s thought. “It is of great importance that Schleiermacher indicated the form of Christianity not as a doctrine, like Islam, not as a social constitution, like Judaism and Catholicism, but as the idea of redemption through Christ. There must be added,” he says, “the pregnant truth that this religion, like all religions, and all spiritual activities, can only be rightly set forth in the fellowship which, on the presupposition of the redeeming work of the Founder, exists as the sharing and spreading of this redeeming activity. . . . Redemption, the Redeemer, and the redeemed community stand for theological knowledge in an inseparable relation to one another.”³ And to Diestel Ritschl wrote:

¹ *R. u. V.*, II. p. 161.

² The writer of *Nicene Theology*, however, says (p. 20) that with Ritschl and his school all the salvation that Christ has secured is for the church and the kingdom. “He has no message for the individual, and the individual has no business with him”!

³ *R. u. V.*, I. p. 495 f.

“Live in the church. Be consciously active in its function, and if you have a temptation thereby to despair of your salvation, or a temptation to self-righteousness, then remember that you can do anything or be anything only as a member of the community which, through its foundation upon Christ, has the assurance of the divine presence and the forgiveness of sins. In this sense we come to Christ only through the church.”¹

VI. What, then, have we found here which we can rely on, in our exposition of Ritschl? First, we have seen that redemption, which is the supreme subject, is a personal matter, mediated through the person, Jesus Christ; with a person, the revealed Father; and in behalf of persons, the Christian community. It is, therefore, to be dealt with by the Christian theologian as a purely religious subject. In whatever ways its minor details may hereafter be modified, here is something definitely and concretely propounded as the supreme theological task, and the method is indicated which is to lead to its accomplishment. Second, while the personal attitude of God is not changed from a sphere of justice to one of mercy, God is yet propitiated in the very significant and absolutely vital relations of personal fellowship. He is changed through the mediating person and work of Jesus Christ, from personal disapproval of man’s sinfulness, and from the consciously withheld fellowship, to propitious

¹ *Leben*, II. p. 50.

favour expressed in positive communion. Third, the Christian community, called by this fellowship into being, as the living kingdom of God, so far from being subjectively illusory is so objectively real that Ritschl has actually been criticised for an over-emphasis of the church. And this would no doubt have proved a well-grounded criticism if he had been dealing with mere machinery. But he sees psychical forces as in Lotze's world of spirits. He sees that living community of Christ, with Christ as its living head, which Calvin had thought of as alone experiencing the fulness of the divine revelation of God as Father. And, with Luther, he has learned that entrance into this fellowship comes through confidence in the compassion of God in Jesus Christ, and that victory over the world is assured by that spirit of devotion to our new calling in the Christian community, which is caught up from the victory of the living Christ Himself. These world-transforming views which inspired the teaching of Albrecht Ritschl, and which have been obscured by the wood, hay and stubble of so many of Ritschl's critics, we are now, I trust, in a better condition to estimate for ourselves at something of their true worth for constructive theology.

CHAPTER V.

RITSCHL'S CONCEPTION OF PARTICULAR DOCTRINES.—(*Continued.*)

§ 15. SIN AND GUILT.

I. Ritschl shows the profoundness of his conception of sin by striking at once into the great realities with which sin has to do. Sin is not to be judged by the subjective consciousness of the individual nor even by humanity, but by the ethical significance of the kingdom of God and the decisive relationship of man to God Himself. "A conception of sin," he says,¹ "can only be formed by a comparison with the conception of Good. According as the conception of Good is more or less complete the unworth of sin will be more deeply or more superficially conceived. If it is now established for Christian faith that the extent of the obligating significance of the good is first completely realized in the task of the kingdom of God, especially as this is perfectly done in the life of Jesus, so also sin is first completely understood as the opposition of this highest moral good. It is thus

¹ *R. u. V.*, III. p. 312.

unreasonable to expect to gain an appreciation of sin which is in accord with Christianity, either in general or as individuals, in practical self-judgment or in theory, before one has gained the conception and recognition of this moral idea. . . . If the practical as well as the theoretical conception of sin is thought to be possible and necessary apart from a knowledge and appreciation of Christian good, then every Christian is put under obligation to adopt the methods of the penance struggles, although according to previous experience this leads either to despair or hypocrisy."

Here, then, is a concrete, objective measure for sin which is as deep in its significance as the truth in the life of Christ, and as the good which He Himself sees in the kingdom of God. Humility of the true stamp is not to come from the personal depreciation to the ash-heap, but in standing at one's best and highest by the side of the true greatness and goodness of Him who rises up beyond us. Then it is that we experience for the first time that true conception of our littleness, and in such a way as to be ennobled by the experience. From what has already been said we can premise that Ritschl will not be disposed to establish a dogmatic doctrine concerning man, to be filled out from the account of creation, but that this will be superseded by his conception of "the spiritual and moral destiny of man as that is manifest in the life of Jesus Christ and in His purpose of the kingdom of God." And this is what is great in Ritschl's conception.

II. Let us now examine further into Ritschl's treatment of the subject. Sin is the opposite of the two fundamental elements in the Christian ideal of life. Let us state in his own language what these are. "There are two sorts of functions," he says,¹ "whose opposite is sin: namely, the religious and the ethical: the confidence in God in which one is superior to the world; and action from love to one's neighbour to the end of bringing about that communion which, as the highest good, sets forth also the perfect good. . . . In the conception of sin we have therefore to distinguish between the two sides which form the opposite of these two functions." In other words, Ritschl will find sin lying not only in one direction, but in two directions, both as touching religious lack and moral violation.

Otto Ritschl brings this out very clearly when he says² that "Now as Ritschl understands sin as the opposite of the kingdom of God, it is conceived of in the later editions according to the double-sidedness of the Christian ideal of life: first, in adherence to the Reformation doctrine as religious defect, that is, as a lack of reverence and confidence in God; and second, as the direction of the will of man against the right." He also shows how Ritschl criticises Schleiermacher for mistaking the character of sin because not making it opposition to the good, and for saying "that God regards sin as but unattained moral perfection, and that the concep-

¹ *R. u. V.*, III. p. 315 f.

² *Leben*, II. p. 201.

tion of sin in the real sense is only applicable for us men.”¹ That is, as if it were only something of a subjective nature which does not actually exist in the estimation of God.

Ritschl, then, in the first place, points out sin in connection with the personal and fundamental relations to God. And Ritschl’s position here is very clear and decisive. “The unworth of sin,” he declares,² “can only be measured by the wrong relation which one takes toward God. For it is important to distinguish sin from wrong and crime. The same act, in comparison with human society and with state law, is wrong and a crime. But it is sin in that it proceeds from indifference toward God as the benefactor and director of human life. By pointing out this relation, sin receives the stamp of a religious conception, as a peculiar conception of worth.” And this is certainly not only a correct but an absolutely fundamental conception of sin, which puts it in harmony with all we have seen of Ritschl’s general method.

III. Then Ritschl passes from the religious conception of sin to the consideration of the ethical, which is to be thought of as inseparable from it. “The good in the Christian sense,” he says, “is the kingdom of God, that is, the unbroken reciprocal working of conduct from the motive of love, in which all enter into relation with each one who has in himself the characteristic of a neighbour: and

¹ *R. u. V.*, III. p. 360.

² *Ibid.*, p. 317.

it is further the union of men in which all blessings are appropriated in their subordination to the highest good. Now sin is the opposite of the good in so far as proceeding from indifference to or distrust of God. It is self-seeking, and directs itself toward the blessings of a subordinate nature without taking into view their subordination to the highest good. Sin does not deny the good altogether, but inasmuch as it runs counter to the subordination of temporal blessings to the good, it is practically opposition to the good."

And he adds the significant remark as to the decisive character of the criterion he has been giving, that "if now from this conception of the kingdom of God is to be derived the standard for the full determination of sin as its opposite, then sin can be completely represented neither in the compass of the individual life nor of humanity as a natural species."¹ Ritschl's conception of sin, therefore, is seen to be as deep and broad as the ethical and religious character of God Himself and of His purpose in the kingdom of God.²

Although Ritschl does not assert for all the descendants of Adam the highest possible grade of sinful tendency, but rather different grades, yet in all these cases he emphasizes in a thoroughly fundamental way the fact of sin, of guilt, and of par-

¹ *R. u. V.*, III. p. 317.

² And yet Professor Orr says that with Ritschl "sin is only a subjective judgment which the sinner passes on himself, to which nothing actual corresponds."

ticipation in a kingdom of sin. And this I wish to make very clear for the reason that several critics, and Professor Orr in particular, have shown here an incredulity that would itself be incredible if we did not have so many illustrations of it. "We distinguish from the grade of malice which we call devilish," he says,¹ "vice, haughty greed of power, vain and shrewd indifference to common moral ends, and finally the selfish forms of patriotism, pride of station, pride of family, which even rest on particular moral blessings, but follow these in opposition to the universal morality."

IV. But this is not all; Ritschl has given us very definitely his conception of a kingdom of sin.² "All these grades of habitual sin we reckon into the universal conception of sinful conduct in forming the conception of the kingdom of sin. And, indeed, we can only think of ourselves as partakers in the guilt of this kingdom of sin, in that we reckon to ourselves not only our own sinful acts as such, but also take into account that these call forth sins in others. . . . To be sure, each one from his standpoint in space looks out upon only a limited portion of this complexity of humanity, and the experience of his unworth is modified further by the impressions of varying degrees of age, position, calling and personal culture. But in so far as this conception is formed at all in the realm of the Christian view of the world, in accordance with the

¹ *R. u. V.*, III. p. 320.

² *Ibid.*, p. 320 f.

value of the kingdom of God, it is qualitatively identical." And he says again:¹ "The web of all these sinful interworkings, which presuppose and on the other hand increase the self-seeking propensity of each one, is designated by the title of 'The World,' which in this respect is not of God but opposed to Him. Every one does not need to be a partaker in this web through badness and lying, since the self-seeking propensity may attach itself to the appreciation of particular goods, to family feeling, to the spirit of rank, patriotism, or churchly confession." And now join to these very clear and comprehensive expositions of sin one more quotation:² "Sin does not come into experience as a logical contradiction; namely, as the extreme opposite of the good which ought to be realized, but the ethical contradiction arises whenever the will does not do, or does something else than, that which corresponds to the perfect good. Even the single deviation from the truth for a selfish end is sin, as well as the universal conscious purpose of untruth, and of suppression of the truth."

This is certainly as thoroughgoing ethics as is to be found anywhere. It not only does not manifest any moral weakness in Ritschl's thought, that "gentle flavour of mild decay" which one has been prepared by the critics to expect, but it is

¹ *R. u. V.*, III. p. 332.

² *Ibid.*, p. 326.

vigorously assertive, and its penetrating analysis goes to the bottom of the subject.

V. Let us now turn to his exegesis of the fact of sin historically considered, that is, his method of accounting for its existence in the human race. Touching the natural origin of sin Ritschl does not hold that the will of the child is directed to the bad, which he thinks is asserted in the doctrine of original sin and necessarily implied in the power which that doctrine puts into the conception of evil. Ritschl has a different conception.¹ "Education in the case of a child strives"—and he thinks strives rightly—"for the direction toward the good in all the special relations of life, and by opposing all special wrong acts." But here he says: "The presupposition is recognized that there is present in the child a common though still undeveloped impulse toward the good, which is not directed toward the same by comprehensive insight, and has not yet been tested by the special relations of life." An understanding of this explanation of Ritschl's will give a clear glimpse of his method of treating the subject of original sin. In a word, he adopts here that method which we saw Calvin employing in the treatment of predestination, that is, he directs the attention to the facts just at hand, and thus becomes inductive instead of dogmatic. But it will very speedily be seen to be in the interest of no superficial view of the subject.

Looking now at the individual, and seeking the

¹ *R. u. V.*, III. p. 319 f.

active principle from which sin arises in man, Ritschl says:¹ "Sin arises as a personal tendency in the life of each individual, so far as our observation extends, out of the sinful desire and conduct which as such finds its sufficient ground in the self-determination of the individual will. But as sin is present in each one and in all, it finds through the habitual conditions of the spiritual life in individuals as well as in their mutual connection the material for an habitual working which does not belong to it in and of itself. This is the fact which the doctrine of original sin aims to set forth, only it does so in an exaggerated way and with incorrect means of explanation, in that it is set up as proof of the servitude of the will." To Ritschl this "law of sin" follows "from the necessary reaction of every volition upon the direction of the will power. Thus there arises from the unlimited repetition of selfish determinations of the will a sinful and God-opposing propensity. By the involuntary reflex action of a will not yet established in the right, when experiencing influences from others, sin transplants itself from one to another."

This, then, is Ritschl's way of accounting for the propagation of sin so far as it is propagated, and of its arising, so far as it is to be accounted for inductively. Certain it is that the common fact of sin is not denied, or belief in its universality undermined, but only the belief in its being the product of a necessity in nature, which should itself in turn

¹ *R. u. V.*, III. p. 331.

need explanation. A further consideration of an interesting phase of this subject, that of sin as ignorance, will be deferred till we come to the subject of the forgiveness of sin.

VI. I wish now to show that Ritschl makes a clear distinction between guilt and the accompanying sense of guilt. The recognition of this fact will help us in properly estimating some of the most serious criticisms of Ritschl's theology. Understand, then, that guilt is the term which is now being considered, of which Ritschl in the first place says:¹ "In its moral sense guilt is the expression of the disturbance of the intended reciprocal relation between the moral law and freedom, which follows from the lawless misuse of freedom, and is designated as such by the accompanying discomfort of the feeling of guilt." This, then, is what guilt in its moral terms is. In the second place, he says that, "In the Christian sense, guilt signifies that opposition to God into which the individual man, as well as all humanity, has entered through the non-fulfilment of the moral law, which is recognized as existing, by the consciousness of guilt, in which the individual experiences with discomfort the unworth of his own sins as well as his share in the universal guilt." He had already said before this that "consciousness of guilt, with reference to God, is a form of the separation of the sinner from God, compared with the universal destiny of men

¹ *R. u. V.*, III. p. 56.

for fellowship with God.”¹ Therefore, third, “The opposition to God and to the proper moral destiny which is expressed in the conception of guilt, and which is experienced with discomfort in the consciousness of guilt, is, by this accompanying circumstance, designated as a real disturbance of the whole being.”²

Such clear language, one would suppose, ought to be decisive as to Ritschl’s conception that guilt is one thing, and the sense of guilt another thing, and that both of them are as real as anything of a moral and religious character can possibly be. But Ritschl does not stop here with the statement of his own positive views. He applies his principle in the judgment of historical opinions. He proceeds to confute the statement of Duns Scotus, who held that guilt, being an ideal relation, was nothing real, and therefore forgiveness was nothing real: so that guilt with Scotus did not indicate an actual defect in the soul, but a defect in the relation of the soul to its destiny (*Bestimmung*). Ritschl replies that the witness of the consciousness of guilt “experiences rather the logical opposition to the will of God, which is contained in guilt as a real opposition, and as an actual defect of the will.” “And in the realm of will,” he says again, “sin as the disturbance of the ideal relation [that is, the perfect relation] of the will to its final end, or to God

¹ *R. u. V.*, III. p. 52.

² *Ibid.*, p. 56.

as the representative of the same in the order of the world, is a real opposition.”¹

And yet, notwithstanding all these clear and positive statements, Professor Orr actually declares² that the effect of Ritschl’s theology, along with others, is “to weaken, if not actually to destroy, the idea of guilt”; that Ritschl regards all sin “as arising so much from ignorance as to be without real guilt in the eyes of God”; and that redemption “is not removal of guilt but of consciousness of guilt”; and “instead of guilt being regarded as something objectively real, which God as well as man is bound to take account of, it comes to be viewed as something clinging to the subjective consciousness—a subjective judgment which the sinner passes on himself, to which nothing actual corresponds.”

True, Ritschl says that guilt is “*designated as such* by the accompanying discomfort of the feeling of guilt,” that it is “*recognized as existing* by the consciousness of guilt.” But this, so far from denying the existence of sin and guilt, is but the rational method of coming to a knowledge of a very real opposition in the will of the sinner. If it is not to be recognized in this way, then how can it be possible in any rational way ever to recognise its existence at all? The fact is that Professor Orr’s

¹ *R. u. V.*, III. p. 57.

² *The Christian View of God*, etc., p. 178. And not by any means set right in his later book, *The Ritschlian Theology*, pp. 146, 269 f.

persistent attempts to explain away everything objectively real from the theology of Ritschl vitiate his whole work, and render him, in spite of his scholarly accomplishments, a misleading guide to the understanding of the Ritschlian theology.

§ 16. THE FORGIVENESS OF SINS.

I. As a presupposition for the understanding of the forgiveness of sins as presented by Ritschl, it will be important to have a clear conception of what in his view is the nature of forgivable sin. "The view of the differing nature of sin," says Ritschl,¹ "runs all through the New Testament; namely, that sin in so far as it can be forgiven or made ineffective by change of heart, is to be distinguished from that sin which in the form of a final decision against Christian salvation, and in the form of an irreclaimable selfishness, has become complete."

And he says further² that "the gradation between sin as ignorance and sin as a final decision against the recognizable good is especially conceivable in its relation to the conception of sin in general." And here he proceeds to state again very clearly his conception of sin. "Sin in general is the active and the habitual opposition to God and the good, which in any measure is either perceived or suspected to be the final end guaranteed by God for

¹ *R. u. V.*, III. p. 356.

² *Ibid.*, p. 357 f.

the human will." And he reminds us again that "the unworth of sin is not determined by the logical conception of contradiction, so that in every case of sin the most extreme possible opposition to the good is realized, or that all sin is conscious universal malice. If sin were to be determined in this sense, it would have a very small place in experience." In other words, he is here guarding himself definitely against misunderstanding, as if he were saying that any lack of comprehensive knowledge shuts out the element of sin. And so he says that "sin is *in all cases* a contradiction of the good, according to the ethical conditionality of the conception, so that even the least deviation from the good, or the single omission of the good, forms a contradiction to it, because the good ought to be actualized unconditionally at every moment by the will." That certainly is clear language, and practically exhausts the possibilities of definition at the disposal of ethics.

Having thus guarded himself by such a comprehensive definition of sin, he proceeds to point out how great a factor ignorance is, not only in the arising of sin and in its development, but also, consequently, in the judgment of it as the total destruction of worth in the sinner. He turns to our experience with children and calls attention to the important part ignorance plays toward the coming in of sin. "Children," he says, "when they enter into the associated special life, are neither furnished with a knowledge of the good or of the

moral law in whole or in part, nor with a propensity which would decide against the good as a whole." That is, they do not have knowledge enough to make a final choice. But "they are obliged to learn to appreciate the good first *in particulars*, and in the particular relations of life in which they stand, since they are not capable from the beginning of grasping the conception of the universal good." When the will comes into activity it is with a full expectation that it can exercise itself without limitations, which it discovers by experience cannot be the case. Under these conditions, therefore, Ritschl considers ignorance to be "an essential condition of the conflict of the will with the order of society as the rule of the good." And ignorance also is the condition for the fact that the will establishes itself in the refusal of this order of society. But Ritschl says here distinctly¹ that "ignorance is itself not the sufficient ground for the establishing of the will in sin," for the will does not always follow the knowledge when it gets it. By summing up all experiences we do not reach the conception of the necessity of sin. We only reach the conviction of the universal reign of sin, with which he thinks theology may be satisfied.

II. Turning now from this inductive examination of sin let us see what Ritschl has to say as to the distinctively religious phase of it. For Ritschl is not seeking to fix the thought in the direction of

¹ *R. u. V.*, III. p. 358.

the naturalistic inquiry, much less of implying that sin is only ignorance and not sin, for he distinctly turns to revelation conceptions. "Since our theological view," he goes on to say,¹ "cannot be separated from the religious view of Christianity or come into contradiction to it, our judgment of sin must coincide with the divine judgment." Yet, on the other hand, he says: "While our judgment of sin as opposition to God is as a fact a presupposition of faith in redemption, it is yet in itself no efficacious ground for the production of this faith, but may be quite as easily a ground for despair or for hardening indifference." In other words, consciousness of opposition to God is not enough, of itself, to lead to a faith in redemption. "When therefore God loves sinners in that He determines their redemption, He does not judge sin in general as the imperfect good, but He judges the special sins which do not exclude redemption, as an attribute of men which does not destroy or finally determine their value for God." That is, the love of God comes into the motive forces for redemption, and this love signifies that the unworth of sin has not become absolute. "In so far as the change of heart to be brought about by God's love toward sinners must be thought of in the form of freedom of the will, we are unable to think that this result of sin as enmity toward God had reached that stage of self-determination by which the will has chosen

¹ *R. u. V.*, III. p. 360.

the evil as its final end. In such a case," says Ritschl, "we could not even regard the love of God as possible." Thus this redemptive love of God "can only be thought of in reference to those sinners who have not reached a degree of sin that excludes a change of will." This, then, is that "negative relation which is expressed by the predicate of ignorance," and Ritschl declares that "no more is expressed by it." Practically, such a view of sinners has just this for its presupposition, "that we regard them as capable of a change of heart." Stated negatively, the thought is this: "The love of God toward sinners as the motive of His purpose of redemption and as the final effective ground of their change of heart, cannot extend to those in whom the purpose of resistance to the divine arrangement of the good has been finally determined." Or, stated positively, "In so far as men, as sinners, individually or altogether, are objects of the redemption and reconciliation possible through the love of God, sin is judged by God not as a final determination of opposition to the recognized will of God, but as ignorance," and therefore forgivable.

III. As we have now seen that the fact of sin is fundamentally and universally recognized by Ritschl, so also in as fundamental and real a way shall we find that to him guilt must be thought of as removed by forgiveness. He says distinctly¹ that "the removal of the consciousness of guilt

¹ *R. u. V.*, III. p. 55.

must be so conceived of that it includes the removal of the actual guilt." For he says: "If this were not the case, hardening might be thought of as a kind of forgiveness of sins. But this is absurd, since hardening is that condition of the sinner which is farthest removed from the forgiveness of sins."

And we shall find the personal element thoroughly recognized as the ruling factor, for, says Ritschl,¹ "if justification puts sinners into a positive relation of congruence with God, and if the justifying of them is not to make their destiny to active righteousness appear superfluous, it must find its end in their fellowship with God." That is, an actual personal fellowship with God, with all that this means, is what the process under consideration anticipates. Or to state this in the same thought-form employed previously, the work which Christ does for us is not any mere overcoming of the world and a stopping there. That result could be secured by a gradual paralysis of the nervous functions. But He will overcome the world for us in the very act of giving us the view of the kingdom itself, and in the experience of the blessedness and the heroism that come through our new fellowship with Him.

This is why the conception of reconciliation has with Ritschl greater clearness and force than that of justification. For to Ritschl² reconciliation "expresses the result which was always intended

¹ *R. u. V.*, III, p. 75.

² *Ibid.*, p. 76.

in justification or pardon, as an actual result, namely, that the one who has been pardoned enters into the relation thereby established." In the conception of justification sinners are thought of "in a purely passive way. And in this conception," he says, "there is no information as to the effect which the divine act exercises upon them." But in the conception of reconciliation it is expressed that those who were before in active opposition to God "are by pardon brought into agreement with God and especially into agreement with the purposes cherished by Him in this." We must therefore expect that "the justification successfully exercised by God will find its manifestation and response in definite functions of the reconciled subject." The matter of forgiveness, declares Ritschl,¹ "must be more broadly grasped, for if the doing away of guilt cannot be thought of as the doing away of the opposition of the will to God, then that result would simply amount to a self-deception on God's part."

IV. Here, then, we see again the double-sidedness of forgiveness as it stands in Ritschl's thought. It changes the opposition of God's will, and brings the pardoned individual into agreement with God, and especially, as Ritschl says, into agreement with the purposes cherished by Him in the pardon. Fellowship, then, according to Ritschl, cannot exist with one person, but always demands the other. This will be more fully seen in a further quotation,²

¹ *R. u. V.*, III. p. 76.

² *Ibid.*, p. 77.

in which Ritschl very conclusively declares that "the doing away of guilt signifies that God does away with that effect of sin which makes fellowship with Him impossible, and accordingly that lack of confidence in God by which one in the consciousness of guilt recognizes himself to be in opposition to Him, is set aside."

But Ritschl also finds that "the doing away of guilt, thought of thus as an actual result, includes in itself also that change in the consciousness of guilt by which the opposition of the will to God, brought about by sin, is no longer operative; that is, even in the fact that the discomfort over sins committed is kept in the memory, there appears the successful doing away of guilt on the part of God, namely, its non-imputation as a cause of separation, in the newly established confidence in God as the reverse of opposition to Him." Thus to Ritschl "justification or forgiveness of sins, *when represented as effective*, is reconciliation, as the expression of mutual fellowship between God and man." And he declares that "if the foundation of Christianity as a religion is designated by the forgiveness of sins, then the subjective functions of reconciliation will be directly religious"; that is, it must bring the soul into the vital relations of fellowship with Him who forgives. Let us now take up those words of Scheiermacher previously quoted, as they have been filled out by what we have been seeing in Ritschl: "Redemption, the Redeemer, the redeemed

community stand for theological knowledge in inseparable relations to one another!"

§ 17. THE WRATH OF GOD.

I. Ritschl's treatment of the wrath of God is not only interesting as an isolated psychological study, but it is also important because of the glimpse which it furnishes of the central place given to the conception of love. It also illustrates Ritschl's estimate of the community of the kingdom of God. In Ritschl's view it is the *covenant* relation of the Old Testament¹ which in the Christian community becomes the full revelation of the kingdom of God in the world.

The occasion for the manifestation of the divine wrath in all the cases in the history of Israel "is always a direct falling away from the covenant with God, or an act which may be regarded as a breach of the covenant. The especial occasions which Israelitish history gives for the wrath of God are always insubordination to God's covenant-leading, the worship of strange gods, or political union with foreign nations, which is in contradiction to the theocratic destiny of the covenant people. All other transgressions which call forth the wrath of God either must or may be put under the category of breach of the covenant."²

And again he says:³ "The wrath of God is not

¹ *R. u. V.*, II. p. 123.

² *Ibid.*, p. 127.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 129.

connected with the first sin of man [that is, in Adam], for the original conception of divine wrath is connected with the experience of sudden and surprising death in the case of those who have broken the conditions of the covenant."

II. In the Psalms Ritschl finds that we have a later modification of the conception of the divine wrath.¹ "Here the case appears that the righteous recognize their own suffering as the effect of the divine wrath, and here there is a relation which goes beyond the original conception. . . . Sins of ignorance, which may receive forgiveness through a sin-offering, do not interfere with belonging to the fellowship of the covenant. We should therefore expect according to this principle that such Israelites as are conscious of their faithfulness to the covenant would recognize no relation between themselves and the divine wrath. Yet this does take place in certain varying conditions. Most easy to understand are those which occur in several of the later Psalms. In these the universal suffering of the people, the pollution of the temple by the heathen, the destruction of Jerusalem, etc., are referred back to the well-deserved wrath of God."

"It is evident," he says,² "that sympathy with the people is the ground on which the righteous recognize themselves also as subject to the divine wrath which God has displayed toward all." This

¹ *R. u. V.*, II. p. 130 f.

² *Ibid.*, p. 132.

shows itself still more in the penitent prayer for the return of the people of God. In so far as the psalmists join the prayer and the hope of salvation to their complaint of suffering under the wrath of God, they neutralize for themselves the impression that their suffering really proceeds from an angry God.

III. According to Ritschl, the wrath of God throughout the whole Old Testament in all the modifications which the conception undergoes, is a conclusion from the original idea of holiness. Even when the impression of passionate excitement in God is limited by associated conceptions, it is yet not denied of God, because the figures of burning as applied to Him remain. "It appears here again," says Ritschl,¹ "that the designation of God's holiness in the Old Testament is a direct expression of the fact that revelation in this realm is not yet complete in its nature. On the other hand, the wrath of God is not a modification or degeneration of the righteousness of God, for this is directed only to the salvation of the righteous. The only relation of the wrath of God to the divine righteousness is that of means to its accomplishment."

IV. Ritschl makes the Old Testament conceptions of the wrath of God furnish the key to its use in the New Testament. In the cases where the divine wrath is mentioned, it must be regarded as probable that it is set forth as an act which has ref-

¹ *R. u. V.*, II, p. 138.

erence to the destruction of such men as by sinful conduct transgress God's covenant purpose.¹

"To be sure," he says, "the scope of the New Testament demands that no longer the old covenant with Israel, but the purpose of salvation for all peoples, revealed through Christ, should furnish the measure for the opposition which falls under the wrath of God. But the form of the conception is not thereby changed. The dependence of the conception in the New Testament upon its Old Testament form is so much the more evident as the authors of the New Testament take no occasion to form anew the conception out of their immediate experience."

Ritschl therefore does not find the present dispensation to be the place for the application of the Old Testament conception of divine wrath. The Christian religion has no interest, according to Ritschl, in the conception of the wrath of God for the present time. "In so far," he says,² "as this idea is carried out in the writings of the New Testament, it occurs under such distinct limitations that the general result [of God's graciousness] is not neutralized. The wrath of God is used by the writers of the New Testament only in the *eschatological application*, which the prophets connected with the picturing of the final judgment." "We have the view of the final judgment in Paul," he says, "in which Jesus saves His own from the wrath

¹ *R. u. V.*, II. p. 138.

² *Ibid.*, p. 140.

to come, 1 Thess. i. 10, and in which at the same time the wrath of God cometh upon the sons of disobedience, Col. iii. 6; Eph. v. 6." According to Ritschl,¹ then, Paul has two distinct points of view in treating of the wrath of God. In the first he treats of it from the standpoint of the principle of retribution, in which both the Jews and the heathen, that is, Greeks, are agreed, and shows that, instead of expecting any double retribution, all mankind are under the wrath of God. The second is the Christian view of the world, in accordance with which believers were never subject to the wrath of God, but were chosen in Christ from the beginning for salvation. "This," says Ritschl, "is the chief change which the conception undergoes in the New Testament, that it is only applied eschatologically, and is no longer used in the judgment of present events. If this is taken into consideration, we cannot deny that it is a real advantage for theoretic theology. For in so far as theology is directly governed by the New Testament, it does not have the task of deciding concerning the nature and possibility of the *emotion* of wrath in its conception of God."

V. Historically, Ritschl finds that Lactantius made the wrath of God the pedagogic exercise of punitive power. "But this does not fit the biblical expression," says Ritschl,² "in either the Old or the New Testament. The modern theologians who

¹ *R. u. V.*, II. pp. 148-153.

² *Ibid.*, p. 153.

undertake to make the wrath-emotion in God subordinate to the Christian conception of love have a thoroughly egoistic kind of love in mind [that is, of injured and grieved love, which cannot go on exercising itself as love and comes to be wrath], and have not found, and cannot find, their very pathological conception of the divine nature in the New Testament." Accordingly in the thought of Ritschl we shall not succeed in harmonizing the emotion of wrath in its pathological characteristics with the New Testament conception of God. "The apostles," he says,¹ "do not continue it, they rather avoid it." But, in the eschatological application, the wrath of God, in their use of it, "indicates the final destruction of those, determined upon by a previous purpose of will, who decide against the order of salvation and thus against God's moral order of the world. This thought is not united with the conception of any special property in God's nature. . . . The oneness [Einzigkeit] and loftiness of God, which is included and presupposed in His revelation through Christ, and in His world-embracing and redeeming love, can expect only such a decision of the moral world-order by which the created spirits who will not suffer themselves to become a definite part of this order must be removed."

"If thus," he says,² "I have relieved Christian theology of an unsolvable problem, then in reply

¹ *R. u. V.*, II. p. 154.

² *Ibid.*

to the objections that will certainly be raised I may ask what religious interest could determine us Christians to apply the conception of the emotion of wrath in God to present experiences? . . . I have no interest," he concludes, "in knowing that God is good unless I may know at the same time that He is good toward me and others. Of just as little interest is it to think in general of the emotion of wrath as an attribute of God, unless we have the right to put certain phenomena in the course of the world under this conception. But if this is forbidden, then the conception of the emotion of wrath in God has for Christians no religious worth, and is a resultless inquiry into the divine nature."

VI. The New Testament conception of the wrath of God has therefore for Ritschl the significance of a final purpose of God against the opposers of His purpose of salvation, or of His moral order of the world. "It occupies, therefore," he says,¹ "the opposite realm to that of redemption, just as in the Old Testament the original conception always represented the wrath of God in such a way as to exclude the purpose of redemption. Accordingly in the New Testament also every indication is wanting to show that in the establishing of salvation in Christ God's purpose of grace came into any relation with His purpose of wrath. And what the exegetes believe that they find of this nature in the

¹ *R. u. V.*, II. p. 155.

books of the New Testament is only a dogmatic tradition which is introduced into the text by false exegetical definitions and combinations, and by the use of explanations which are quite foreign to the men of the New Testament."

And to Ritschl¹ "this influence of dogmatic tradition supports itself by the constant misunderstanding of Paul's letter to the Romans. . . . The proposition that God will visit every one according to his works in reward or punishment, Rom. ii. 6, which forms the foundation-stone of the old dogmatic system, and from which follows the legal treatment even of the Christian conception of reconciliation, is the fundamental principle of both the Pharisaic and the Greek views of the world. Paul has only given expression to this dialectically, in order to make clear to the Roman Christians who had Greek education the fact that according to their view all men were subject to punishment, and thus to exclude the possibility of a reward on God's part. In doing so, however, he has also proved that the fundamental proposition of a double retribution cannot be regarded as the fundamental proposition in the religion of redemption." And therefore, in the view of Ritschl, it is a serious error to take out Paul's real conception of the world and of salvation, from its foundation in a divine purpose of grace, and try to force it under the legal conception which is in contradiction to it.

¹ *R. u. V.*, II. p. 155.

CHAPTER VI.

MYSTICISM AND PIETISM. SUMMARY AND GENERAL ESTIMATE. RITSCHL'S INFLU- ENCE ON THEOLOGICAL RECONSTRUC- TION.

§ 18. MYSTICISM AND PIETISM.

I. Ritschl's emphasis of positive revelation, and of the importance of holding absolutely to the historical elements of Christianity, led him to look with the strongest disfavour on the practical abandonment of the historical in mysticism; and Ritschl's critics who have seen in him an apostle of subjectivism have not been able to explain his scientific attack on mysticism.

Ritschl certainly makes a vigorous application of his theory of knowledge, both negatively and positively, against mysticism; and he does this in the interest of what he considers a true psychology. For he says:¹ "Since theology has to do, not with natural things, but with conditions and movements of the spiritual life of man, it makes use also of

¹ *R. u. V.*, III. p. 20.

psychology." And he calls attention to the collision between two theories of knowledge already referred to; namely, the Platonic and the Lotzian. The scholastic psychology, which he identifies with the Platonic, he sees connected with the idea of the thing at rest behind its workings and characteristics, which finds a predominant application in the theory of mysticism. Whereas, according to the Lotzian theory of knowledge which Ritschl adopts, "we know nothing of the soul in itself, and of a life in the spirit shut up in itself, *above or behind* the functions in which it is active, living and consciously present as an individual value-quantity [Werthgrösse]. There is a contradiction in the supposition that the powers of the soul are active in its operation while, being at the same time at rest, they are supposed to make up the real existence of the soul *which is separated from its functions.*" This is the psychology which he finds misleading when applied to the mystical union of the divine spirit and the human soul, apart from all rational functions,—the *unio mystica*, against which he directs what he considers the true psychology. He answers the question what it is to know God, by a re-emphasis of the religious view of regeneration which can be explained in harmony with this modern psychology. And he believes the result to be more genuine and real, and not less so, for this reason. For Ritschl, therefore, the line of thought of the *unio mystica* is outside the field of churchly teaching. "To the question of what it is to pos-

sess God, Luther," he says,¹ "does not answer 'The indwelling of the whole Trinity within the believing man.' But with a correct psychology he declares that for man the possession of God consists in his active confidence in God as the Highest Good. That thus man experiences the self-impartation of God for his salvation is no object of a knowledge which fixes and explains the procedure in this form, but is evident in an activity of the human spirit in which the feelings, knowledge and will meet in understandable order. For all the causes which meet the soul, work upon it as motives to the activity which is peculiarly natural to it. The soul is not related to the causes which work upon it in a simply passive way, but it takes up in sensation all the operations upon it as in reactions in which it maintains itself as an independent cause."

From this fundamental rule of psychology there results for scientific theology, in the view of Ritschl,² "the task of indicating everything which is to be recognized as the effect of God's grace upon the Christian in the corresponding religious and moral acts which are awakened by revelation in general and by the special means included in it." And he declares that "we must give up trying to answer the question proposed by scholasticism, which is unanswerable, as to how man is seized upon or permeated or filled by the Holy Spirit."

¹ *R. u. V.*, III. p. 21.

² *Ibid.*, p. 22.

Whereas what we really have to do is to point out the life in the Holy Spirit recognizable in those fruits of the Spirit indicated in the New Testament.

II. And I wish to call attention to the fact that Ritschl especially emphasizes mediation in all psychological relations. The interchange of personal relations, and especially those that are religious, is "not to be represented as immediate," for in so doing, he says,¹ "we explain them at once as fanciful. For without much mediation nothing is actual. The personal relation of God or of Christ to us is and remains mediated through our exact memory of the word, that is, of the law and of the promises of God. And God works upon us only through one or the other of these revelations. Now the fundamental assertion of immediateness of any perceptions and relations destroys the possibility of distinguishing between reality and hallucination. Those who maintain this pretension of the immediate personal relation to Christ or God are evidently not well read in the literature of mysticism," which is characterized by many absurdities. And he says again that "without the mediation of the word of God, which is the law and the gospel, and apart from the exact meaning of this personal revelation of God in Christ, there is no personal relation between a Christian and God. This correct and suitable knowledge of the reformers I have wished herein to explain and to justify. I am

¹ *Theol. u. Met.*, p. 47 f.

neither under obligation to hold nor justified in holding any other doctrine." The historical revelation of God, then, is not only the beginning but the middle and the end of our revelation media. Communion with God is not to become the sphere for the novelties of direct revelations. And the originality which would exercise itself in this direction is certainly to be ruled out of a place in scientific theology.

III. When, therefore, Ritschl comes to the history of doctrine, he finds himself sorely tried at discovering that the mystical union has been put as a test for regeneration in the place of the Reformation doctrine of faith. To Ritschl the indwelling of the whole Trinity, according to the Formula of Concord, and as presented by J. Gerhardt, as an *explanation* of God's work, signifies nothing more than what must be meant by regeneration. And he complains that it was first through Nicolai and Meisner that the idea of this *unio mystica* "received such a turn that it becomes the basis for the joyousness, and the royal and priestly dignity, of believers."¹

And thus he says: "The effects which from the beginning correspond to justification by faith are now transferred to the conception of the *unio mystica*. Hence this new doctrine forms a rival to that of justification. For one can see already . . . how the original doctrine of the Reformation is set

¹ *Theol. u. Met.*, p. 49.

aside and made practically ineffective in honour of the vague and apocryphal idea of the new mysticism which is to guarantee salvation. Now, one may judge whether the occasional use of mystical formulas by Luther establishes their characteristic value for the Reformation, as Weiss maintains. Did Luther make the Reformation with the doctrine of justification by faith, or with the doctrine of the *unio mystica*?"

Further along in this same connection Ritschl calls attention to what we have already seen in Luther, that "Luther's conscious intention in his grasp of the whole theological problem in so far as it has reference to our salvation . . . may be seen when he says that a knowledge of the being of God as such, as it is understood by the scholastics, is unwholesome and destructive; and that the knowledge of the *gracious purpose* of God can be understood as the correlation of the knowledge of Christ and Christ's Godhood, only in His activity in His calling. . . . All these thoughts follow the rule of knowledge that the thing exists and is present in its manifest operation, and a spiritual person exists, therefore, and is present in his manifest will. This thought," says Ritschl, "rules the whole Reformation usage as to the gospel, the promises, faith in the gospel and faith in the promises. Pietism has gone astray in respect to the value of these formulas; that is, in failing to appreciate their worth. Brockel and Lampe missed in them the guarantee of the presence of Christ, and believed that they

might go beyond the enjoyment of the promises to the enjoyment of the Lord Himself [that is, above and apart from all revelation characteristics]. In this case, however, the impulse toward a separated piety [that is, one that must come into fellowship with the unrevealed God] can only withstand the idea of the reformers by means of a misunderstanding of the correct theory of knowledge.”¹

IV. Ritschl’s biblical theology shows also what he considers to be Scriptural grounds for his choice of the faith-element in preference to the love-element as expressing our relation to God. “In spite of the command,” says Ritschl,² “to love God with all our strength, both Christ Himself and His apostles make so discreet a use of love toward God that the devotion of the Middle Ages with its revival in pietism is shown to be error.” “John himself,” he says further,³ “does not go beyond the proper limits of delicacy of feeling, in that he only makes the demand for love to God as the Christian law, on the basis that God has first loved us, and makes it so much the plainer by adding, in the meaning of Jesus Himself, that love to God manifests itself in love to one’s brother, and consists in the fulfilling of the divine commands. Besides these there is no word in the New Testament which indicates love toward God as our human work. . . . Love is rather the designation for God and

¹ *Theol. u. Met.*, p. 55.

² *R. u. V.*, II. p. 99.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 100 f.

for the Son of God in the founding and direction of the community; while from the members of the community are demanded faith and confidence in God and His Son. Here," says Ritschl, "we have expressed the norm of the difference in rank between God and His revealer on the one hand; and on the other, the community which accepts the revelation, which was rightly understood by the reformers. Thus no one has cause to exalt himself beyond this by the pretension that it is a more valuable life-work to put oneself on an equality with the Lord in self-sacrificing responsive love." *The whole manner of life*, then, is that which, in the thought of Ritschl, is to reveal the disposition of love to God. Here, and here only, it is to have a value. In just these activities of the Christian life, if anywhere, love to God reveals itself from the whole heart and with its whole power.

V. Ritschl's real attitude on this point is probably best indicated when in another place he says,¹ decidedly and yet sympathetically: "It is not a matter of indifference that the Western church doctrine, since the time of Augustine, and still more clearly the Reformation conception of Christianity, builds directly upon the original Pauline line of thought. And, moreover, the history of doctrine has shown that this line of thought carries the Reformation life-ideal which Protestantism cannot give up, and to which it must be brought back

¹ *R. u. V.*, II. p. 24.

from the error of pietism." And yet Ritschl is thoroughly in sympathy with the Christian spirit found in other types of experience, for he says distinctly: "On the other hand, we must remember that in the church there will always be those to whom Christianity, under the stamp of James or of John, is more accessible than under that of Paul." But these, in Ritschl's judgment, "will always remain, to a certain degree, below the ideal of life of the Lutheran Reformation."

This, then, in substance, is what Ritschl in his theology has to say critically about pietism and mysticism. In his historical study of pietism, in which he has given almost a classical place to that type of religious thought and life, he has much to say kindly of the Christian spirit of the men of whom he writes. That is another matter. He does not look with complacency upon the growth of mysticism on Reformation territory, and he seems to see good reason why Reformation doctrine should be kept true to its best history. To Ritschl it is not mystic love which is to bless theology and the church, but that simple, world-conquering confidence in the compassion of God, and that true life-devotion to our divine calling which comes from Jesus Christ as our personal Master and Redeemer. And certainly no less love will be manifested in this practical ideal than in the ecstatic joy of mediæval monk or of modern pietist.

§ 19. SUMMARY AND GENERAL ESTIMATE.

I. We have now taken a glance at some of the most important points of Ritschl's theology. It has been necessarily brief, but we have certainly seen that Ritschl, so far from being a reckless adventurer in the theological world, is not only a fresh and acute historian, but a cautious and reverent religious teacher.

The theory of knowledge which Ritschl has applied in theological science is only that which we have been considering legitimate in physical science. Professor Simon admits this, in his preface to the English translation of Stählin's book, when he says that "most of our 'men of light and learning' in science and psychology and even in literature are more or less consciously disciples of the thinkers criticised by Stählin, especially as regards the theory of cognition." But when Professor Simon apparently implies that there is uncertainty as to the objective reality in the conceptions of Lotze or Ritschl, he casts unjust suspicions and awakens unnecessary anxieties. The question is no trifling one, as Professor Simon himself realizes, for he says later: "The three questions on which the whole discussion turns are: Is the invisible world, especially God, as real a factor of man's environment as the visible world, especially our fellow men? Does this environment, visible and invisible, really reveal itself in what are called phenomena? And is the intellect of man constituted

so as not only to take up this self-revealing environment into itself through the various organs appropriate to the several parts thereof, but also gradually to understand it? . . . Neither Christianity nor the church can stand, if either of these three questions be answered in the negative." What I contend for, and have hoped to establish with reasonable clearness, is that Ritschl has answered all these questions in the affirmative; and also that in doing so he has employed not only the common-sense view of reality, but exactly the common scientific method. There is no more conflict between Ritschl's theology and philosophy in general than between common science and philosophy. Science draws the line of agnosticism at phenomena, and necessarily so, for it has no means of going further. Far be it from any of us to deprecate the speculative value of philosophy, but after all, it is the scientific which must mark the practical boundary-line between the known and the unknown in nature, and history, and revelation.

II. We have seen that Ritschl was not an enemy of theology, or even of metaphysics itself when in its proper place, which to Ritschl, however, was not in the very practical service of the Christian church. And to Ritschl, Christian theology, as the servant of the church, has to do only with those things which mediate salvation. What Ritschl stands for is a theology founded on a revelation made in history, and a Christian experience tested by the contents of this historical revelation, in

clearest distinction from mere philosophical speculation. We have therefore found him consistently placing biblical theology before dogmatics, and presenting himself in vigorous opposition to metaphysics and speculation in theology. This can hardly prove an offence to American Christians, however freely we on this side of the Atlantic may have been given to mingling all forms of cosmological and metaphysical argumentation with our fundamental expositions of positive revelation.

III. It is not legitimate to speak of any special biblical *theory* as peculiarly Ritschlian, or of any method of interpretation of Scripture, except that historicoo-exegetical method which was used as far back as the days of Colet and Erasmus. Nor is it correct to speak of any peculiar *critical* views as Ritschlian, any more than it would be to speak of them as Scottish or American. The sources from which the biblical criticism of the so-called "Ritschlian school" will gather its views will generally be such as are prevalent in the best biblical scholarship of the time. Every school which treats the Bible as divine means, and not as *à priori* dogmatic authority, will naturally see the writings from the side of their human conditions. The times and the men will always be looked upon in a historical way: truths will always be thought of as first seen and experienced in the lives of very real men and women, and not primarily as of an oracular nature, as if slipped into the world in a miraculous manner. We have no such Bible in the thought of Ritschl.

The Bible is to be humanly interpreted, but it is of no private interpretation. No one has the secret of it, and God leaves us to find its meaning by just that common law of probabilities which must rule everywhere. And it is only the meaning of the Bible which makes it divine.

This whole question of the highly probable is just that which came in to deliver Ritschl from the destructive historical criticism,—of science gone mad in the historical method,—and led him to accept the law of a high degree of probability in the books of the Bible as in all historical data. So that while Baur cast out nearly all, Ritschl with but one exception received all. The law of a high degree of probability, therefore, which rules in making up the content of history, rules in like manner in Ritschl's biblical theology. This may exclude dogmatic control, but it insures a life which is only to be found where there is some freedom of movement.

IV. We have seen that Ritschl, so far from denying the objective work of Christ or the resurrection of Christ and His ascension on high, has made these fundamentally important in his theology, but without separating the work of Christ from His person—indeed, because he does not separate them. Just what Ritschl sought to show was that we are to get all our objective Christian knowledge, so far as we have it at all, from the concrete revelation made in Jesus Christ and experienced by the Christian community, and not to hope to get this object-

ive knowledge of what God is in His unrevealed character. We may move upward in our thought inductively from the revelation which we have, not from the philosophical top downward, and therefore in neither case merely dogmatically. Although these two methods, the philosophical and the scientific, must eventually come to the same practical result, and are never to be thought of as occupying separate worlds, yet Ritschl is quite confident that for the Christian church the inductive method which deals with established facts and the historical method which rests on biblical exegesis, are not only abundantly sufficient, but alone safe. We are even to limit our theological knowledge drawn from the Gospels to practical ends. And this experimental Christianity does not need the scientific knowledge of God and the world, beyond that which is revealed, nor can we obtain by naturalistic or rationalistic means what is not revealed.

But to Ritschl God is just as much the God of the universe as to any philosopher or to any theologian of any school. To the influence of Ritschl as much as to any other theologian is due the recent turning of theological thought from transcendentalism toward the immanence of God. The Christian view of the world which Ritschl has certainly made fundamental in all his theology, is that the world belongs to God, is the sphere for God's revelation, is used of God for higher ends, so that God is not less to the world in the Christian sense, but more. Ritschl believed that what science can-

not furnish because it cannot distinguish natural forces from spiritual forces, and which philosophy presents too feebly for distinctively religious purposes, the Christian is able to realize vividly and comprehensively with the experimental acceptance of Christ's lordship in His world-conquering community. But is Jesus Christ to be thought of as nowhere but in His community, and is not God to be believed in and personally worshipped as the One inhabiting eternity? Ritschl has certainly held very close to his scientific treatment. But all halo and mystery are not to vanish under the scientific rigidity of theology. That would be the securing of deliverance from an old literalness only to fall into the more deadening bondage to a new. It is true that personality, with which religion has to do, is scientifically knowable only in its manifested phenomena, and scientific theology can go no further than these. But while personality is truly in its activities, it is itself more than they all. Love is not mystery, but there is no love without mystery. Worship is not absolutely superrational, and it cannot exist on an irrational basis, but it cannot be confined within the limits of rational concepts.

But Ritschl's theology does not shut a man up, with just so many historical facts, and turn him, with his face set, toward the treadmill of his little world and his little doings in it. That were indeed to reduce everything to morality alone. To Ritschl religion is just the opposite of mechanism. It is

spiritual freedom in fellowship with the only God there is, in the person of the only Jesus Christ there is, and in the only kingdom of God, which is His living community. The prophets, of all those before Christ, saw God. The Psalms are full of the poetry and spiritual movement of worship; and it is with these that Ritschl sees the revelation of Jesus Christ joined, while the latter morality and ethics of Scribe and Pharisee is discredited. Ritschl does not seek to shut up religion to the earthly life of Jesus any more than he would limit faith to His death. We have seen that with him revelation is completed only when we have received the knowledge of our eternal Father, our eternal Redeemer, and the redeemed community for which the worlds were made. Scientific theology cannot, however, make the leap beyond the historical revelation given; but religion as we see it in Jesus Christ is for the first time in all the world given its own free space and atmosphere, and yet always in such a way that fancies and speculations are to have no life in themselves. The revealed life alone is to rule every fancy, and poesy is to have its roots in the concrete truths we know. Science cannot write a poem, construct a philosophy, found a religion; but theology is the science of that life which can produce them all. The Ritschl with whom we have been seeking to establish an acquaintance is not to be thought of, therefore, as the scientific theologian of dead forms, but of living persons and the deepest and best that belong to

this concrete spiritual world. If he speaks of a world-conquering morality, it is because such a morality can come from a soul in fellowship with Jesus Christ. And that Ritschl in his treatment of prayer should not make petition its chief element is not strange, for love seeks to give, more than to receive. It is natural that with him thanksgiving should be the key-note of the soul's communion with its Prophet, its Priest, its King.

V. Eck, from the pietistic point of view,¹ writes very appreciatively, yet naturally also pathetically, of Ritschl's criticism of pietism. Ritschl had an appreciation of the character of the pietists as Christians. It was just as far from his thought to deprecate piety as it was to advocate Lutheran formalism, or mere intellectuality. If Ritschl had one purpose above another, it was to present to the world a living religion with all the vigour of the absolutely loyal soul in it. Only he would not make the test of Christian character to be the possession of immediate revelations, but of personal confidence in the forgiveness of sins by Jesus Christ, and in His priestly work in our behalf.

It is a most definite presentation which Ritschl gives us of the faith-conception of the Christian life as predominant over the conception of love considered as mere ecstasy. With Ritschl, faith is turned into love in the form of heroic service or humble simple patience, and into faithfulness in things

¹ *Die theologische Schule Albrecht Ritschls*, von Gustav Eck, 1897.

small as well as great. To Ritschl this emphasis of confidence in God, instead of the sentiment of love to God, was but the re-emphasis of the Reformation conception of faith over a mediæval conception of love which had often developed into asceticism and mysticism. Confidence in God as revealed in Jesus Christ, loyalty to the task of the kingdom of God, and love to God shown to the brethren, was the threefold direction of Christian life which gives it at the same time a full Christian assurance.

If in our American Christianity we have had more appreciation for the love-conception, it should prove helpful to try to enter for a brief experience, at least, into the view opened up by the faith-conception, which to Ritschl was alone purely Protestant in distinction from Catholic. It is a great subject which is opened up for consideration, and one which is again beginning to receive large attention, and is certain to receive much more. The exaltation of the mystical has been very marked in the Christian life of England and America as well as of Germany.¹ Certain it is that the principles of analysis which Ritschl has introduced will be helpful in giving the necessary means for critical examination and for an independent self-judgment.

¹ The English translation of the *Theologia Germanica* which was published in America in 1855 contains a letter of commendation by Chevalier Bunsen, an Introduction by Charles Kingsley, and a Preface by Professor Calvin E. Stowe. Professor Inge devoted the Bampton Lectures of 1899 to the exposition and advocacy of Christian mysticism.

It is a reasonable question whether eventually there may not come an enrichment to the church from a deeper appreciation of the mutual relations of both faith and love. It is certainly not desirable that the warmth and fervour of mediæval devotion should be lost. And it is just as certainly not necessary that the faith-element which made the Reformation, and which was as much a revival as it was a revolution—which was, indeed, first a revival that it might become a revolution—should develop into cold intellectuality and formalism. There is, in any case, no need for apologies in behalf of one who sees the dangers of hallucination from mere sentiment, and the possibilities of a misdirection of the best unguided impulses of love; and who in an earnest way seeks to re-emphasize those tests for reality and those objects for activity given in the gospel itself, and which are as inexorable as they are religious. If Ritschl has discouraged interest in the unusual in piety, he has sought to guide the attention toward the inauguration of a revival in the common piety of every-day life.

VI. The significance of the kingdom of God as Ritschl saw it, and the relation which he conceived of as existing between this and the greatness of Christ, may be thought of as working together in forming one of the greatest of his conceptions. The kingdom of God is that which gives value to the world and our life in it. Everything in the world and for the eternities finds here its verification and its true measure of worth. And Christ, as the con-

scious Founder of this kingdom and all it implies of the foreknowledge and final purpose of God, is by this very fact pre-eminently seen to be our divine Lord and the Head of the church of God. In this Ritschl has given a much needed exaltation of the ethical, not only as over against the natural, but especially in its relation of worth to the kingdom of God. And no effort to separate Ritschl's view of the ethical and moral from their source in the religious will ever be successful. Whoever tries to twist these conceptions of Ritschl's into mere moralism or legalism will most certainly find himself unable to present anything of value for the history of doctrine. Ritschl's central conception, his whole theological trend, his one life-purpose, are as fundamentally religious as any that can be found in modern theology. Indeed, Ritschl's conception of the Christian community as the kingdom of God is, taken all in all, the best example of religious realism without sentimentality to be found in our period.

VII. Ritschl nowhere shows his genius as a theologian more clearly than in his consistent application of what he considers a correct psychology to the problems of Christian theology. We have seen this in his conception of sin, in his exposition of justification and reconciliation, and especially in his grasp of the fundamental character of love itself as furnishing the key to the Christian view of God and the world. To go more fully here into these great questions would be to encroach upon the most in-

teresting but most difficult field of the dogmatic theologian. It is enough for us to recognize the fact that Ritschl, in treating these subjects in a purely psychological way, has indicated what he considers the true method for their exposition.

§ 20. RITSCHL'S INFLUENCE ON THEOLOGICAL RECONSTRUCTION.

It is not within the scope of these pages to show in detail how great has been the influence of Ritschl in creating discontent with formalism and dogmatism, and in awakening an earnest desire for more concrete and vital statements of the doctrines of Christian salvation. Those who have supposed that final results have already been reached in dogmatics have found in Ritschl a disturber of their quiet. Those who believe that Christian doctrines may be composed in part of philosophical speculation, or that metaphysical presuppositions may properly have a place in the authoritative dogma of the church, will have little patience with one whose scientific method cuts into what has been standing on an equality with the revealed elements of evangelical theology. But in the view of the impartial historian Ritschl's line of thought does not awaken distrust, but rather inspires confidence in the present and for the future. Ritschl was not a heretic, for he lived and died a reverent and loyal disciple of Jesus Christ. He was not the introducer of philosophical novelties, for he has set theological

science above philosophical speculation. He was not opposed to revivals, for he turned away from the scholastic Luther to the earlier Luther of religious experience. He was no innovator in the church, for while desiring to start no new society of his own, he made the old church the mediating agency of reconciliation with God, and the living church itself the realization of the community of the kingdom of God.

However he may be judged by others, in all the work which he did he himself believed that he had not only preserved all the vital conceptions of the Christian revelation, but also preserved these in their most practical form. And to those who know him best there can be little doubt that he will really be found to be one of the most valuable and effective conservative forces in the days of reconstruction which are always before us. Certain it is, that just so far as the historical and scientific spirit of Albrecht Ritschl shall influence the future, there will be no mystical vagueness in subjective experience, no futile reaching into the air after unrealizable ideals, no rash sawing off of the historical trunk between our past and our future.

We have seen enough to be convinced that under his influence the reconstruction of theology can never come to stand for the untried novelties of theological revolution, or theological anarchy, but for a new life on thoroughly evangelical lines.

A personal canvass of those most seriously interested in theological reconstruction on a thoroughly

evangelical basis, and who believe that such a reconstruction ought to be undertaken and can be accomplished, would probably reveal the fact that most of them are either working directly on the lines which they have found in Albrecht Ritschl, or are using fundamental principles in substantial accord with those which we have just been examining.

We may safely predict that evangelical reconstruction will continue to be historical, resting on the absolutely normative factors of divine revelation; redemptive love will be the fundamental principle, and the person of the historical Jesus the central factor in it; it will be psychological, dealing not with a legal order of the universe, but with the living realities of the forgiveness of guilt and of personal fellowship with God; it will place the ethical above the cosmic, the conception of God as compassion above the conception of God as cause; and it will be content with no make-believe fellowship with God as a utilitarian means of securing merely moral and ethical results, however beautiful in themselves; but in fundamental distinction from this, the end of its redemptive effort will be that real communion with the living God in the person of Jesus Christ which finds its expressions of loyalty and love in ways that are vitally and simply human, because just these are the natural witnesses of that divine life which overcomes the world. And this fellowship itself, which is the fundamental aim of the redemptive purpose of God, will be thought of

as no temporary result, but as the entrance upon those personal relations of blessedness which are as eternal as the life and love of God Himself. But such conceptions as these, wrought out into a new personally grounded and personally adjusted theological system, will be essentially Ritschlian not only in spirit and aim, but substantially in the means employed in bringing all into a living organism.

The Christian world need never fear for the positive and evangelical character of any theology of the present or the future which shall make redemption the key to its message, repentance and the forgiveness of sins the door into its new world. And such a theology may be thought of as belonging to the new days in just so far as it turns from legal externalities and seriously takes up as its task the comprehensive expression of these redemptive forces in the terms of personality.

INSTRUCTION
IN THE
CHRISTIAN RELIGION
BY
ALBRECHT RITSCHL

*TRANSLATED BY PERMISSION FROM THE
FOURTH GERMAN EDITION*

BY
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INSTRUCTION IN THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION.

INTRODUCTION.

1. Since the Christian religion has its origin in a special revelation, and exists in a special community of believers and worshippers, its peculiar conceptions of God, in order to be understood, must always be considered in connection with the recognition of the Bearer of this revelation, and with the right appreciation of the Christian community. A system of teaching which ignores either the one or the other of these two elements will prove defective.
2. Christianity claims to be the perfect religion, as distinguished from all other kinds and grades of religion, and to furnish man with that which in all other religions is striven after but is only dimly and imperfectly realized. That is the perfect religion in which a perfect knowledge of God is possible. This perfect knowledge of God Christianity claims to have, because its community originates in Jesus

Christ, who as the Son of God ascribes to Himself perfect knowledge of His Father,¹ and because it derives its knowledge of God from the same Spirit of God, in whom God knows Himself.² These conditions of the existence of the Christian religion are referred to in our baptism into the name of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit.³

3. To understand Christianity so as to appreciate its claim to perfection (§ 2), the point of view must be that of the Christian community. Because however in the course of history this point of view has often been shifted, and the intellectual horizon of the community clouded by outside influences, it stands as the foundation-principle of the Evangelical Church that Christian doctrine is to be obtained from the Bible alone.¹ This principle has direct reference to the original documents of Christianity gathered together in the New Testament, for the understanding of which the original documents of the Hebrew religion gathered together in the Old Testament serve as an indispensable aid. These books are the foundation of a right understanding of the Christian religion from the point of view of the community, for the reason that the Gospels set forth in the work of its Founder the imme-

¹ Matt. xi. 27.

² 1 Cor. ii. 10-12.

³ Matt. xxviii. 19.

³¹ Art. Samlc. II 2. Verbum dei condit articulos fidei, et praeterea nemo, ne angelus quidem. Form. Concordiae, Procem.

diate cause and final end of the common religion, and the Epistles make known the original state of the common faith in the community, and moreover in a form not yet affected by the influences which as early as the second century had stamped Christianity as Catholic.

4. The instruction in the Christian religion must be so divided that the conditions set forth in § 1 shall be preserved. Moreover, that portion of the doctrine which has direct reference to the life of the individual Christian will be governed by the mutual conditions of religion and of ethical development, as directly pointed out in the preceding divisions. The instruction in the Christian religion may be divided as follows:

1. The doctrine of the kingdom of God.
2. The doctrine of reconciliation through Christ.
3. The doctrine of the Christian life.
4. The doctrine of public worship.

PART FIRST.

THE DOCTRINE OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD.

5. The kingdom of God is the divinely vouched-for highest good¹ of the community² founded through His revelation in Christ; but it is the highest good only in the sense that it forms at the same time the ethical ideal, for whose attainment³ the

⁵¹ Rom. xiv. 16-18. The kingdom of God is the divinely ordained end of the preaching of Christ, including the demand for change of heart and for faith (Mark i. 15), and forming the principal subject of prayer to God (Luke xi. 2; Matt. vi. 10). The value of the highest good is especially set forth in the parable of the wedding-feast (Matt. xxii. 2-14; viii. 11; Luke xiv. 16-24; xiii. 29). In John the promise of eternal life has the same significance.

² Christ in His office of Revealer actualizes the kingdom of God (Matt. xii. 28); in order to assure its task for men, He calls the twelve disciples, that they may be with Him (Mark iii. 14; Luke vi. 13), may learn the mysteries of the kingdom (Mark iv. 11), and enter into the same union with God which He Himself maintained (John xvii. 19-23); in accordance with this purpose He distinguishes them, the sons of God, as a special religious community, from the Israelitish community of the servants of God (Matt. xvii. 24-27).

³ The parables (Mark iv.), which set forth the mysteries of the kingdom in figures of the growth of grain, etc., al-

members of the community bind themselves together through their definite reciprocal action.⁴ This meaning of the conception becomes clear through the task which is at the same time expressed in it.

6. The righteous conduct in which the members of the Christian community share in the bringing in of the kingdom of God has its universal law and its personal motive in love to God and to one's neighbour.¹ This love receives its impulse from the love of God revealed in Jesus Christ (§§ 13, 22).

ways signify by "fruit" a human product, springing out of an individual activity called forth by the divine "seed," i.e., by the impulse of the divine word of revelation. The parable of the labourers in the vineyard has the same meaning (Matt. xx).

5⁴ Fruit is the figure for a good deed or for righteous conduct (Matt. vii. 16-20; xiii. 33; Jas. iii. 18; Phil. i. 11). The kingdom of God consists in the exercise of righteousness, in the peace thereby produced among all its members, and in the joy or blessedness proceeding from the Holy Spirit (Matt. vi. 33; Rom. xiv. 17, 18). As to peace, compare Mark ix. 50; Rom. xii. 18; xiv. 19; 2 Cor. xiii. 11; 1 Thess. v. 13; Heb. xii. 14. As to joy and blessedness, compare Gal. v. 22; Jas. i. 25; and Luther's Smaller Catechism, second division, second article: "That I live under Him in His kingdom and serve Him in everlasting righteousness, innocence and blessedness."

6¹ The law which Christ indicates, as expressed in the two chief commandments of the Mosaic law (Mark xii. 28-33), has reference to the conduct suitable to the kingdom of God. Love to God has no sphere of activity outside of love to one's brother (1 John iv. 19-21; v. 1-3).

The broadening of the conception of one's neighbour to include men as men, i.e., as moral beings, distinguishes the kingdom of God from the narrower moral circles limited by the natural endowment [Ausstattung] of men and by the natural interdependence of their common activities.² The law of love, however, appears also in contrast to the arrangement of human society as based merely on private right,³ and goes beyond the principle of regard for others set forth in the Mosaic decalogue.⁴

⁶² One's neighbour is no longer one's relative or compatriot alone, but possibly may be also the benevolent citizen of a hostile people (Luke x. 29-37); thus love of one's enemy in manifestations which are at all permissible is included in the Christian love which embraces all mankind (Matt. v. 43-48; Rom. xii. 20, 21). This special command does not mean that we shall support an enemy in what he is doing against us, but that we shall have regard for his dignity as a human being. The ordinary duty, of course, is love of the brethren (1 Pet. i. 22; iii. 8; 1 Thess. iv. 9; Rom. xii. 10; Heb. xiii. 1), to whom one is also bound to extend forgiveness (Luke xi. 4; xvii. 3, 4); but since the Christian community is the special body in which the members of different peoples are bound together into a moral fellowship whose principle is brotherly love, the circle of the kingdom of God is in this latter command also extended to include all men (Gal. iii. 28; v. 6; 1 Cor. vii. 19; Col. iii. 10, 11).

³ The surrender of private rights which follows from the law of love is the rule in intercourse with the brethren (Matt. v. 23, 24, 38-42; the evil doer referred to in v. 39 must also be understood to be a brother).

⁴ The Mosaic decalogue, except in the command to honour one's parents, prescribes negative regard for the

7. The Christian conception of the kingly authority of God, to which the kingdom of God as the union of subjects bound together by righteous conduct corresponds, arose out of the similarly expressed thoughts in the Israelitish religion, which are indicative of its original purpose.¹ These conceptions are in their historical development elevated by the prophets to the expectation that through the supernatural judgments of God His dominion will be realized in the righteousness of the morally purified Jewish people, and will be recog-

personal rights of every one, in the sense of not inflicting injury (Ex. xx. 12-17). This negative care for the rights of others is always the presupposition of the positive regard which finds its completion in the love of others (Rom. xii. 10); this love manifests itself in the positive demand for the good of all, therefore in the exercise of public spirit (Rom. xii. 16, 17; xv. 7; Phil. ii. 2-4; 2 Cor. xiii. 11; 1 Thess. v. 11; Heb. x. 24; 1 Pet. iii. 8). Thus the "royal law of love" includes in itself the decalogue and has a broader reach than its prohibitions (Jas. ii. 8, 9; Rom. xiii. 8-10).

⁷¹ The one only God who created the world and therefore is the King of all nations (Jer. x. 10-16; Ps. xlvii; xcvi; ciii. 19-22) will especially lead his chosen people as their King, on condition that they by obedience keep His covenant (Ex. xix. 5, 6; Judg. viii. 23; Is. xxxiii. 22). As ruler God administers justice among all peoples (Ps. ix. 8, 9; 1 Sam. ii. 2-10; Is. iii. 13), but especially among the chosen people, partly as their leader in war, maintaining their cause against other peoples (Ex. vii. 4; Ps. vii. 7-14; lxxvi. 5-10; xcix. 1-5), and partly executing justice for righteous individuals against their insolent oppressors (Ps. xxxv.; xxxvii.; 1.).

nized also by heathen peoples.² This idea is distinguished from the heathen designation of their gods as kings, partly by the background of the free creation of the world by God, and partly by the humane content of the corresponding law (§ 6, 4); and for this very reason begets the expectation of the religious and moral purification of the nations. The Christian form of this thought goes beyond its Old Testament form, in that the ethical end of the dominion of God is set free from admixture with the political and ceremonial conditions under which the Old Testament idea and the Jewish hope laboured.³

8. The kingdom of God, which thus (§§ 5-7) presents the spiritual and ethical task of those gathered in the Christian community, is supernatural, in so far as it is higher than the ethical forms of society,—marriage, the family, the calling, private and public justice, or the State. These are conditioned by the natural endowment of man,—difference in sex, birth, class, nationality,—and therefore also offer occasions to self-seeking. The kingdom of God, even as it now exists in the world as the present product of love-inspired action, is supramundane, in so far as we understand under mundane all natural, naturally conditioned and divided exist-

² Is. ii. 2-4; Mic. iv. 1-4; Jer. iii. 14-18; iv. 1, 2; Is. xlvi. 1-6; li. 4-6; lvi. 6-8.

³ Mark x. 42-45; xii. 13-17; ii. 27, 28 (compare with Is. lvi. 2-5); Matt. xvii. 24-27.

ence. And the kingdom of God is also the highest good of those who are united in it, in so far as it offers the solution of the question propounded or implied in all religions, namely, how man, recognizing himself as a part of the world, and at the same time as being capable of a spiritual personality, can attain to that dominion over the world, as opposed to limitation by it, which this capability gives him the right to claim. The supernatural and supramundane kingdom of God continues to exist as the highest good of its members even when the present mundane conditions of spiritual life are changed (§ 76).

9. Although benevolent actions and human organizations inspired by love, are perceptible as such to the senses, nevertheless the motive of love which inspires them is in no case perfectly open to the observation of others, and therefore the presence of the kingdom of God within the Christian community is always invisible and a subject of religious faith.¹ Especially can the real membership of the kingdom of God not be regarded as identical with that of the Christian community, in so far as this in concrete worship becomes visible as the Church.²

⁹¹ Luke xvii. 20, 21; Heb. xi. 1.

² The name of the community of believers (church, *ἐκκλησία*, Heb. *kahal*), in harmony with Old Testament use of terms, designates also its public united worship (§ 81). But this religious community has at the same

10. The equality of all men as such, regardless of differences of nation and of rank (§ 6, 2), and the duty of universal brotherly love, are recognized even in the classic thought of paganism. Greek poets recognize the equality of freeman and slave.¹ Stoic philosophers witness to the brotherhood of all men, and derive from this conception of human nature the virtues which are to lead to the estab-

time to unite itself to the kingdom of God by the mutual exercise of love. By virtue of the different nature of these two activities, and the difference of the conditions under which they arise, it follows that they are never exercised to an equal extent during the historical existence of the community. The community of believers must fulfil its mission in these two relations, and in such a way that the two lines of their activity shall stand in reciprocal relation to one another, but it is a mistake so to identify the two as to use the same name interchangeably for them both. For the duties in the exercise of which the community becomes a church are not those by which it unites itself to the kingdom of God, and *vice versa*. And it is particularly misleading to claim, as does the Roman Catholic Church, the right to consider itself the kingdom of God because of a certain external judicial form [rechtliche Verfassung].

10¹ Menander: "The slave becomes base, when he learns merely to bend himself to every service; give freedom of word to the slave and he will surely become the best of the good." "Serve in a free spirit and thou dost not serve." Philemon: "Even he who is a slave, Madam, is yet none the less human, since he is verily a human being." "Though one be a slave, he is yet of the same flesh; for nature never created a slave, it is only fortune that has thrust the body into servitude."

lishment of the most comprehensive human fellowship,² and all this apart from any thought of God. None the less is it a fact that the transformation of human society in accordance with these views was a development, not out of Stoicism, but out of Christianity. This is accounted for by two reasons. First, a conclusion the exact opposite of that of the Stoics may as easily be drawn from the conception of the nature of man, because everything depends on the empirical view which gives content to this conception. Second, a knowledge of universal ethical precepts, as such, is never sufficient to call out and to organize corresponding activity. This only follows when a special, and indeed a religious motive, or ground of obligation, is united with the knowledge of the universal principle. Accordingly

¹⁰ ² Antiochus of Ascalon in Cicero's "De finibus bonorum et malorum," V. 23, 65: "In omni honesto, de quo loquimur, nihil est tam illustre, nec quod latius pateat, quam conjunctio inter homines hominum et quasi quae-dam societas et communicatio utilitatum et ipsa caritas generis humani, quae nata a primo satu, quo a procreatoribus nati diliguntur et tota domus conjugio et stirpe conjungitur, serpit sensim foras, cognationibus primum, tum affinitatibus, deinde amicitiis, post vicinitatibus, tum civibus et iis qui publice socii atque amici sunt, deinde totius complexu gentis humanae: quae animi affectio, suum cuique tribuens, atque hanc, quam dico, societatem conjunctionis humanae munifice et aequa tuens, justitia dicitur." Seneca expresses himself similarly. Compare the collection in Schmidt, "Die bürgerliche Gesellschaft in der altrömischen Welt," p. 306.

the principles, common in a certain degree to both Stoicism and Christianity, became fruitful only upon the soil of the latter, because here they were brought into union with the ground of obligation found in the special religious community. The highest standard for this relation of obligation, however, is the thought of a supramundane supernatural God.³ And the exercise of benevolence, instead of being connected with an unstable conception of human nature, is so much the more surely connected with this thought, in proportion as the union of men as men at which it aims bears in itself the stamp of the supernatural and the supramundane (§ 8).

11. The complete name of God, which corresponds to the Christian revelation, is "The God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ."¹ In this is included the fact, recognized to some extent in the religions of all civilized nations [Culturreligionen], that God is a spiritual person. It includes also the characteristics first brought out in the religion of the Old Testament, that God is the only Being of His kind,² that He is not burdened with nature,

¹⁰³ Concerning a standard of this relation which comes closer to us, compare § 19.

¹ ¹ 2 Cor. i. 3; xi. 31; Rom. xv. 6; Col. i. 3; Eph. i. 3; I Pet. i. 3.

² 1 Sam. ii. 2; Is. xlv. 18, 21, 22; Ex. xx. 2, 3. The Old Testament conception of the gods of the heathen is accordingly either that they are nothing or vanity (Lev. xix. 4; 2 Kings xvii. 15; Jer. ii. 5; viii. 19), or, in so far as their existence is granted, that they are subordinate organs of the government of the only God (Deut. iv. 19;

and thus did not come into existence with the world like the heathen divinities; but that He is the Creator of the universe, the Will that determines Himself and all things for Himself,³ and who in particular designs a community of men for religious communion with Himself and ethical communion with one another.⁴

x. 17; Ps. xcv. 3; xcvi. 4; 1 Cor. viii. 5, 6). Being the only One the true God is the Holy One (1 Sam. ii. 2), unattainable by the way of natural knowledge, exalted above all sense perception, inviolable.

ii³ Gen. i.; Is. xlv. 12; Matt. xi. 25. That God as the absolutely free Will determines Himself, and as Creator determines all that together makes the world, is united into the statement that God is the end of the universe, or that the course of the world ministers to His glory (1 Cor. viii. 6; Rom. xi. 36; Eph. iv. 6). The conception of the creation of the world by God lies entirely outside of all observation and ordinary experience, and therefore outside of the realm of scientific knowledge, which is limited by these. Thus, even though we are able to obtain from experience a clear idea of natural causes and effects, yet the creation of the world by God cannot rightly be thought of as analogous to these forms of knowledge. It can only be analogous to the original force of our will directed toward an object, and this as we think of the world, not as individual parts, but as a whole in relation to God.

⁴ Scientific observation of nature is directed toward the causal relationship of things. Since it regards organic beings (plants, animals) with reference to the end which they have in themselves, it has no occasion to recognize them as necessarily existing for the sake of man. Such a relationship is only apprehended by the religious judg-

12. In the complete Christian name of God, "The God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ," is also indirectly included that He is the Father of all, of whatever nationality, who are united in the community of the Lord Jesus Christ. Therefore in the abbreviated name, "God our Father,"¹ the thought is expressed that the only God directs His especial purpose to this community, whose highest good and common task is the kingdom of God (§ 5). Now, however, the complete name of God indicates that He has only assumed this especial relation to this community because He is already first the Father of Jesus Christ, whom they recognize as their Lord. But in this capacity Christ stands by so much nearer to God than any other, because He shares in God's attribute of being the end of creation,² and because in His relation of sonship to the Father He recognizes Himself as set apart from the world.³ The key to the relation be-

ment; thus in the Old Testament everything is subservient to the world-supremacy of the Israelitish people.

12¹ In the majority of the inscriptions of the New Testament epistles.

² As the end of creation (Col. i. 16; Eph. i. 10), Christ is also by the divine purpose the central reason [Mittelgrund] for creation (1 Cor. viii. 6). As Lord over all He is the One "to whom every knee shall bow," that is, He receives divine worship (Phil. ii. 9-11). But God the Father is placed over Him (1 Cor. iii. 23; viii. 6).

³ Matt. xi. 27. That God alone knows the Son signifies that He is set apart from all the world. God's knowledge of Him, however, includes in itself a voluntary purpose

tween God the Father and the Son of God is found in the declaration that God is love.⁴

13. In the complete name of God the fact that God is our Father is connected with Jesus Christ in so far as He is recognized as the Lord of a particular fellowship (§ 12). Through Christ's mediation this community of human beings is also designated as the object of the divine love.¹ This relation would not be conceivable if God's purpose were merely the maintenance of the natural existence of the human race. For in this case men would not be of like nature with God (§ 12, 4). The conception of God as love necessitates that idea of humanity which destines it for the kingdom of God,

(1 Pet. i. 20; Rom. viii. 29). Thus Jesus knowing His peculiar existence to be grounded in the love of His Father (John x. 17; xv. 10), places this relation above the coherence and existence of the world (John xvii. 24).

12⁴ John iv. 8, 16. Love is the constant purpose to further another rational being of like nature with oneself in the attainment of his peculiar end [Bestimmung], and in such a way that the one who loves follows in so doing his *own* proper object [Selbstzweck]. This appropriation of the life-purpose of another is thus not a weakening negation but a strengthening affirmation of one's own purpose. Thus if God is revealed as love in that He directs His purpose toward Jesus Christ His Son, the love of God will be revealed in proportion as this purpose includes the world of which this Son is Lord, and causes it to be recognized as the means to the end, this end being Christ as the Head of the community.

13¹ Rom. v. 5-8; viii. 39; 2 Thess. ii. 16; 1 John iv. 9, 10; Heb. xii. 6.

and for the activity directed toward this kingdom, i.e., the mutual union of men through action springing from love² (§ 6). This destiny, however, is realized by men in their union into the community of their Lord Jesus Christ.

14. The reciprocal relation between the conception of God as love, and of the kingdom of God as the final purpose of the world, is confirmed by the statement that the establishment of the kingdom of God was divinely decreed before the foundation of the world.¹ The eternity of God, which this implies, is, however, not sufficiently expressed in saying that His existence reaches out beyond that of the world without beginning or end, and that God has therefore a different measure of time from that of men.² Rather do we recognize God's eternity in the fact that amid all the changes of things, which also indicate variation in His working, He Himself remains the same, as well as maintains the same purpose and plan in which He creates and directs the world.³

¹³² In the love shown by Christians to their brethren the love of God is perfected (1 John ii. 5; iv. 12), i.e., finds its complete revelation.

¹⁴¹ Eph. i. 4-6. "God has chosen us (the Christian community) in Christ (as Lord of the same) before the foundation of the world, that we might be holy and without blame before Him; having in love predestined us to the adoption of children through Jesus Christ to Himself, according to the good pleasure of His will, to the praise of the glory of His grace."

² Ps. xc. 2, 4.

³ Ps. cii. 26-28.

15. The religious recognition of the omnipotence and omnipresence of God, which are implied in the creation and preservation of the world by the will of God,¹ does not undertake to explain the continuance of natural things in whole or in part,² but always to establish the certainty of the care and gracious presence of God for the good, by the fact that the world-creating and world-preserving will of God has for its purpose the good of man. Therefore the thought of the omnipotence of God completes itself consistently in that of His wisdom, omniscience and disposition to meet the needs of men.³

16. Out of the thought of the omnipotence of God arises first the perception of the insignificance of man. Yet inasmuch as the same thought is also

¹⁵¹ Ps. xxiv. 1, 2; cxv. 3; cxxxv. 6; cxxxix. 7-12.

² This is the application given to these divine attributes in the theological doctrine that God as the First Cause is present in all mediate causes. This doctrine consists, nevertheless, of a confused mixture of religious and scientific observation. The idea of God is not at the disposal of science in her explanation of nature, and this explanation would indeed militate against the content of this idea, if it should make Him, under the conception of cause, similar to the natural causes which are explicable by observation. Religious observation of nature, however, does not limit itself to the explanation of natural phenomena as such, but subordinates their existence for the sake of man to the will of God (§ 11, 4), which is entirely different in kind from natural causes.

³ Ps. cxxxix (as a whole, culminating in verses 23, 24); xxxiii. 13-19; civ.; Job v. 8-27; xi. 7-20; xxxvi.; xxxvii.

the foundation of our impression of God's constant readiness to help (goodness, mercy, grace, pity¹), it receives in the special revelation of the Old and New Covenants the peculiar stamp of *righteousness*. By righteousness the Old Testament signifies the consistency of God's providence [Leitung zum Heil], manifested now in the case of the pious and upright individual adherents of the Old Covenant,² and now undertaken for the community, over whom the government of God is to be perfected for their salvation.³ In so far as the righteousness of God manifests itself for this end according to its directing purpose of salvation, in spite of all the difficulties which proceed from the Israelites themselves, it is *faithfulness*.⁴ Thus in the New Testament also the righteousness of God is recognized as the standard of the special operations by which the community of Christ is brought into existence and led on to perfection,⁵ and therefore cannot be distinguished from the grace of God.

17. The religious view of the world is based on the fact that all the operations of nature are at God's disposal when He wishes to help men (§ 15).

¹⁶¹ Ps. cxlv. 8, 9; Ex. xxxiv. 6; Ps. ciii. 8; Acts xiv. 15-17; Jas. v. 11; Rom. ii. 4; 2 Cor. i. 3.

¹⁷ Ps. xxxv. 23-28; xxxi. 2-8; xlvi. 10-12; lxv. 5; cxliii. 11, 12; li. 14-16.

³ Is. xlvi. 21; xlvi. 13; li. 1-6; lvi. 1.

⁴ Hos. ii. 18-21; Zech. viii. 8; Ps. cxliii. 1.

⁵ 1 John i. 9 (Ps. li. 16); Rom. iii. 25, 26; John xvii. 25, 26; Heb. vi. 10 (1 Cor. i. 8, 9; 1 Thess. v. 23, 24).

Accordingly remarkable natural occurrences, which are in experience connected with especial help from God,¹ are regarded as miracles, and thus as special tokens² of His gracious readiness to help believers. Therefore the conception of miracles stands necessarily in reciprocal relation to a special belief in the providence of God, and apart from this relation is quite impossible.³

¹⁷¹ Ps. cv.; cvii.; lxxi. 16, 21; lxxxvi. 8-17; lxxxix. 6-15; xcvi. 1-3; cxlv. 3-7; Job v. 8-11.

² Signs and wonders, Ps. cxxxv. 8, 9; Ex. iii. 12; xiii. 9.

³ Mark v. 34; x. 52; vi. 5, 6. We shift completely the religious conception of miracle when we measure it against the background of the scientific acceptance of the orderly coherence of all natural events. Since this conception lies outside the horizon of the men of the Old and the New Testaments, a miracle never signifies to them an occurrence contrary to nature, or a breaking through of the laws of nature by divine arbitrariness. Hence the belief in miracle in the sense above referred to, as a gracious providence of God, is perfectly consistent with the probability of the coherence of the whole world in accordance with natural law. If, nevertheless, certain accounts in the Bible appear to be contrary to these laws, it is neither the duty of science to explain this appearance nor to confirm it as a fact, nor is it the duty of religion to recognize these narrated events as divine operations contrary to the laws of nature. Neither ought one to base one's religious faith in God and Jesus Christ upon a preceding judgment of this kind (John iv. 48; 1 Cor. i. 22), especially since every experience of miracle presupposes faith. Beginning, however, with faith, every one will meet the miraculous in his own experience, and, in view of this, it is entirely unnecessary to stumble at the miracles which others have experienced.

18. God administers the government of the world, that is, the adjusting of the relation between man and the world, by means of retribution. This legal conception belongs to Christianity, as to all religions, because several of its characteristics correspond to the relations which are recognized in every religious view of the world. For law as well as religion has to do with regulating the relation of the individual to the world in accordance with his social or moral worth, and has to do further with the fact that this position is assigned or recognized by an external will (of society or the state, or God). Thus the conception of divine reward and divine punishment is also employed in Christianity.¹ The analogy exists also in the fact that as the exercise of the right of punishment in the state is only a means of upholding the public well-being, so also the divine punishments which are visited upon godless and persistently rebellious men are always subordinate to the purpose of perfecting the salvation of the righteous and maintaining their cause in the world. But these dispensations of God are never in His purpose a matter of equivalents. On the contrary, there is not involved in this legal administration on God's part either, first, any admission of human right as against God,² or, second,

^{18¹} Matt. v. 12; vi. 1, 2; 1 Cor. iii. 8; 2 Thess. i. 8, 9; Heb. x. 29.

² Job xli. 11; Rom. xi. 35. In general the view of life set forth in the biblical writings moves within the limits set by the covenant grace of God. When, therefore, the

any equality between reward and worthiness, and punishment and unworthiness,³ or, third, any immediate congruence between misfortune and guilt, prosperity and goodness in individual cases, as might have been expected from the divine power, whereas this is referred to the future, particularly to the final judgment and the future life.⁴ Therefore

righteousness of God is appealed to for the reward of righteous men (Ps. vii. 9-11; xvii. 3; lviii. 11; cxxxix. 24; 2 Thess. i. 5-7), the mutual legal relation thereby indicated is only apparent. For the righteousness of God signifies in these cases also only the consistent completion of the salvation of the righteous (§ 16), which, however, has the appearance of reward because it deals in these cases with a condition of innocence and righteousness. Properly the recompense of the righteous is the work of the grace of God (Ps. lxii. 12), that of the wicked is their exclusion from his (grace-) righteousness (Ps. lxix. 25-29). Reward and punishment are not co-ordinated as expressions of the righteousness of God, but only as visible acts of His exercise of justice, i.e., of His government of the world (Ps. xciv. 1, 2; lviii. 10, 11).

¹⁸ ³ Ex. xxxiv. 7; Mark x. 29, 30. The divine punishment in its common Old Testament representation as the wrath of God, by the very nature of the term wrath excludes the idea of an exact weighing of the amount of the punishment.

* The poets of the Old Testament find themselves completely disappointed in their natural expectation that the good would be prosperous and the wicked unhappy. They must content themselves with praying God for the righting of the wrong condition of affairs in the future. Thus the establishment of the right order awaits the future judgment of God in the Old as well as in the New Testament.

the current conclusion of the prechristian manner of judgment, that great misfortune was evidence of great guilt, is invalidated,⁵ and the probability is introduced that exactly in connection with religious and moral worthiness there may exist a high degree of worldly misfortune.⁶ Finally, however, a point of view is opened up which substitutes for the mechanical relation between reward (punishment) and worthiness (unworthiness), recognized in human law, an organic relation of cause and result.⁷ That such a principle as this is operative in all cases cannot, it is true, be clearly seen until the end. In the course of history clear examples of this principle are surrounded and obscured by manifold instances of an exactly opposite nature. Christian faith, however, does not suffer itself to be confused as to the consistent direction of the world by God through the apparently purposeless complications of the

⁵ Eliphaz draws this conclusion in the book of Job (iv. 7; xxii. 4-11); on the other hand Job's assurance of his integrity (vi. 28-30; xxiii. 10-12). As against this combination compare John ix. 1-3; Luke xiii. 1-5.

⁶ Matt. v. 11; Mark viii. 34, 35; Phil. i. 28; compare § 32.

⁷ The scheme of retribution in the final judgment (Rom. ii. 6-12; 2 Cor. v. 10; 2 Thess. i. 6, 7; Eph. vi. 8) is surpassed by the analogy of the seed and the harvest (Gal. vi. 7, 8). The final result in the case of the good as in that of the evil is but the appropriate legitimate effect of the force of the good or the evil will. In comparison therewith the brief temporal experiences of a contrary nature are not worthy of consideration.

present and the suffering of the righteous in consequence of the guilt of the unrighteous,⁸ because the regular experience of an exact and immediate connection between happiness and worthiness would endanger the freedom and dignity of the moral disposition.

19. The duty of the moral union of all men as men could become effective only as begotten out of the religious motive of the special Christian community (§ 10). Since, moreover, that duty is higher than all naturally conditioned moral motives, its value in the Christian community finds its necessary standard in the thought of a supernatural God developed in §§ 11-18. Now, however, the special fact of the community, which sets itself to the realization of this universal task as of the kingdom of God is not a natural product, but is comprehensible in its nature only as positively established by Christ. Therefore, to an understanding of the existence of this community and for our right participation in the same, it is necessary to recognize and to understand the permanent rela-

¹⁸ ⁸ Rom. xi. 33-36. From § 13 follows the universal law of the divine government, which is maintained everywhere in the Old as well as in the New Testament, that all punishment or destruction of the wicked by God serves as a means to the complete salvation of the righteous, not, however, as a co-ordinate means to His own glory or righteousness, as is set forth in Luther's and Calvin's doctrine of predestination.

tion which exists between the community of the kingdom of God and its Founder Jesus Christ.¹

20. The historical connection between Christianity and the religion of the Old Testament (§ 7) makes it natural that Jesus should represent Himself as a Prophet sent from God, who in the counsel of God is set apart over the world and mankind.¹ He sets Himself, nevertheless, above all the preceding prophets of the Old Testament, in making Himself known as the Son of God and as the promised King of David's race, Christ the Anointed,² who has not to prepare the way for the kingdom of God, but who works *the* work of God,³ i.e., who Himself exercises immediate divine ruler-

¹⁹¹ In all national religions the person of the founder, even when known (Zoroaster, Moses), is a matter of indifference, because the religious community, consisting of the whole race or people, is determined by nature. On the other hand, in universal religions (Buddhism, Christianity, Islam), allegiance to the Founder, or worship of him, is prescribed, because only through the Founder does the special community exist as it is, and only by allegiance to him can it be preserved. In these cases the difference in the estimation of Mohammed and Christ is to be explained by the difference in the nature of the two religions.

²⁰¹ Mark vi. 4; ix. 37; John iv. 34; v. 23, 24; vi. 44. It comes also under the prophetic conception (Ex. xxxiii. 11; Num. xii. 8) that Jesus speaks what He hears from God (John viii. 26, 40; xv. 15) and has seen of Him (John vi. 46; viii. 38).

² Mark xii. 1-9; viii. 29; xiv. 61, 62; John iv. 25, 26.

³ John iv. 34; xvii. 4.

ship over the new community of the sons of God, and establishes it for the future (§ 5, 2). However, the prophetic calling of Jesus is not set aside by His claim to Messianic dignity, but only modified thereby, since He exercises His right as Ruler only by His morally effective teaching and by His gracious mode of conduct, but not by the compulsion of legal judgment.⁴

21. In the moral world all personal authority is conditioned upon the nature of one's calling, and upon the connection between one's fitness for his special calling and his faithful exercise of it. Accordingly, the permanent significance of Jesus Christ for His community is based, *first*, on the fact that He was the only one qualified for His special calling, the introduction of the kingdom of God;¹ that He devoted Himself to the exercise of this highest conceivable calling in the preaching of the truth and in loving action without break or deviation,² and that

²⁰ ⁴ John xviii. 36; Mark x. 42-45.

²¹ ¹ The fitness of Jesus finds expression in His assertion of the mutual knowledge existing between Himself and God as His Father (Matt. xi. 27; John x. 15; compare Luke ii. 49). He does not know God as His Father without being Himself conscious that He is *the* one called of God to found the kingdom of God in a new religious community. This conviction vouches also for all the other sides of His spiritual endowment for this calling, because all the characteristics of His life witness to His absolute rational soundness, and there is not the least trace in Him of fanaticism or self-deception.

² The sinlessness of Jesus (John viii. 46;—1 Pet. ii. 22;

in particular as a proof of His steadfastness³ He freely accepted in willing patience⁴ the wrongs which the leaders of the Israelitish nation and the fickleness of the people brought upon Him, and which were so many temptations to draw back from His calling.

22. *Second*, the work of Jesus Christ in His calling, or the final purpose of His life, namely, the kingdom of God, is the very purpose of God in the world and is thus recognized by Christ Himself.¹ The solidaric unity between Christ and God, which Jesus accordingly claims for Himself,² has reference to the whole extent of His activity in His calling,

¹ John iii. 5; ² Cor. v. 21; Heb. iv. 15) is only the negative expression of the constancy of His disposition and conduct in His calling (obedience, Phil. ii. 8; Heb. v. 8), or for the positive righteousness in which He differs from all other men (1 Pet. iii. 18).

² ¹ Heb. ii. 18; iv. 15; Mark xiv. 33-36; i. 13.

⁴ The principle of Matt. xi. 28-30. The two Greek words, *πρᾶψις* and *ταπεινός*, point to the use of one Hebrew or Aramaic word, *anav*, which indicates the regular characteristic of the righteous in their suffering under the persecution of the godless (Ps. ix. 12; x. 12-17; xxv. 9; xxxvii. 11; lxix. 32). The addition of *τὴν καρδίᾳ* denotes that Jesus in His righteousness is ready to endure all the undeserved sufferings which follow from the opposition to His activity in His calling. Thereby, however, He makes a distinction in kind between Himself and the righteous of the Old Testament, who always seek to be delivered from undeserved suffering.

²² ¹ John iv. 34.

³ John x. 28-30, 38; xiv. 10; xvii. 21-23.

and consists therefore in the reciprocal relation between the love of God and the obedience of Jesus in His calling.³ Now Jesus, being the first to realize in His own personal life the final purpose of the kingdom of God, is therefore alone of His kind, for should any other fulfil the same task as perfectly as He, yet he would be unlike Him because dependent on Him. Therefore, as the original type of the humanity to be united into the kingdom of God, He is the original object of the love of God (§ 12), so that the love of God for the members of His kingdom also is only mediated through Him (§ 13). When, therefore, this Person, active in His peculiar calling, whose constant motive is recognizable as unselfish love to man, is valued at His whole worth, then we see in Jesus the complete revelation of God as love, grace and faithfulness.⁴

23. In every religion not only is some sort of communion with God (or the gods) sought after and attained, but there is also sought at the same time such a position of the individual toward the world as corresponds with the idea of God which rules in each particular religion. Hence, *third*, Jesus Christ's prerogative, that the rulership of the world is delivered over to Him,¹ answers to the solidaric unity of Jesus with the supramundane God, in the realization of the supramundane (§ 8) kingdom of God, which as the final purpose of God is also the

²²³ John xv. 9, 10; xvii. 24-26; x. 17; xii. 49, 50.

⁴ John i. 14; Ex. xxxiv. 6, 7; compare § 16.

²³¹ Matt. xi. 27.

final purpose of the world. The significance of this attribute is not secured if we suppose that Jesus did not exercise it, but allowed it to remain inactive, in His historical life. Moreover, He did not merely exercise it indirectly, in that by His deeds and His words and His patience in suffering He prepared the way for the kingdom of God in His community, in whose historical progress His dominion over the world first became established. Rather, He exercised this rulership directly, not only in the independence of His conduct with reference to the standard of religion peculiar to His people,² but also in His very readiness to suffer everything even unto death for the sake of His calling.³ For through this suffering He changed the world's opposition to His life-purpose into a means of His own glorification, i.e., of the certainty of overcoming the world by the very fact of this momentary subjection to its power, and of assuring the supramundane continuance of His life.⁴ Accordingly, His resurrection through the power of God is the

²³ ² Matt. xvii. 24-27; viii. 11, 12; Mark xii. 9.

³ Matt. xi. 28-30; compare § 21, 4.

⁴ John xvii. 1, 4, 5; xvi. 16, 33. Accordingly, the view of Jesus' life given by Paul in Phil. ii. 6-8 is not complete. The path of obedience even unto death is for Jesus only apparently a degradation beneath His dignity. It is in truth the form of His self-exaltation above the world and above its usual standards (Mark x. 42-45). That is to say, one *becomes* great through the degradation of service only because in unselfish obedience (Phil. ii. 1-5) one *is* already great.

consistent completion, corresponding to the worth of His personality, of the revelation through Him, which is final both in respect to the actual will of God and to the destiny of man.

24. In Christ's activity in His calling, directed to the divine purpose of the kingdom of God, the same acts of love and patience are both manifestations of the grace and faithfulness actual in God Himself, and also proofs of His dominion over the world.¹ These relations, which are necessary to the full appreciation of Jesus, and are apparent in the account of His life, are referred to in the confession of the Godhood of Christ which the Christian community has made from the beginning. That is to say, this attribute cannot be maintained unless the same activities in which Jesus Christ proves Himself man

²⁴¹ In apostolic usage, the Old Testament name of God, "Lord," is applied only to the risen Christ, exalted to the right hand of God (Phil. ii. 9-11). Yet this conception can only be understood on the condition that this attribute is discernible as an actual characteristic in the historical life of Christ (§ 23). But this dominion of Christ has no sphere of activity save such as is maintained through the power of a will concentrated upon God's supramundane purpose of love. Also the apostles regard Christ as Creator only in this respect that, because He comprises typically in Himself the object of the world. i.e., the kingdom of God and the glory of God, He furnishes in the divine creative will the central reason for the creation of the world (Col. i. 15-18; 1 Cor. viii. 6; Heb. i. 1-3). This line of thought, however, leads over into the territory of theology proper, and has no direct and practical significance for religious belief in Jesus Christ.

are thought of as being at the same time and under the same circumstances also peculiar predicates of God, and as the peculiar means of His revelation through Christ. But if the grace and faithfulness and dominion over the world, which are evident both in Christ's active life and in His patience in suffering, are also the actual attributes of God and those essential for the Christian religion, then the right appreciation of the completeness of the revelation of God through Christ is assured by the predicate of His Godhood, in accordance with which Christians are to trust in Him and to worship Him even as they do God the Father.²

25. The estimate of Christ set forth in §§ 20-24 is intentionally directed with the greatest possible exactness to the historically certified characteristics of His active life, but at the same time it is undertaken from the standpoint of the community of the kingdom of God founded by Him. These two criteria, historical and religious, for the understanding of His person should be coincident,¹ inasmuch as the purpose of Christ was directed to the

²⁴² Melanchthon, *Loci theol.* (1535. Corp. Ref. XXI. 366), "The Scriptures teach us the divinity of the Son not only speculatively, but practically, i.e., they command us to pray to Christ and to trust in Christ, for thus is the honour of divinity truly accorded to Him."

²⁵¹ There is a complete misconception of the problem, and the understanding desired is rendered impossible, if the principle is followed that historical knowledge of Christ is possible only in so far as one is divested of religious devotion to Him.

founding of a community in which He was to be recognized in religious faith as the Son of God. If now this purpose is in any measure historically realized, it follows that the perfect historical estimate of Christ is possible only to His religious community, and that this estimate will be religiously correct in proportion as His community remains faithful to its unquestionable historical task. Accordingly, it is essential to the continuance of the Christian community as such, that it should keep alive within itself the memory of the finished life-work of Christ,² and that accordingly the personal impulse of its Founder should be ceaselessly operative in like efforts on the part of the members of His community.³ In the fulfilment of these conditions we see the visible side of the mystery of Christ's exaltation to the right hand of God, which is recognized by His community⁴ as a guarantee that the purpose of His life was not frustrated but rather fully accomplished in His death.⁵

²⁵ Accordingly, His death will be regarded, not as a just punishment for blasphemy, as His enemies intended it, nor as the result of fanatic daring, but as the completion of the work of His calling, which He accepted with dutiful determination, because He recognized in it God's purpose for Him. This significance of the death of Christ, set forth by the apostles, marks also the right and complete understanding of His life-obedience which was completed in it. (§ 41, 3.)

³ Gal. ii. 20; iii. 27; Rom. vi. 5-11; viii. 2-10; xii. 4, 5; 1 Cor. xii. 12.

⁴ Rom. x. 9; 1 Cor. xv. 3-20; 1 Pet. i. 3; iii. 21, 22; Heb. xiii. 20, 21.

⁵ Mark xiv. 62; John x. 17, 18; xvii. 4, 5.

PART SECOND.

THE DOCTRINE OF RECONCILIATION THROUGH CHRIST.

26. The idea of the perfect common good included in the conception of the kingdom of God, and the idea of personal goodness included in our conception of God and in our view of Jesus Christ, lay the foundation in the Christian community for a corresponding idea of evil and sin. Every one judges himself by this idea, in so far as he stands in reciprocal relation to the world, i.e., to that structure of human society which in all conceivable varying degrees is in contradiction to the good as recognized in Christianity.¹

27. The task of the kingdom of God is assigned to the members of the Christian community, their capacity for good in general being pre-

26¹ It is impossible to arrive at the view of sin which is in accordance with Christianity, before arriving at the knowledge of what Christianity regards as good. Therefore it is a peculiarly inconsiderate demand, that one shall recognize his own and universal sin in their full extent, in order from this first to derive a longing for a redemption such as is promised in Christianity.

supposed from the revelation of the love of God in Christ, and from its special effect upon them (§ 13). But it must be remembered that the kingdom of God, in so far as the Christian community is active in its realization (§ 5, 3), is in process of growth, and that it is therefore at all points mingled with the opposing currents of the evil springing up on every side from the merely natural impulse of the human will. Therefore, while every one born of Christian parents is born into the community of Christ, he is at the same time put into connection with evil, against which his natural will as such does not contend.¹ Sins are evil volitions, but they are also the corresponding intentions, habitual inclinations and dispositions, in so far as these are contrary to the intended union of men into the kingdom of God, or are in opposition to the moral

27¹ Augustine's doctrine of original sin, i.e., that the original inclination to evil transmitted in generation is for every one both personal guilt and subject to the divine sentence of eternal punishment, is not confirmed by any New Testament author. Paul draws from his scholastic exegesis of the account of the fall only the conviction, that the universal decree of death for man was the consequence of the sin of the first human beings, and the conclusion that their descendants have sinned since that fate was theirs also (Rom. v. 12-19). Neither Jesus nor any of the New Testament writers either indicate or presuppose that sin is universal merely through natural generation. The expressions in the Old Testament which approach this view (Ps. li. 5; Job xiv. 4; xv. 14) are not dogmatic in character and not suited to determine the Christian conception.

law of Christ (§ 6, ₄), or run counter to the glory of God ² (§ 11, ₂), and not only so but also in so far as they manifest in varying degrees a lack of reverence and a lack of trust in God.³

28. The possibility and probability of sinning, and this only, can be derived from the fact that the human will, which is to decide for the recognized good, is a constantly growing power, whose activity also is not from the first accompanied by a complete knowledge of the good. A *universal necessity* of sinning can be derived neither from the natural endowment of man, nor from the idea that sin is adapted to further his moral development, nor, least of all, from a discernible purpose of God.¹ The *fact* of universal sin on the part of man is established, in accordance with experience, by the fact that the impulse to the unrestrained exercise of freedom, with which every one comes into the world, meets the manifold attractions to self-seeking, which arise out of the sin of society. Therefore, it comes to pass that in every one some degree of self-seeking takes form, even before the

²⁷ ² Gen. viii. 21; Matt. v. 28; Gal. v. 16-21; 1 Cor. vi. 9, 10; Tit. iii. 3;—1 Thess. iv. 3-8; Luke xv. 21; 1 Cor. vi. 18-20; viii. 12;—1 John iii. 4.

³ Conf. Aug. I. 2. “Post lapsum Adae omnes homines secundum naturam propagati nascuntur cum peccato, hoc est sine metu dei, sine fiducia erga deum et cum concupiscentia.”

²⁸ ¹ Therefore the sinlessness of Jesus (§ 21, ₂) does not contradict His human nature.

clearness of common self-consciousness is awakened in him.

29. Sins, in particular, are actions or volitions which, as unmannersness [Unart], immorality, careless or intentional wrong, crime, come into conflict with increasingly severe social and legal restrictions. For at the same time they oppose the highest law of good. But actions and dispositions which follow an end justifiable in a narrower sphere (§ 57, 3), but follow it in such a way as to come into conflict with higher common ends, are also sins. On the other hand, we recognize various degrees of sin, in a comparison between a single action and a propensity to or a habit of sinning, between a carelessly and a wilfully sinful act, between a character still in the process of development and one already developed, between prudent self-seeking, unbridled passion, vice, insolence, malice. Although all these forms of sin are alike in their opposition to the good, yet they are different in the degree in which they are detrimental to it, and in the possibility still existing of improvement and change.¹

29¹ This gradation is indicated in 1 John v. 16, 17. It is also signified when Jesus represents sin or the world, now as an object of redemption (Mark ii. 17; Luke xiii. 2-5; xv. 7, 10, 24, 32; xviii. 13), now as incapable of salvation (Mark viii. 38; Matt. viii. 22; xii. 39-45; xiii. 49). In the same way with reference to Num. xv. 27-31, a distinction is made between sins arising from ignorance or mistake and therefore receiving forgiveness (1 Pet. i. 14; Eph. iv. 17-19; Acts xvii. 30; 1 Tim. i. 13; Jas. v. 19, 20), and those which are committed freely or with final deter-

30. The united action of many individuals in these forms of sin leads to a re-enforcement of the same in common customs and principles, in standing immoralities, and even in evil institutions. So there comes to be an almost irresistible power of temptation¹ for those who with characters yet undeveloped are so much the more exposed to evil example because they do not see through the network of enticements to evil. Accordingly, the kingdom of sin, or the (immoral human) world,² is re-enforced in every new generation. United sin, this opposite of the kingdom of God, rests upon all as a power³ which at least limits the freedom of the individual to good.⁴ This limitation of the freedom

mination, and which bring destruction in their train (Col. iii. 5, 6; Eph. v. 5, 6; Rev. xxi. 8).

³⁰¹ Jas. i. 14, 15; Mark ix. 43-47, represent individual impulses and their bodily organs as causes of temptation to sin, in so far as the impulses are directed to worldly good and the organs are the means of the attraction. Along with this the power of social custom, and the authority as well as the example of others furnish seductive occasion to sin (Mark iv. 17; ix. 42; 1 Cor. viii. 13; Rom. xiv. 13, 21; Rev. ii. 14). But also the suffering of the good, when not understood, works in the same way (Mark xiv. 27, 29; 1 Cor. i. 23; 1 Pet. ii. 8).

² Jas. iv. 4; 1 John ii. 15-17. The expression "the kingdom of sin" is, it is true, not directly biblical, but yet it is indicated in the representation of the devil as the prince of this world (1 John v. 18, 19; John xii. 31; xvi. 11). Of course this union of evil is unlike the kingdom of God, in that it is controlled by no positive purpose.

³ Rom. iii. 9; v. 20, 21; vi. 12-23.

⁴ The absolute inability to good which the Reformers

of the individual by his own sin and by connection with the common condition of the world is, taken strictly, a lack of freedom to good. This, however, outside of the kingdom of God, is the common condition of all men, because even the partial good is only assured in its kind through the existence of the whole.

31. It is true that the full extent of the existence and guilt of sin appears only from a comparison of the same with the task of the kingdom of God (§ 26). Yet its character, as contrary to the destiny of man, to the freedom of the will and to the commands of God, is made evident in all the preceding grades of moral development through a self-condemnation, which arising everywhere as an act of the individual, grows into a common conviction. The kernel of all individual as well as common condemnation of evil is the feeling of guilt, as an expression of the individual accountability included in the freedom of the will. This feeling of guilt is a witness to the fact that even the single sinful act does not by any means come to an end with the act, but continues to work as a disordering or perversion of moral freedom, and to the further fact that the consciousness of an opposite destiny, which consciousness is necessary to freedom, maintains itself in spite of the sinful action and desire.

find expressed in the sinfulness of every individual, is not asserted in the New Testament, and is limited even by the Reformers themselves by the recognition of "justitia civilis" as the work of sinners.

The feeling of guilt, in the form of this unavoidable judgment of condemnation, springs from the conscience,¹ the presence of which in every man is to be counted upon as long as he has a measure of free-will in connection with his sin. To be sure, the feeling of guilt as such has not the power to undo the sin, or to limit the continuance or increase of the sinful propensity. On the other hand, it is in many cases the occasion of a stubborn maintaining of the propensity, or of an increased rejection of, or, at least, aversion to the authority of God. In yet worse cases, through the growth of the sinful propensity, the conscience itself is weakened, and the feeling of guilt in extreme wickedness is practically lost. Yet it is not consistent with regard for human worth to admit even in those apparently most hardened the complete absence of this manifestation, and thus the impossibility of repentance.

32. By evils we mean natural events which, pro-

31¹ The manifestation of conscience in involuntary self-condemnation for a deed done, is to be understood as a proof of freedom, i.e., of self-determination to good, but this of course takes place only on the presupposition that one is brought up in a moral fellowship. An evil conscience is a positive manifestation, a so-called good conscience the absence of the same. In the New Testament the former is referred to in Heb. x. 2, 22; and the latter in Acts xxiii. 1; 2 Cor. i. 12; Heb. xiii. 18; 1 Pet. iii. 16; and both together in Rom. ii. 15. That a good conscience has only a relative value in proving a mode of action to be right is shown in 1 Cor. iv. 3, 4. As to the conception of the positive law-giving conscience compare § 66, 1.

ceeding partly from the course of nature, partly from the operation of man, limit the exercise of our freedom in the attainment of our purposes. In part evils are, directly or indirectly, the result of sin. But the view of the prechristian world, which regarded great common misfortunes as divine punishments, and therefore as necessarily the result of unusual transgression against the gods, and the corresponding principle that all evils without exception are consequences of personal sins and are divine punishments, are in part out of harmony with experience and in part contrary to the view of the world set forth by Christ.¹ For, in general, the estimate of evil by different men varies according to their strength of will or their habit, and is therefore subjectively conditioned. And on the other hand, Christianity teaches us to recognize that through our very devotion to our faith we necessarily draw suffering upon ourselves, which is the result of our coming into collision with actual historical forces (§ 18, ₆). The Christian view of the world differs therefore from the heathen and Jewish manner of judgment, in that tenderness of feeling which prevents us from considering a man's personal sufferings as divine punishments.² Thus finally it follows that the Christian regards death, even though it may have entered the world as a

³² ¹ John ix. 1-3; Luke xiii. 1-5; compare § 18, ₅.

² This tenderness of feeling Luther, for instance, did not exercise when he declared Zwingli's tragic end a divine punishment for his heresies (Briefe IV. 332, 352).

universal decree in consequence of the first sin of man,³ not as a punishment of his personal sin, nor as at all the specific hindrance to his communion with God, and to salvation, and therefore not as the greatest evil.⁴

33. Speaking strictly, the misfortunes which come upon any one can only be determined by himself to be divine punishments for sin, when he so reckons them to himself because of a feeling of guilt. This is true both in case one has through redemption attained to trust in God (§ 51), and also in case of defiance toward God. Still worse indeed is the condition of a sinner who regards deserved misfortunes as an injustice, or who connects with his experience no thought of a divine government of the world. So far the analogy holds between the punishments inflicted by God and those decreed by human law. In both cases the lessening of privilege consequent upon the unjustifiable extension of it is seen in evident misfortunes. But punishment in the religious relation to God, apart from external misfortunes, is the lessening or loss of the communion with God designed or desired. Accordingly, the continuance of unforgiven guilt, whether felt more or less strongly or even not at all, is to be regarded as divine punishment in the fullest sense, as the real condemnation, in so far as it is connected with that lack of trust in God which gives expression to separation from God (§ 27, 3).

³²³ Rom. v. 12.

⁴ Rom. xiv. 7, 8; Phil. i. 21-24; Rom. viii. 35-39.

34. As a member of the Christian community one is called to the kingdom of God as man's highest good and highest common duty (§ 5), because this is the final purpose of God Himself (§ 13). At the same time, however, by the very recognition of this calling, there comes an increase of the feeling of guilt, and of the separation from God which arises from our own sin and our connection with the common sin. Thus Christianity seems to require of us a self-contradictory judgment of ourselves, but at the same time it does away with this contradiction in bringing the certainty of a God-given *redemption*.

35. Redemption in Christianity has not only an exclusively inner significance, but also a universally religious significance. It follows, from the first particular, that we are not to understand by redemption, as in the Old Testament, the removal of social misfortune, especially political dependence upon foreign nations, to say nothing of the establishment of economic prosperity.¹ From the second particular it follows that redemption does not

35¹ The liberation of the people of Israel from Egyptian bondage into an independent national life, and the establishment of their own true religion (Ex. xv. 13; xx. 2), is the type by which all similar expectations of the prophets are governed, in each recurring subjugation of the people to foreign nations (Ps. cxi. 9; Is. xxxv. 10; xlvi. 17; li. 11). The conversion or the spiritual renewing of the people is, to be sure, included also in this conception (Is. x. 21; xxxii. 15-18; Ezek. xxxvi. 24-30; Ps. cxxx. 8).

refer directly to the setting aside of the condition of sin which dominates the individual.² For while this condition is common to all, it is also something distinctive in each individual, and can therefore be contended against and set aside directly only by means of individual opposition in the form of voluntary determination, after one has experienced for himself religious redemption. This religious redemption denotes in Christianity forgiveness of sins or pardon, through which the guilt which separates man from God is removed, provided that with the feeling of guilt is joined neither indifference to nor defiance of God.³

36. The forgiveness of sins or justification [Gerechtsprechung (Rechtfertigung)], which guarantees the existence of the Christian community

³⁵² This is not even the definite sense of such passages as Rom. xi. 26, 27; 1 Pet. i. 18, 19; ii. 24; they depend rather upon being made clear by the line of thought which follows.

³ Redemption is now forgiveness of sins (Col. i. 14; Eph. i. 7; Heb. ix. 15; x. 16-18), and now justification or acquittal (Rom. iii. 24-26); this latter again is also forgiveness of sins (Rom. iv. 5-8). The figure of the forgetting or covering of sins by God, does not mean that God commits an intentional self-deception as to the existence of human sin, but it has the meaning expressed in the conception of pardon, that the result of transgression, namely, the interruption of intercourse between the guilty individual and the representative of moral authority, is purposely brought to an end by the latter. This meaning follows from the comparison of the divine forgiveness with the human (Luke xi. 4; Mark xi. 25).

(§ 38), is, as a divine purpose of grace, a matter of free judgment. That is to say (without taking up at present the conditions to be considered in §§ 39-44), sinners are given by God the right to enter into communion with Him, and into co-operation with His own final purpose, the kingdom of God, without their guilt and their feeling of guilt forming a hindrance thereto.¹ The freedom and independence of this divine judgment consist in this, that on the part of men so situated no moral work (merit), which might call forth this judgment of God or actually establish it, is conceivable. On the contrary, this judgment needs only religious faith,² or confi-

36¹ It is utterly purposeless to compare the Catholic and the Evangelical conceptions of justification [Rechtfertigung], since they stand in relations which are completely indifferent to one another. That is to say, the Catholic conception of justification [Gerechtmachung] through the imparting of love to the will, is intended to explain how sinners are made capable of good works. This thought has therefore a different purpose from that of the Evangelical formula referred to above; in themselves considered both might be at the same time true and in force side by side without conflicting with one another. Yet the Catholic formula sets forth a spiritual occurrence in a mechanical and materialistic way, and is out of relation to the authoritative biblical conception. For the conception of *δικαιοῦν* adopted by Paul (Rom. iii. 26, 30) follows the meaning of a Hebrew verbal form (*hizdik*), which denotes the pronouncing of one as righteous by the sentence of a judge (Rom. iv. 11).

² The justification established by God's gracious judg-

dence in the free grace or righteousness of God (§ 16, 5), in order to become actual and effective.

37. With the forgiveness of sins, pardon, justification, coincide the more specific conceptions of reconciliation with God and adoption as His children. These merely add something individual. Thus in reconciliation the forgiveness of sins appears no longer merely as the purpose of God, but also as the result purposed. According to the conception of reconciliation with God the individual has in faith and trust appropriated to himself the final purpose of God (kingdom of God), and given up his enmity against God.¹ In adoption (acceptance as children of God) the gracious purpose of the judgment of forgiveness or justification is carried into effect, so that God places Himself in the relation of Father to the believer, and gives him the right to the full confidence of a child.² These effects of divine redemption, however, find practical application only on the condition that the believer takes at once an active part in the recognized purpose of the kingdom of God, and has given up the follow-

ment (*δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ*) is conditioned on faith (Rom. i. 17; iii. 22, 26; ix. 30; Phil. iii. 9).

³⁷^{1, 2} Cor. v. 18, 19; Rom. v. 10; Col. i. 21.

² Matt. xvii. 26; 1 John iii. 1; Gal. iv. 4-7; Rom. viii. 14-17. Luther's Catechism, third main division: "God will lead us to believe that He is our real Father, and we His real children, to the end that we, in all boldness and confidence, may ask of Him as dear children of a dear Father."

ing of selfish ends and inclinations, whether intentional or habitual.³

38. The forgiveness of sins, or reconciliation, as the common fundamental condition of the Christian community is as essential to its peculiar character as is the fact of its being called to realize the kingdom of God, or as is the impulse to this work implied in this calling, and it is within the community that the individual member appropriates to himself this gift of forgiveness.¹ It is a going back

37² Since the Christian life is only complete in the fulfilment of both these conditions,—assurance of reconciliation (or adoption [Gotteskindschaft]), and the seeking of the kingdom of God and its righteousness,—these two lines serve as a mutual proof of their rightness and genuineness, or mutually condition one another. This appears in the following propositions: 1. Assurance of reconciliation is not justified when the life is either directly sinful, or is marred by a predominating form of self-seeking. 2. A life directed by a constant good purpose fails of its end when the assurance of reconciliation is marred by a predominating self-righteousness. 3. In so far as the moral life must be judged incomplete in general, and also because of special sin, this lack finds its rectification not alone in the assurance of divine forgiveness, but also in the purpose to make greater effort and improvement, and in the carrying out of this purpose. The commonly received idea opposed to this rests upon the error that in Christianity forgiveness of sins is a substitute for what is assumed to be the original arrangement, by which one might attain to the right relation to God by a mechanical fulfilling of the law. Compare § 38.

38¹ This is evident from the fact that Christ, in the establishment of the Lord's Supper (Mark xiv. 24), refers

to the point of view of the Old Testament religion, or a falling back into the Catholic conception of the matter, to preach forgiveness of sins merely to individuals as such, in relation to their personal feeling of guilt and their need as thus measured, or as a good ever yet to be attained.²

back to Jeremiah's prophecy (xxxi. 31-34) of the New Covenant, whose foundation is the forgiveness of sins. As the prophet refers to this covenant as made with the whole unit of the people of Israel as the existing community of the true God, so Christ in consonance with this thinks of the community as existing in the Twelve, for whom He makes the covenant of forgiveness efficacious by the sacrifice of His life.—Compare Luther, Smaller Catechism, second division, third article, "in which Christian church God daily forgives me and all believers freely all sins." Catechismus major, II. 40-42: "Credo spiritus sancti opera me sanctificari. Qua autem re illud facit? Per *christianorum communionem, remissionem peccatorum*, carnis resurrectionem et vitam aeternam. Primum enim singularem in mundo communionem obtinet; haec mater est, haec quemlibet christianum *parturit ac alit per verbum.*" These sentences are essentially the same as Conf. Aug. I. 5: "Per verbum et sacramenta tanquam per instrumenta donatur spiritus sanctus, qui fidem efficit . . . in iis qui audiunt evangelium, scilicet quod deus propter Christum justificet hos qui credunt, se propter Christum in gratiam recipi." For, as the "Tractatus de potestate et primatu papae, 24" testifies: "tribuit deus principaliter claves (i.e., the word of God, the gospel) ecclesiae et immediate."

38² In the Catholic system the idea of forgiveness of sins is made clearly efficacious only in the ceremony of the priestly absolution of the individual in the sacrament of confession. A similar procedure is maintained in the Lu-

39. Forgiveness of sins cannot be inferred as necessary from any universally established conception of God.¹ As the positive fundamental condition of the Christian community, it is rather to be gained from the positive Christian conception of God. Therefore its validity (§ 38) is made dependent upon the peculiar work of Christ (§ 19).

40. Redemption or forgiveness of sins is not assured to the Christian community by Christ's making as Prophet and thus as the Revealer of God (§ 20) a universal promise to that effect, which is

theran confessional, without there being any reference in their liturgy to the specific principle of the Reformation, namely, that in consequence of the redemption mediated through Christ we belong to the community founded upon the forgiveness of sins, and accordingly do not make confession of past sins, in the sense that we have lost the state of grace, and therefore forgiveness must be received as something new. This confessional practice rather furthers the fateful error (§ 37, s) that churchly forgiveness of sins is a substitute for a defective striving after the good.

39¹ Although the love of God has been occasionally construed as the ground of a reasonable lenity on God's part toward the weakness of men, yet it does not furnish the datum for a so-called natural religion, which indeed does not exist. But even were it otherwise, lenity toward the imperfections of human conduct is an entirely different thing from Christian forgiveness of sins. Such lenity accepted as a divine substitute for human weakness would sacrifice the seriousness of moral obligation, and would utterly fail to assure a fellowship of men with God, in which the task of the kingdom of God calls forth the constant effort of the will.

just what He did not do.¹ But rather He Himself beforehand, and the earliest witnesses after Him, connected this result with the fact of His death. And this takes place in so far as His death is capable of comparison with the Old Testament sacrifices,² which in accordance with the grace of God were offered for the whole Israelitish community, partly to indicate their own entrance into the covenant with God, and partly to serve in yearly repetition for the forgiveness of sins, i.e., to maintain the integrity of the covenant.³

⁴⁰¹ The direction to pray for the forgiveness of sins (Luke xi. 4) and the command to exercise a forgiving spirit (Mark xi. 25) apply to the community as existing already in the twelve disciples, and express the thought that in this community one cannot appropriate to himself the forgiveness of sins without at the same time giving proof by the forgiving spirit, or the love of one's enemies, that one is engaged in the ethical work of the kingdom of God (§ 37, 3).

² Mark xiv. 24 refers to the sacrifice of the covenant (Ex. xxiv. 3-8). Since the Israelites entered by this act upon their vocation as the possession of God and as a kingdom of priests (Ex. xix. 5, 6), compare Acts xx. 28; Rev. i. 5, 6; Tit. ii. 14. Rom. iii. 25, 26, Heb. ix. 11-14, refer to the type of the universal yearly sin-offering (Lev. xvi.); 1 Pet. i. 18, 19, to the passover, which belongs to the redemption out of Egypt; Eph. v. 2, makes no distinction between these various kinds of sacrifice.

³ The sacrifices prescribed in the Mosaic law, as well as the sacrifice of the covenant, signify that by these acts the covenant-community approaches its God, and they rest therefore upon the certainty of His covenant grace. This is also true of the sin-offering which has reference only to

41. The death of Christ has the value of the covenant-offering and the universal sin-offering, not because of the fact that His enemies put Him to death, but because of the fact that He obediently yielded Himself to this fate as in the providence of God a certain result of His special mission.¹ This significance of the death of Christ is also expressed in the double fact that in the completing of His life-work He represented both the priest and the sacrifice.² Therefore we may regard His death as a sacrifice offered for the purpose of bringing forgiveness to His community only in so far as we connect Him with the offering of the sacrifice, or with the priestly self-devotion which fills His whole life-activity.³

such transgressions as do not involve a breach of the covenant (Num. xv. 27-31).

⁴¹ ¹ John x. 17, 18; xiv. 31; xv. 13, 14; xvii. 19; Rom. v. 19; Phil. ii. 8; Eph. v. 2; Heb. v. 8, 9; compare § 25, 2.

² The combination in the epistle to the Hebrews, especially in ii. 17; iv. 14-16; vi. 20; ix. 11, 24-26.

³ It is remarkable that the epistles have so few reminiscences of the life of Christ. Hence it appears as if the emphasizing of His death as the act of redemption counted upon an interpretation of this act which is in complete contrast to the thought of His life. Yet it is plain that the apostles understood the divinely purposed death of Christ to be a sacrifice only as it was connected with His obedience to His life-calling. This highest proof of the obedience of Christ serves thus as a redemptive sacrifice, because it can be understood as summing up in itself the value of His life given in the service of God and of the community to be established. Mark x. 45, "For

42. The obedience of Christ to His calling can be interpreted as a gift to God or as a sacrifice and priestly service, because His righteous life, His patience and His truth [Wahrheitreden] were the result not only of His divine mission but also of His free consecration of Himself to God. For by this obedience to His calling He maintained the special fellowship of love between God and Himself.¹ Now this obedience to His calling He rendered not only for His own sake, but at the same time necessarily for the purpose of bringing mankind into the same relation toward God as their Father which He occupied.² For this very purpose He accepted with patience and resignation to God's will increased sufferings and even death as a proof of His fellowship with God. And finally He did all this in such a way as to prove the genuineness of His fellowship with God, and the possibility of a similar fellowship for all. In these respects, therefore, He, as the royal Priest, represented the community before God for the purpose of its complete establishment.³

verily the Son of man came not to be ministered unto, but to minister, and to give His life a ransom for many."

⁴² ¹ John xv. 10; x. 17, 18; compare § 22, s.

² John xvii. 20-26.

³ The view that Christ, by the vicarious endurance of the punishment deserved by sinful men, propitiated the justice or wrath of God, and thus made possible the grace of God, is not founded on any clear and distinct passage in the New Testament. It rests rather on a presupposition of natural theology, clearly of Pharasaic and Hellenic origin. This presupposition is that the fundamental re-

43. If we now compare the fact of the existing community of Christ to which we ourselves belong with His purpose in its foundation and with the priestly significance of His life and suffering even unto death, there appears clearly in His death, i.e., in the completion of His life from the point of view of sacrifice, a pointing to the analogy between it and the Old Testament types. For the universal meaning of the symbolic actions performed by the ministering priest, in order to the acceptance of the sacrifice by God, is rightly interpreted by Peter, when he says, in speaking of Christ, that thereby be-

lation between God and man, to which religion is subordinate, is that of justice. And along with this a principle is accepted which is contrary to every judicial system, namely, that on the whole justice is equally maintained by vicarious punishment and by the regular course of law. But these two ideas cannot be co-ordinated. For the object of justice is the universal well-being of a people or a company of men, and punishment is comprehensible only as a subordinate means to this end (§ 18). Now all law is binding only because the law-giver shows himself a benefactor, a maintainer of the public weal. Thus the goodness of such an one is the motive for the recognition of his law by the society he founds. Applied to God, this principle shows that the experience of God's goodness or grace is precedent to all law which gives expression to mutual rights between God and man. Therefore the "foedus operum" cannot be regarded as the fundamental relation between the two, and hence the "foedus operum" cannot rationally be transformed into the "foedus gratiae" by Christ's fulfilling the conditions of the former and so doing away with it.

lievers are led to God,¹ are brought near to Him in the sacrifice.² This bringing near of men is nec-

⁴³¹ Pet. iii. 18; compare Eph. ii. 16-18; Heb. vii. 19; x. 19-22. The same thought is expressed in saying that the community is sanctified by the sacrifice of Christ (John xvii. 19; Heb. x. 14), for "to sanctify," "to make his possession" and "to cause to come near" all mean the same thing (Num. xvi. 5).

² The symbolism of all animal sacrifice in the Old Testament has the following content: The ministering priest, who is authorized, in the place of the people or of the individual Israelites, to bring their gifts (*corban*, that which is brought near) into God's presence, fulfils this purpose in sprinkling the blood, in which is the life of the animal, upon the altar where God meets with the people (Ex. xx. 24), and in burning the animal, or certain parts of it, in the fire, which signifies God's presence (Lev. ix. 24). By these actions, which present the gift to God, the priest "shields" the people or the individuals from God there present. This is according to the presupposition that no living being can come *uncalled* into the presence of God without being destroyed. But the gift, brought according to the divine order, is the covering or protection under which those in covenant with God are in thought brought into His presence. In the sin-offering there is no rite prescribed which would signify any different conception from that of the burnt-offering and the peace-offering. In the yearly sin-offering the blood of the goat is sprinkled on the cover of the ark of testimony (ark of the covenant), because this is a higher symbol of the gracious presence of God than the altar of sacrifice. When God thus suffers the national community, who are conscious of sin, to draw near Him in prescribed ways, in these acts the separation from Him resulting from sin is done away with. This bringing near to a gracious

essary in the case of the community to be founded by Christ, because they are originally separated from God by their sin and feeling of guilt. Therefore, the sacrificial act of Christ's priestly completion of His life-work serves to bestow upon the new community the divine forgiveness of sins, just in so far as He as their intentional representative changes this separation of man from God into fellowship with Him as their Father.

44. Christ's victory over the world through patience in the suffering made necessary by His calling is not only a mark of His Godhood in His office of revealer (§§ 23, 24), but is also the mark of the completeness of His work as priestly representative of the community to be brought to God through Him. The same obedience of Christ to His calling, which fills all His life and is perfected in His death, is thought of from two contrasted points of view, from that of His royal prophetic office, the representing of God to men (§§ 20-24), and from that of His royal priesthood, the representing of men (as His community) before God (§§ 40-43). Of these two sides of His calling (or offices) the latter is, it is true, subordinate to the former. But in this double value of His life Christ is the mediator of the highest conceivable fellowship between God and man.¹

45. The peculiar nature of the community

God, thus accomplished, is the ground of the fact that sins are forgiven, i.e., that they no longer separate from God.

⁴⁴¹ Heb. iii. 1; ix. 15; xii. 24.

founded by Christ does not conform to the value of His life as the representative and revealer of God and therefore Himself God,¹ for in this relation Christ stands in contrast to the community. But the character of the community, reconciled to God and of every individual in it who appropriates to himself justification through faith in Christ,² corresponds rather to Christ's position as representative of the community in relation to God and the world. As His dignity as Son of God is peculiar to Him for the very reason that He sacrifices His life for the sake of the community,³ so the adoption as children belongs to the members of His community as a result of the reconciliation with God (§ 37, 2). As His patience in suffering and death establishes His dominion over the world for the sake of His believers, so faith in Christ includes in itself spiritual dominion over the world,⁴ i.e., eternal life or spiritual freedom.⁵

⁴⁵¹ Thus the idea of Athanasius, that the positive result of redemption through Christ is the deification of the human race, is untenable.

² Mark viii. 29; Jas. ii. 1; 1 Pet. i. 7, 8; 1 John v. 1; Heb. ii. 3; Rom. iii. 21, 22; Acts iv. 10-12.

³ John x. 15-18.

⁴ Mark ix. 23; xi. 23;—Rom. iv. 13; viii. 31-39; 1 Cor. iii. 21-23; Jas. i. 9;—1 John ii. 25; iv. 9; Rom. v. 1, 2, 17; 1 Cor. iv. 8.

⁵ John viii. 36; Gal. v. 1. Luther "De libertate christiana": "Quemadmodum Christus has duas dignitates (regis et sacerdotis) obtinuit, ita impartit et communes easdem facit cuilibet suo fideli. Hinc omnes in Christo

sumus sacerdotes et reges, quicunque in Christum credimus (1 Pet. ii. 9).—Quod ad regnum pertinet, quilibet Christianus per fidem sic magnificatur super omnia, ut spirituali potentia prorsus omnium dominus sit, ita ut nulla omnino rerum possit ei quidquam nocere, imo omnia subjecta ei cogantur servire ad salutem (Rom. viii. 28; 1 Cor. iii. 21-23).—Potentia haec spiritualis est: quae dominatur in medio inimicorum et potens est in mediis pressuris. Ecce haec est Christianorum inaestimabilis potentia et libertas. Nec solum reges omnium liberrimi, sed sacerdotes quoque sumus in aeternum, quod digni sumus coram deo apparere, pro aliis orare, et nos invicem ea, quae dei sunt, docere.—Per sacerdotalem gloriam apud deum omnia potest, quia deus facit, quae ipse petit. Ex iis clare videre potest quilibet, quo modo Christianus homo liber est ab omnibus et super omnia, ita ut nullis operibus ad hoc indigeat, ut justus et salvus sit, sed sola fides hoc largitur abunde.”—In this interpretation of the freedom founded on faith we find the specific difference between Catholicism and Protestantism. Catholicism prescribes in its place the “timor filialis,” the continued anxiety lest one offend God by transgression. This anxious fear before the law-giver corresponds to the whole Catholic system, and holds men in slavery beneath the structure of supposed guarantees of salvation, which reach their culmination in an infallible pope. The Protestant, on the other hand, lives in reverent trust in God our Father, which imparts courage to strive after the righteousness of God, and needs no other guarantee than the grace of God revealed in the man Christ Jesus (Rom. v. 15).

PART THIRD.

THE DOCTRINE OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE.

46. The individual believer within the Christian community does not appropriate to himself the call to the kingdom of God and reconciliation or acceptance as a child of God, without at the same time experiencing these effects of grace as motives to a corresponding personal activity.¹ Thus, conversely, in the religious estimate of our whole life-work, which corresponds to these motives, we recognise everything good in us as the effect of divine grace.² The agreement of these impulses with the purpose of God and their similarity in different individuals is effected and assured by the Holy Spirit in the community.³ That is to say, the impulse to right conduct, i.e., to fulfilling the task belonging to the kingdom of God, and the impulse

⁴⁶¹ Pet. i. 15; 1 Thess. iv. 7. The opposite condition is abnormal (2 Cor. vi. 1).

² Phil. ii. 12, 13; Heb. xiii. 20, 21.

³ 1 Pet. i. 2; 1 John iii. 24; iv. 13; Heb. vi. 4; x. 29; 1 Thess. iv. 7, 8; Gal. v. 5, 6, 22-25; 1 Cor. iii. 16, 17; Rom. viii. 4, 13.

to the practical proof of sonship with God, have their criterion in the knowledge of God as our Father which is given us in Christianity. The Christian knowledge of God, however, springing from positive revelation, is congruent with God's knowledge of Himself. Hence, seen from the divine point of view, the development of the Christian community, resulting from the exercise of love in accordance with this knowledge of God, is a part of the divine self-revelation (§ 13, 2). From these considerations it appears that the common Spirit through which the members of the community win their like knowledge of God, and hence their like impulses toward the kingdom of God and toward sonship with God, is God's Holy Spirit.⁴

47. Practical proof of sonship with God in spiritual freedom and dominion over the world, and labour for the kingdom of God, fill out the Christian life, which, in contrast with the implied [vor-ausgesetzt] sinful state, is a new creation of God.¹

⁴⁶ ⁴ 1 Cor. ii. 10-12; Gal. iv. 6; Rom. viii. 15, 16. . . . Melanchthon, *Loci theol.* (1535. Corp. Ref. XXI. pp. 366, 367). "Scriptura . . . vult nos spiritus sancti divinitatem in ipsa consolatione et vivificatione cognoscere. Haec officia spiritus sancti prodest considerare. In hac invocatione filii, in his exercitiis fidei melius cognoscemus trinitatem, quam in otiosis speculationibus, quae disputatione, quid personae inter se agant, non quid nobiscum agant."

⁴⁷ ¹ Pet. i. 3, 22, 23; Jas. i. 18; Gal. vi. 15; Eph. ii. 10; Rom. vi. 4-6; xii. 2; Col. iii. 9-11; Eph. iv. 22-24. The usual expression, the new birth, for the ideal beginning of the Christian life, corresponds to none of the expres-

It is as certain that these two activities stand in reciprocal relation to one another (§ 37, ³) as that the ends and motives in both cases have the same supramundane level. The correlation of these activities, the first religious and the second ethical, is evident in the fact that the religious duty of dominion over the world calls for the same effort of the will as the ethical duty belonging to the kingdom of God, and that this latter includes in itself religious elevation above the world. The unity of this double life-purpose is evident in the joy or blessedness springing out of them both.² This is the feeling of religious-ethical perfection.³ In so far, then, as blessedness is expected in the Chris-

sions used in these passages. It is necessary to be on one's guard against wishing to make certain of this foundation of one's own Christian life by direct experience or at a definite time. Objectively, the new birth or new begetting by God, or admission into the relation of sonship with God, coincides with justification (§ 37), as well as with the bestowal of the Holy Spirit. This again is the same as admission into the community. Thus for the one who attains to the independence of his Christian life through the innumerable means of education belonging to the Christian community, it is quite impossible as well as unnecessary to mark the beginning of this result. What individuals regard as the beginning is at the best to be considered only as a step in their Christian development.

⁴⁷ ² Rom. v. 1-4; viii. 31-39; xiv. 17, 18; Jas. i. 2-4, 9, 25; 1 Pet. i. 3-9; Phil. iv. 4.

³ Jas. i. 4; iii. 2; 1 Cor. ii. 6; Phil. iii. 15; Col. i. 28; iv. 12; Rom. xii. 2; Heb. v. 14; vi. 1; 1 John iv. 18; Matt. v. 48.

tian life, the possibility is therein admitted of that perfection which, in the two directions of striving after the kingdom of God and its righteousness and of exercising freedom over the world, is set before us as our task.

48. It is, of course, true that the series of obligatory actions in which we can represent to ourselves our life-work remains always incomplete, because in thought such a series can be carried on endlessly, and also because its individual parts can be crowded closer and closer together. In reality, therefore, it is not the consideration of the actual continuance of sin,¹ but this external quantitative conception of the Christian's life-work, which is the ground of the traditional assertion that incompleteness of good works is unavoidable, and the possibility of Christian perfection therefore out of the question. Nevertheless, in spite of the unavoidable incompleteness of human conduct, the fact that we are called to personal perfection must be maintained, since it conforms to the qualitative judgment of the religious-ethical life as of something complete in its kind [ein Ganzes in seiner Art]. Now the conception of a whole signifies that the component parts of an organic existence are in a special way united by a common end. In accordance with this conception, Christian perfection consists in the accomplishing of the ethical life-work,² and in the

⁴⁸ ¹ I John i. 8.

² Not individual good works, but a complete consistent life-work, is the duty set forth in the chief writings of the

developing of ethical and religious character.³ In this it is included that one will act for the end of the kingdom of God in a special ethical calling,⁴ and will show his sonship with God and his dominion over the world in the special conditions of life in which he is placed.

49. The striving against and suppression of selfish impulses and habits are included in sanctification or the formation of Christian character.¹ The task here is not the rooting out of any impulse or affection, but its ennobling and purification by the opposing force of moral principles (§ 72). This task cannot and should not be accomplished by special thought or special ascetic practices, before the beginning of right action or the attainment of the positive virtues. The similar attempt of monasticism to avoid certain temptations to sin by a separation from the fundamental institutions of

apostles (Jas. i. 4; 1 Pet. i. 17; Heb. vi. 10; 1 Thess. v. 13; Gal. vi. 4; 1 Cor. iii. 13-15). Good works are to be considered only as the manifestation of a consistent state of life (Jas. iii. 13; 2 Cor. ix. 8; Col. i. 10).

⁴⁸³ In James under the name of *σωφρα* (i. 5; iii. 17), in Paul and elsewhere under the name of *ἀγιασμός* (1 Thess. iv. 3-7; 1 Cor. i. 30; Rom. vi. 19, 22; Heb. xii. 14; 1 John iii. 3).

⁴ This is clear in the case of Paul, who grounds his expectation of the completion of his salvation upon that which he accomplishes in his calling (1 Thess. ii. 19; Phil. ii. 16; 2 Tim. iv. 5-8; 1 Cor. iii. 5-9). Compare § 57.

⁴⁹¹ Jas. iv. 8-10; 1 Pet. ii. 11, 12; Rom. viii. 13; xiii. 12-14; Col. iii. 5-10.

human society is also a mistake. For evil inclinations and habits are rendered ineffective only by the development of contrasting good inclinations and habits, while virtues are produced only by the reaction of dutiful or righteous action upon the will itself.² Therefore the Christian duty of perfection is recognized alongside of the continual consciousness of sinfulness, in the command to strive for the common good with the idea that as a member of the Christian community one is no longer alive to sin.³ This is also the intended purpose of all righteous and effectual repentance, to which in the process of sanctification one is the more inclined the more sensitive one becomes to the effect of sin upon oneself.⁴ Such repentance, however, is not attained when one dulls the perception or observation of one's own special sins by putting them in the uncertain light of the unmeasured common sin. In the constant readiness for real repentance the change of heart prescribed by Jesus becomes the stamp of the whole life.⁵

⁴⁹ ² The exercise of righteousness serves to sanctification (Rom. vi. 19, 22; compare Heb. xii. 14), i.e., to the attainment of a godly character.

³ Rom. vi. 11. It is analogous to this that the perfect no longer look upon that part of their course which is behind, but on that which is before (Phil. iii. 12-15).

⁴ 1 John i. 8.

⁵ Mark i. 15; 2 Cor. vii. 9, 10. . . . Luther's First Thesis of Oct. 31, 1517: "In that our Mediator and Lord Jesus Christ says, 'Repent,' He means that the whole life

50. The Christian perfection which corresponds to the personal example of Christ Himself¹ separates itself into the religious functions of sonship with God and dominion over the world, i.e., trust in the fatherly providence of God, humility, patience, prayer, and into the ethical functions of dutiful action in one's calling and the development of the ethical virtues.² In this coherence of the spiritual life the individual attains to the value of a whole which is superior to the worth of all the world as the order of a partial and naturally conditioned existence.³ In this is included inde-

of His believers shall be a constant and ceaseless repentance."

⁵⁰¹ The example of Christ is, it is true, only appealed to in the New Testament in particular respects, as love (Eph. v. 2), devotion to the public good (1 Cor. x. 33; xi. 1; Phil. ii. 2-5), patience in suffering (1 Pet. ii. 21).

² Conf. Aug. II. 6: "Perfectio christiana est 1. serio timere deum, et rursus concipere magnam fidem et confidere propter Christum, quod habeamus deum placatum, 2. petere a deo, 3. et certo expectare auxilium in omnibus rebus gerendis juxta vocationem, 4. interim foris diligenter facere bona opera et servire vocationi. In his rebus est vera perfectio et verus cultus dei, non est in coelibatu aut mendicitate aut veste sordida" (contrast to the Catholic conception of Christian perfection as attained only in monasticism). This contrasted conception of perfection corresponds to the conception of sin in Conf. Aug. I. 2 (§ 27, s).

³ Mark viii. 35-37: "Whosoever shall lose his life for My sake and the gospel's, the same shall save it. For what shall it profit a man if he shall gain the whole world and lose his own life? Or what shall a man give in ex-

pendence toward all special authority.⁴ This attainment of the Christian religion is the end actually aimed at in all religions (§ 8), namely, the assuring of the value of our spiritual life, in spite of its limiting complication with nature or the world, by means of the appropriation of the divine life or of the evident divine purpose.

51. Faith in the fatherly providence of God is the Christian view of the world in an abbreviated form.¹ In this faith, although we neither know the

change for his life?" The valuing of life as of an incomparable good, superior for us therefore to the value of the whole world, is here presupposed as a universal conviction. At the same time, however, a truth is also presupposed which is in direct opposition to this conviction, namely, that the loss of life, which awaits every man, proves the insignificance of life in the presence of the regular order of the world. But if one assures his life through union with Christ, even though it be by losing it according to the order of the world, then, on this special condition, the correctness of the claim felt by every human being to a value surpassing that of the world, is established, and any experience of an opposite nature is rendered invalid.

50 ⁴ 1 Cor. iii. 21, 22.

51 ¹ Conf. Aug. I. 20: "Qui scit se per Christum habere propitium deum, scit se ei curae esse." Justification by faith in Christ has for its object and its test reverence toward God and trust in His help in all times of need. Compare Apol. Conf. Aug. II. 8, 18, 34, 35, 45. This reciprocal relation between a special trust in Providence and the certainty of reconciliation with God is not rendered less valid by the fact that Seneca also says (De Providentia 2): "Vir fortis est omnibus externis poten-

future nor comprehend perfectly the past, yet we judge our temporary relation to the world accord-

tior, nec hoc dico: non sentit illa, sed vincit. . . . Omnia adversa exercitationes putat. . . . Patrium deus habet adversus bonos viros animum." For, first, these sentences do not signify that trust in God's providence belongs to all human beings, and is thus a datum of so-called natural or rational religion. Instead, it is a special mark of the Stoic philosophers and not common to paganism as a whole, since *this natural religion* can attain to this idea neither in its polytheistic form, nor does attain to it in tragic poetry, nor in the course of philosophy as a whole. But these sentences of Seneca's are also not at all like the Christian expressions which they resemble, because they stand in connection with all the hardness of the Stoic sense of self and consciousness of power: "Digni visi sumus deo, in quibus experiretur, quantum natura humana posset pati. . . . Praebendi fortunae sumus, ut contra ipsam ab ipsa duremur; paulatim nos sibi pares faciat" (cap. 4), and therefore are interwoven with positively irreligious expressions: "Ego non miror, si aliquando impetum capiant dii spectandi magnos viros colluctantes cum aliqua calamitate. . . . Non video, quid habeat in terris Jupiter pulchrius, quam ut spectet Catonem, jam partibus non semel fractis, stantem nihilo minus inter ruinas publicas rectum. . . . Ferte fortiter, hoc est quo deum antecedatis. Ille extra patientiam malorum est, vos supra patientiam" (cap. 2, 6). Particularly is there nothing more in contrast to a Christian trust in Providence, than the admiration for Cato's suicide, which Seneca not only expresses for himself but even ascribes to his gods: "Non fuit diis immortalibus satis, spectare Catonem semel: retenta ac revocata virtus est, ut in difficiliori parte se ostenderet. Non enim tam magno animo mors initur, quam repetitur. Quidni libenter spectarent alnum suum, tam claro ac memorabili

ing to our knowledge of the love of God, and according to the assurance which this knowledge gives us of the value of every child of God in comparison with the world, which is directed by God in accordance with His final purpose, i.e., our salvation.² From this faith springs that confidence which in all its degrees is equally removed from the gnawing anxiety which might arise from our relation to the superior power of nature, and from dull indifference or bold recklessness or Stoic imperturbability, because no one of these is an expression of constant spiritual freedom. In particular, faith in providence furnishes a standard by which the first impression of misfortunes as limitations of freedom or as divine punishments is transformed into a recognition of their significance as blessings, i.e., as means of education or probation.³ In this judgment of evil, he who trusts in providence gives evidence of his dominion over the world, as well as of his redemption from the guilt and the power of sin and his reconciliation with God. But not less clearly does faith in providence illumine the expe-

exitu evadentem" (cap. 2, 6)? According to the Christian standard, suicide is only conceivable as a result of an utter lack of faith in the providence of God.

51 ² Rom. xi. 33-36. Compare § 18, 8.

³ This knowledge breaks through occasionally even in the Old Testament (Jer. xxx. 11; Prov. iii. 11, 12; Ps. cxviii. 18). It follows in Christianity from the necessary explanation of the sufferings of Christ the Righteous One (Mark viii. 34, 35; Jas. i. 2, 3; 1 Pet. i. 6, 7; Heb. xii. 4-11; Rom. v. 3, 4; viii. 28).

riences of prosperity or happiness as gifts of God, which call for thankfulness to Him, and purification or moderation of our sense of self.⁴

52. Humility is that tone of feeling which springs from the knowledge of the fatherly leading of God, and either accompanies this knowledge, or, as a constant readiness to acquiesce in all the dispensations of God, takes the place of the conscious exercise of trust in His providence. As a distinctively religious virtue it is again that power of self-possession which leads us to view both unpleasant and agreeable experiences as dispensations of God, and therefore in such a way that we are neither cast down nor unduly lifted up by them.¹ The humility of the Christian does not spring out of a constant consciousness of his sin, neither is it indifferent to it. Rather, it involves a more lively sense of God's grace in view of sin, and accordingly a hesitation to regard our moral and religious convictions, however well intended, as God's cause, or to defend them as such. The religious man is unconscious of his own humility,² and still less is it an object of

⁵¹ ⁴ 1 Thess. v. 16-18. Thankfulness to God is in general the motive to joy, which is expected to be the pervading tone of the Christian life. Compare also Rom. xiv. 17; xv. 13; Phil. iv. 4.

⁵² ¹ Humility is most clearly expressed in the "fear of God" (1 Pet. i. 17; iii. 2; Phil. ii. 12; Rom. xi. 20, 21; 2 Cor. v. 11; vii. 1), which is the "beginning of wisdom" (Prov. ix. 10), i.e., godly righteousness.

² "Humility is like an eye, which sees everything else,

observation and exhaustive judgment on the part of others, as it does not manifest itself directly in any moral property or mode of action.³ Least of all does it find its necessary manifestation in ceremonial-legal ascetic actions, although from the first, in accordance with a dualistic view of the world, a low estimation of the natural conditions of human life has been accepted as a specially clear proof of humility toward God.⁴

but not itself; real humility does not know that it exists" (Scriver). Here the line is drawn against the self-conscious pride of virtue in Stoicism, and the self-conscious pride of religion in all kinds of Phariseeism. The healthy emotional life, expressive of constant harmony with one's self or with the world and with God, moves along but dimly perceived. Thus religious experiences of conscious and hence heightened happiness can never be frequent, and are of doubtful value, since their discontinuance is usually experienced with dissatisfaction. We must judge in accordance with this the cases of conscious religious happiness, and the universal desire for religious enjoyment.

⁵² ³ Humility will, it is true, always be accompanied by modesty toward others (both meanings meet in *ταπεινός*, Phil. ii. 8; Matt. xxiii. 12; Col. iii. 12; Eph. iv. 2; Phil. ii. 3; 1 Pet. v. 5), but also, on occasion, by anger and zeal against the wicked (Mark iii. 5).

⁴ Such a case is judged as "false humility" in Col. ii. 20-23. The ceremonial-legal exhibition of humility, as of a special devotion to God, Jesus judges in the Pharisees as hypocrisy (Matt. xxiii. *ὑποκριτής* = actor). The zeal which seeks to impose upon others such or similar ceremonial-legal forms of humility, or to put them into effect by force, is fanaticism.

53. Patience under the hampering limitations of the world,¹ arising from the judgment of faith in providence through the feeling of humble submission to God's fatherly leading, accepts deserved evils as divine punishments and also as means of training, undeserved evils as tests, or perchance also as the honour of martyrdom. Patience is fundamentally always a determination of the will; but it may take the form of a tone of feeling and so unite itself closely with humility, when the original determination of will becomes extended in order to meet a like continuance of special worldly limitations. Since, however, in the Christian view of the world the difference in value of misfortune and of prosperity is a relative matter, patience as a religious virtue has room for exercise not only in experiences which appear at first as direct limitations, but also proves itself of value, in connection with humility, as a moderation of the sense of self in experiences of prosperity, which tend to make one effeminate and dependent on the world.

54. Prayer, whether as thanksgiving or as petition, is the conscious and intentional exercise both of faith in God's providence¹ and of humility. It

53¹ Jas. i. 3; v. 10, 11; 2 Cor. vi. 4; Rom. v. 3; xii. 12. . . . Calvin's Institutes, III. 8, 8: "Neque ea requiritur a nobis hilaritas, quae omnem acerbitatis dolorisque sensum tollat; alioqui nulla in cruce esset sanctorum patientia, nisi et dolore torquerentur et angerentur molestia."

54¹ Petrus Martyr Vermilius: "Hoc est ingenium filiorum dei, ut quam frequentissime orationibus vacent: nam illud est dei providentiam agnoscere."

is also, as thanksgiving, the proof of patience, and, as petition, the means of gaining or of strengthening patience. In these respects prayer is the proof which the individual gives before God and for himself of his condition of reconciliation, and is also the means by which he establishes himself in the same. As the united act of the community, it has still other characteristics (§ 79).

55. The answer to prayer for special material blessings, which seems to be assured without any limit,¹ is nevertheless limited by the reservation that the petition must accord with God's providence over us,² and that the one who prays must be engaged in the fulfilment of the divine commands.³ And finally the value of the petitions addressed to God is made independent of the test of their direct and continuous fulfilment by the fact that, if we know that God hears us, we know also that we have the blessings which we have desired of him.⁴

56. The ethical task of the kingdom of God is performed as the universal task of the Christian community, only when all the duties of the nar-

⁵⁵ ¹ Matt. vii. 7-11.

² Mark xiv. 36; 1 John v. 14.

³ 1 John iii. 21, 22.

⁴ 1 John v. 15. That is, the certainty of God's care in general is not disturbed by the fact that many petitions for individual blessings are not directly answered, but rather it furnishes a compensation for the fact that certain petitions are not answered with exact literalness.

rower circles of life conditioned by nature (married life, family life, social life, national life) are done according to the special principles of each, under the inspiration of love to one's neighbour as their final motive. For the whole is never realized except in the particulars that compose it. If the opposite were true, and one could fulfil Christian duty outside the natural conditions of life, that which is of universal force would be changed into a false particularity, into something peculiar.¹

57. Conduct in the narrower and naturally conditioned circles is subordinated to the common end of the kingdom of God and brought into direct relation to the same, when the regular activity incumbent upon each one in these circles is exercised in the form of one's ethical calling (§ 50, ₂) for the common good.¹ The purpose to serve the com-

56¹ This is the error of the Catholic view that monasticism fulfils real Christian virtue or the ideal of the supramundane angelic existence just because it is outside of the natural forms of morality. But the giving up of family, private property, complete independence and personal dignity (in obedience to superiors), does not in itself assure a more positive and rich development of the moral nature, but rather threatens it. For these blessings are absolutely essential conditions of moral health and of the formation of character. Pietistic inclination approaches in this matter the error of the Catholic system.

57¹ 1 Cor. vii. 20-24. If here even the condition of slavery is viewed in the light of an ethical calling and so made morally endurable (1 Pet. ii. 18, 19), this is certainly true of all kinds of free labor. As to labor, 1 Thess. iv. 11; 2 Thess. iii. 10-12; as to public spirit, Phil. ii. 2-4; Rom.

mon good, with which the work of every special civic calling should be undertaken, does not exclude personal interest in its success or the gaining of property; this latter becomes a motive to self-seeking, however, unless in this moral conception of our calling it is balanced by the common ends. Accordingly, fidelity to one's calling is also following the example of Christ.² Moreover, by this appreciation of ethical callings, as parts of the kingdom of God, the temptations to self-seeking, which as such belong to each calling in its separate existence,³ are overcome, and the Catholic idea is disproved that one lives a spiritual life only in separation from worldly callings.⁴

xii. 3-5. Compare *Apol. Conf.* Aug. III. 68-72.—The demand of Christ in *Mark* x. 21 has reference to the condition on which the calling of the disciples was to be exercised at that time, but does not prescribe monasticism for all times.

⁵⁷ ² *Apol. Conf.* Aug. XIII. 48-50. (As to the conversation of Christ with the rich young man, *Matt.* xix. 21): “Perfectio est in hoc, quod addit Christus: sequere me. Exemplum obedientiae in vocatione propositum est. . . . Vocationes sunt personales, sed exemplum obedientiae est generale. Perfectio erat futura illi juveni, si huic vocationi credidisset et obedivisset; ita perfectio nobis est, obedere unumquemque vera fide sua vocationi.”

³ The ethical blessings of family, station, patriotism, can be perverted into foolish pride of family, pride of station, national vanity.

⁴ Luther, “To the German Nobility”: “Just as those whom we call the clergy [die Geistlichen] are distinguished from other Christians only by the fact that they

58. The significance of marriage as the union of two persons of different sexes into one (monogamy), which is set forth in the Old Testament and recognised by Christ as the original arrangement of God,¹ not only implies that in marriage husband and wife are of equal honour [Werth], and that their union is indissoluble during earthly life,² but approves itself also in the fact that in this relation the self-sacrificing power of Christian love [Näch-

are to administer the word of God and the sacraments,—this is their work and office, in the same way secular officials hold the sword to punish the wicked and to protect the good. A shoemaker, a smith, a peasant, each one has the work and office of his own craft, and yet they are all at the same time consecrated priests and bishops, i.e., spiritual persons [geistliche Personen], and each one ought in his office or his work to be useful and serviceable.” “De votis monasticis”: “Melior et perfectior est obedientia filii, conjugis, servi, captivi, quam monachi obedientia. Igitur si ab imperfecto ad perfectum eundum est, ab obedientia monachi ad obedientiam parentum, dominorum, mariti, tyrannorum, adversariorum et omnium eundum est.”

⁵⁸¹ Mark x. 6-8; Gen. ii. 24. Apol. Conf. Aug. XI. 11-13: “Coniunctio maris et feminae est juris naturalis. Porro jus naturale est jus vere divinum, quia est ordinatio divinitus impressa naturae.” Therefore the positive institution of the legal marriage contract falls under the control of the state. Christian marriage is legal marriage between Christians, and does not, therefore, first derive its Christian character through consecration by the Church.

² Mark x. 9-12; xii. 25; 1 Pet. iii. 7. Exceptions to the indissolubility of marriage appear early, Matt. xix. 9; v. 32; 1 Cor. vii. 15.

stenliebe] can and should make the highest and most blessed proof of itself.³ When, nevertheless, love is demanded of the husband and obedience of the wife,⁴ this is because of that difference in the nature of the two sexes which leads the wife to subject herself to her husband as the representative of their mutual union.

59. Since the exalted exercise of Christian love in marriage is further continued in the care and training of children by their parents, the relation of these children to Christianity is already assured by their birth from Christian parents.¹ The children, also, during their bringing up fulfil their Christian duty in that obedience to parents which is in general becoming.² The children of a household are, moreover, as brothers and sisters put into a position to develop, on the one side, a consciousness of mutual rights, and on the other, to form especially close friendships with one another. In both these respects their relation serves as a school for the necessary participation of each one in the public community of rights, and in common ethical intercourse. For the real efficiency of the latter depends precisely upon the filling out and establishing of the ethical individuality of each one through the winning of friends.

60. Justice [Das Recht] is the ordering of mutual

⁵⁸ ³ Eph. v. 25-29.

⁴ Col. iii. 18, 19; Eph. v. 33; 1 Pet. iii. 1.

⁵⁹ ¹ Cor. vii. 14.

² Col. iii. 20; Eph. vi. 1-3.

or concerted actions which have reference either to personal ends (private justice), or to such common ends (public [state-, criminal-] justice) as are of narrower range than the ethical end of the kingdom of God. Inasmuch as judicial law directly controls actions alone, actions which are in accordance with law are not necessarily and always the expression of a corresponding disposition; indeed, judicial law is always accompanied by compulsion to enforce rightdoing in the case of those otherwise disposed. But since justice, when completely understood, is the means by which ethical freedom attains its ends, and therefore is an ethical product, the right ethical disposition includes necessarily a disposition to uphold law, and in the community we habitually reckon upon such a disposition on the part of each one.¹

61. Therefore, while the legal constitution of a people or a state is in itself a matter of indifference to Christianity, regarded either as worship or as

60¹ The view, therefore, of the Middle Ages, and shared even by Luther, that we could get along without legal ordinances were it not for sin, because then every one would act from love, is false. This view does not take into account the necessary organization and gradation of the ethical principles for the different spheres of life, whereby we are spared a waste of energy. The use of legal enactment thus makes active life an easier matter than would be possible if at every step it were necessary to consider the highest possible standards and their application to ordinary civic duties.

the praxis of the kingdom of God,¹ yet the state is recognized as an arrangement of God, and obedience to judicial authority prescribed as a religious duty.² For the system of justice [Rechtsgemeinschaft], being a necessary means to the assurance of ethical freedom, is thus an indispensable condition of the possibility of Christian fulfilment of the duties of the kingdom of God in all the spheres of ethical association.³

62. Accordingly, while active participation in the state, even in so far as it springs out of patriotism and a universal sense of justice, is not an activity which belongs directly to the kingdom of God, yet (in accordance with § 61) it is not only compatible with the Christian life, but the two activities have a necessary reciprocal relation to one another.¹

⁶¹ ¹ Mark xii. 17.

² 1 Pet. ii. 13-17; Rom. xiii. 1-7.

³ Society, when unorganized into a state, whether in a revolutionary or nomadic condition, is an absolute hindrance to the Christian task of the kingdom of God. Even the Israelites were obliged to abandon the nomadic life in order to perform the duties of their religion, whose fundamental promise was that they should acquire a permanent dwelling-place (Gen. xii. 1-3).

62 ¹ Conf. Aug. I. 16: "Necessario debent Christiani obedire magistratibus suis et legibus, nisi cum jubent peccare; tunc enim magis debent obedire deo quam hominibus" (Acts v. 29). This limitation of the duty of obedience to the state deals with a very distant possibility. The expression of Peter referred to asserts rather the duty of Christian confession in direct opposition to unjustifiable limitations proceeding from a churchly authority.

For, on the one hand, the Christian will find it incumbent upon him to promote the legal authority of the state for the very purpose of gaining room for striving after the kingdom of God. On the other hand, the education of a Christian people to humanity, which is demanded by the welfare of the state, is founded upon an effort to realize the kingdom of God, and must be regulated by an insight into the morality suitable to it, an insight which a statesman in a Christian nation cannot afford to be without.—In such measure as this disposition pervades the different nations, it will strengthen regard for their mutual rights. So long, however, as statecraft has to defend the rights of a people or a state against hostility from other nations, while it is never justified in the use of criminal means to this end, it is yet not bound by the same rules which hold for the legal and ethical action of the individual Christian in his relation to the state and in intercourse with other men.

63. The conceptions of virtue and duty arise in this form from philosophical ethics. The use of these conceptions, however, cannot be avoided also in Christian ethics, because the material of both conceptions is included in the right apprehension of the Christian life. Ethical virtues, and actions regulated by the conception of duty, are the products of a will directed toward the highest purpose. The difference between the two is that actions in accordance with duty proceed forth from the will, while virtues are acquired in the will itself;

the former have relation to intercourse or association with others, and the latter belong to the individual as such. When, however, actions also are judged virtuous their relation to others is here not considered, but their relation to the distinctive energy of the doer himself. When on the other hand it is declared also a duty to become virtuous, this conception of duty with reference to itself is a transformation of the usual conception of duty which is likely to cause confusion. That is to say, such an expression is in part an unnecessary circumlocution with regard to personal rights, e.g., that of self-preservation or of the choice and maintenance of the ethical calling, and in part an expression, permissible in pedagogics, of the necessity of acquiring virtues on the part of the one who is yet immature.

64. In reality dutiful actions and the acquiring of virtues are separate from one another neither in time nor space. On the one hand, the very way in which virtues are acquired is by constant dutiful action (§ 49, 2); on the other hand, virtues are exercised as well in the formation of the right conceptions of duty as in the execution of these conceptions.¹ And as they are exercised they are es-

64¹ Paul clearly recognized this (Rom. xii. 2; Phil. i. 9-11; compare Rom. ii. 18). This proving of what is different, the good and the bad, denotes the finding out of duty, i.e., of what it is necessary to do in a particular case. Col. i. 9, 10, refers further to the reciprocal relation, that by wisdom we recognize what God's will is as to a special

tablished or acquired in ever higher degree. This is not the description of a self-contradictory and thus falsely conceived and impossible process. The ethical will is a force whose effect upon others and whose effect upon itself stand in an inseparable reciprocal relation to one another. For the ethical development of the individual will as such, apart from social intercourse with other persons, is utterly inconceivable.

65. The virtues arise out of the various relations in which the rightly disposed will is to be recognized as a whole. When the will subjects the impulses of the individual disposition to the good end, it gains *self-control*. When it establishes firmly the condition upon which the ethical calling depends (§ 57), whether this results in the limitation or in the strengthening of this calling, it gains *conscientiousness*. When it orders its regular activity in consistency with its purposes, intentions, determinations, it gains *wisdom, discretion, determination, constancy*. When, through the motive of love, it directs the good disposition toward the individual persons with whom one is in moral association, it gains *kindliness, thankfulness, justice*.¹

course of action, while by the performance of the recognized duties the ability to recognize duty is increased.

65¹ This table of virtues is complete. All others so referred to are either synonyms (as faithfulness with conscientiousness or kindliness), or are subspecies of self-control (chastity, frugality, moderation), or are the principles of duty which correspond to the virtue of kindliness

66. The first group of virtues, self-control and conscientiousness,¹ is founded on independence and honourableness of character. In the opposite vices, sensuality, intemperance, immoderate ambition, imperious dogmatism, unscrupulousness, untrustworthiness, the will is lacking in the capability of determining itself continuously. Honour is the

(modesty, uprightness, readiness to serve, etc.). This may be seen in the fact that kindness is to be present always, while these special activities cannot be exercised in all cases, but must be suspended in intercourse with certain persons.

66¹ The exalted importance of conscientiousness (Luke xvi. 10; 1 Cor. iv. 2) appears in the fact that it serves as an abbreviated standard of right for the actions of one's regular calling. It does not, it is true, serve to determine the necessary manner of conduct outside of the regular calling. It is, however, often enough applied as a rule in this realm, through a belief in the authority of conscience as a trustworthy and final standard for all ethical conduct. But the correctness of such a belief is confuted by the fact that there exists also an erring or weak conscience (1 Cor. viii. 7-12; x. 28-31; Rom. xiv. 1-4), which is to be respected in the person of its possessor, but which is also to be recognized as a tribunal needing correction by higher standards. Still less can the conscientiousness of individuals determined for themselves by false judgment be accepted as a general law for others. When one, for instance, not only erroneously makes ascetic rules a part of his own Christian calling, but also wishes to judge others by his own conscientiousness so determined, his conscience is spotted or seared (Tit. i. 15; 1 Tim. iv. 2, 3), because he must have suppressed his doubt as to the rightfulness of his proceeding. Compare § 52, 4.

moral independence of an individual in so far as recognized by other independent individuals. The man without virtue has therefore no moral honour. Moreover, no one gains honour by winning for himself the regard of his companions through yielding to the prejudices or immoralities of a special circle. Finally, honour must not be confounded with that negative regard which is to be accorded to the dignity of the human being, even in the case of those without virtue.

67. The second group of virtues, wisdom, discretion, determination, constancy,¹ is founded upon clearness and energy of character. For the good end at which one aims is without effect upon one's character, if one is wavering in his purposes, inconsiderate in his principles, undecided in particulars and changeable as to the whole. In the exercise of conduct which is systematic and also expedient for the moment, prudence alternates with discretion,² the latter estimating the measures to be taken according to one's own power, the former according to the resistance to be expected from others.

68. The third group of virtues, kindliness,¹

⁶⁷¹ Wisdom: 1 Cor. iii. 10; vi. 5; Luke xxi. 15; Matt. xxiv. 45; xxv. 2; discretion, soberness, 1 Pet. i. 13; v. 8; 1 Thess. v. 6-8; determination, Rom. xiv. 22, 23; Col. iv. 5; Eph. v. 15, 16; constancy, Luke viii. 15; Heb. x. 36; xii. 1; Rev. ii. 2; Rom. ii. 7.

¹ Matt. 10. 16; Luke xvi. 8.

⁶⁸¹ 1 Cor. xiii. 4, 5; Gal. v. 22; Col. iii. 12; Eph. iv. 32; Phil. iv. 5.

thankfulness, justice, is founded upon a good disposition or amiability of character. There is at least a lack of virtue, when out of a thoroughly good intention the moral ends of society are treated in a purely impersonal manner, or too impersonally, hence with harshness and want of consideration for the persons to whom one nevertheless wishes to show love. The full comprehensiveness of love appears, when, in kindness, we gain facility in adjusting our manner of action to the claim which others have upon our love; in thankfulness, we gain the readiness to depend upon the kindness of others; in justice, we gain the disposition so to bear the lack of kindness and of thankfulness in others as not to allow ourselves to be led by our perception of it into harshness toward them. Thus justice will not exercise the necessary severity toward others without tempering it with a perceptible measure of kindness.²

69. The moral law is so completely expressed in Christ's precept of love to one's neighbour (§ 6), that all morally necessary and desirable actions fall within the circumference of this rule. But it has direct reference to the disposition alone, and leaves

68² The moral peculiarity of individuals depends upon the different degrees in which the several groups of virtues are developed, and the various combinations thus arising. At the same time it is also conditioned upon the nature of one's calling, the grade of intelligence and the kind and grade of artistic activity which belongs to each one and which affects his moral self-expression.

undetermined all the other conditions by which the necessity for individual benevolent action is to be recognized. To these conditions belong not only the determination of the special ways in which love is to be manifested (§ 72), but also the judgment whether in any particular instance we have to deal with a neighbour in the full sense, or with one who is undeveloped in character and in need of education, or with an enemy (§ 6, 2). And finally it must be determined whether in a special case one ought to act from the disposition of love or refuse to act at all. A safe conclusion as to these conditions must, however, be included, if one is to be able to assure oneself that a special action, or the omission of all action, is in any special instance in accordance with the moral law.¹ These conditions are, however, so innumerable that they could never be wholly included in any systematic statutory exposition of the moral law.² For a judicial law can

69¹ This principle decides against Jesuitic morality, which, because the moral law does not extend to definite actions, treats the conception of obligation itself as indefinite, and accordingly withdraws the individual possible actions from any definite determination and teaches that they are to be decided according to the authority or assurance of the individual in accordance with the precept that "the end justifies the means."

² This appears clearly in Christ's Sermon on the Mount (Matt. v.-vii.), the particular precepts of which are sometimes applicable only by analogy, and sometimes have reference to intercourse with brethren, i.e., with men of like moral disposition, and thus they always take for

be laid down as statutory and exhaustive in its definite commands and prohibitions only because the actions which are neither commanded nor forbidden are permitted, i.e., remain legally undetermined. On the contrary the moral law reckons upon a measure of virtuous independence in the individual, according to which he has to determine what is moral duty in each case (§ 64, 1), namely, whether one is necessitated by the universal moral law to act now in accordance with it, or under the circumstances not to act at all. Under these conditions the moral law perfectly understood becomes the law of liberty.³

70. Moral duty, therefore, is the judgment of the virtuous man that in a special case, determined by an estimate of the personal and material circumstances, the moral law requires him to act from the disposition of love. The element of freedom, which is inseparable from this judgment of the necessity of a benevolent act, brings it about that in the same case one individual may be under obligation to act and another not to act. This disparity allowed by the conception of duty has not however the significance of lawlessness. For since it is in his own special moral calling (§ 57) that each one is to work at the common task of the kingdom of God and to fulfil the universal moral law, the greater part of moral duties are thereby determined in ad-
granted the free judgment of the circumstances which cannot be enumerated in the rule.

⁶⁹⁸ Jas. i. 25.

vance. The duties of one's calling are therefore the regular duties of love.¹ And thus the disparity in the duty of different individuals in the same case is explicable from the difference in the moral callings. But those actions which are not provided for by one's special moral calling are also recognized as necessary or obligatory because one finds them analogous to those of one's own calling. In these cases one forms the judgment that by means of special circumstances one is called to the exercise of unusual duty.

71. Yet the network of ordinary (belonging to one's calling) and extraordinary duties of love does not extend so far as to cover all the voluntary expressions of the good character. It is a question, therefore, whether all that action to which one gives the benefit of being considered morally allowable, and which one

70¹ Because the duty of one's calling is the regular and ordinary form of the duty of love, its fulfilment is rightfully recognized as a part of Christian perfection (§ 50, 2). For the determination of the duties belonging to one's calling, the virtue of conscientiousness which corresponds to the calling is, in the formula of the authoritative conscience, the ordinarily sufficient subjective standard. Hence conscientiousness seems to extend also to the judgment as to whether one is called to the performance of certain extraordinary duties. Yet this is the very realm where the erring conscience (§ 66, 1) has full play, when one forgets that his own calling has its limitations, and that many actions are really less analogous to it than one easily imagines.

is thus accustomed to withdraw from the direct application of the conception of duty, is to be regarded (1) as altogether morally indeterminable, or (2) as still to be forced under the severity of the conception of duty, or (3) as perhaps to be morally regulated in some other way. The first case is improbable, because the coherence of the good character would not admit of the morally indifferent nature of a large range of its activities. The pedantic rigorism of the second case is not to be recommended for the very reason that we must be able to assure to ourselves our moral freedom as such, when in the conception of duty it encounters a legal necessity. We must, for instance, be able to preserve our freedom in that we follow no imperative duty in the choice of our special calling; in that we are not under obligation to marry any particular person or to marry at all; or that we are not in all cases under obligation to defend our calling against hostile attacks. In these respects one exercises rather only rights, which one may ignore or may exercise in a choice which is not amenable to any conception of duty. However, the way in which this exercise is morally measurable will become clear when the other realm of what is morally allowable is taken into consideration. This is, namely, the realm of recreation, partly as rest from the exertion of work, partly as sensuous and intellectual enjoyment, i.e., as luxury over and above the indispensable needs of life,¹ partly as

⁷¹ ¹ Calvin's Institutes, III. 10. 2: "Jam si reputemus,

social entertainment and amusement, and partly as a combination of both. The occasion for rest from moral activity and for enjoyment is furnished by the dependence of our spiritual life upon bodily conditions. The occasion for social amusement in bodily and mental exercise is furnished by the intellectual necessity for individual artistic self-expression which exists along with the necessity for moral association. Thus it corresponds more to the dignity of man to seek his recreation from useful toil in the exchange of all possible artistic activity than in sitting still by himself. This content of recreation is therefore originally of such a nature as not to come under direct subordination to the moral conception of duty. Only when health is impaired is one led to recreation from a sense of duty to oneself or to one's usefulness in one's calling. Nevertheless, recreation is limited indirectly and negatively by duty. The kind and duration of recreation is to be so regulated that one will not be less fitted for the fulfilling of one's calling after the recreation than before. When one is thus less fitted, recreation is contrary to duty and morally unallowable. Hence, since the regulation of recreation by the conception of duty does not reach further, the third case holds good, inasmuch as the maintenance of virtue must accompany the whole

quem in finem deus alimenta creaverit, reperiemus non necessitati modo, sed oblectamento quoque ac hilaritati eum voluisse consulere. . . . Annon res multas citra necessarium usum commendabiles nobis reddidit?"

extent of recreation, and especially that of social recreation. In all cases the same conscientiousness, self-control, discretion, kindness, thankfulness and justice are to be maintained, and all amusement and all entertainment is unallowable which interferes with the exercise of these virtues. Thus it follows that in this realm the same thing is to one allowable and to another unallowable, according as these virtues are therein exercised or not. Finally, it is evident that even in the exercise of personal rights as discussed above virtue must co-operate as the moral standard.

72. The duties of love arising from the universal loving disposition may be divided according to the varieties of the application of this kindness; and hence there result special principles, which make easier the decision as to a particular obligation. Kindness manifests itself either in the positive kindly *regard* for other persons, or in the *support* of their justifiable ends, or in *forbearance* with the defects in their virtue. In the first case there result the principles of *modesty* and *sincerity*; in the second the principles of *rectitude*, *readiness to serve*, *benevolence*, *truthfulness*; in the third the principles of *compatibility* and *placability*.

73. Kindly regard for others includes the negative regard for the dignity of the human being and the sparing of the possessions of others of whatever kind, these being antecedent conditions of love and maintained even by the order of public justice.¹

73¹ This is the underlying principle of the second table of the commandments (§ 6, 4).

For in and of itself this negative regard can be exercised in connection with complete indifference toward others, and of itself leads therefore to no moral fellowship. The principles of modesty and sincerity, however, point to such a regard for another that in action and speech we enter into moral fellowship with him. Modesty is the right limiting of the sense of self, arising from the fact that we recognise in another the worth of the fellowship to be entered into with him.² Sincerity is the right

73² The right conception of modesty must always be distinguished from such a false ascetic conception as that of Thomas à Kempis (*De Imitatione Christi*, I. 7). "Si aliquid boni habueris, crede de aliis meliora, ut humilitatem conserves. Non nocet, si omnibus te supponas; nocet autem plurimum, si vel uni te praeponas." This rule contradicts the natural impression of many experiences and involves a constant reflective self-scrutiny in comparing ourselves with others, and is so much the more unwholesome since the result sought after can often enough be reached only by ignoring the truth. For in modesty it cannot be the important thing that one regards an immature man as more mature than himself, etc., but the important thing is that one subjects himself as an individual to the value of the fellowship which is sought, by putting himself both in speech and action in relation to another. When we are forbidden to judge [*richten*] others (*Matt. vii. 1-5*), the giving up of all moral judgment [*Beurteilung*] of others is not demanded of us. It appears rather from a comparison with *Jas. iv. 11, 12*, and *Rom. xiv. 4*, that such judging of others is wrong as elevates itself indirectly above the law-giver or ignores the value of another in God's sight. For thereby the value of this one for our fellowship would be denied

expression of the constant spirit of appreciation of others [Gemeinsinn] which recognizes the value of another to the purpose for which we enter into fellowship with him.³

74. The kindly support of the justifiable purposes of others includes righteous deportment in all relations to them which are governed by contract. For since the administration of justice is the means to the assured exercise of moral freedom, the disposition to uphold justice is included in the disposition of love (§ 60), and guides our duties to others by the principle of rectitude.¹ Rectitude has

also; but the necessity of such fellowship is established by the law of Christ and by the common dependence of all upon God. One can thus, for instance, make clear to one's self the lower moral grade of another in accordance with the truth and yet show to him modesty, i.e., the loving regard for his personality which makes one care for his education or improvement.

73³ That sincerity which duty demands of us is not the same as natural frankness, though it is made more easy by frankness, and the material of individual self-communication is contained in them both. But frankness cannot come to its full expression in sincerity without a recognition of the common end which one is seeking in contact with others. This limitation of natural frankness in sincerity varies according to the character of those with whom one has to do.—The two negatives, immodesty and insincerity, denote direct and positive violations of regard for others, the latter as falsity under the guise of sincerity. Non-sincerity or reserve is to be distinguished from these as a purely negative manifestation.

74¹ Therefore rectitude is possible apart from the disposition of love, as is the negative regard for the person and

reference, it is true, to those relations with others which depend upon mutual advantage, while on the contrary, the trait of unselfishness, or the surrendering of our own advantage in the assisting of others, is necessarily involved in readiness to serve, benevolence and truthfulness. Yet this distance between the principle of rectitude and these other principles is lessened by the fact that the principle of rectitude includes equity in dealing with those who are under legal obligation to us and can lay claim only to our rectitude. Equity is of course no measure of our duties of love, but it recognizes the fact that our relations to others, while ordered for the time being only by contract, is not exhausted by legal justice, but that he who is temporarily under legal obligation to us possesses at the same time human dignity and moral freedom, which may at any moment give us occasion to exercise the duties of love. The real duties of love arise, however, only when there is no question of mutual right involved, when therefore unselfishness is possible.

property of others (§ 73, 1). Both are included in the conception of civil justice which according to the doctrine of the Reformers is possible in the sinful state. It is, however, to be remarked that even in this conception of rectitude the standard is found not in the positive law but in the idea of justice. For this rectitude also excludes such forms of fraud as under certain circumstances are not subject to punishment by the letter of the law and the administration of justice connected with it, for instance, usury, i.e., the making use of another's distress to one's own profit under the form of a legal contract,

This is the case when the justifiable ends of others are supported by readiness to serve in the rendering of personal assistance,—by benevolence in the sharing of property,—by truthfulness in the sharing of knowledge.²

75. Benevolent forbearance with the want of virtue in others expresses itself in the principles of compatibility in existing intercourse, and of placability when this intercourse has been interrupted by strife. Both are distinct from a weak indulgence toward wrong, in that they are connected with sincerity.¹ Moreover, right action, in accordance with these and the preceding principles, with the exception of rectitude, is limited by the consideration as to whether the kind and degree of the formation of moral character in others allows moral fellowship

74² These three principles have a common opposite in a fundamental unwillingness to please which refuses personal services, gifts and information (in disobliging taciturnity or reserve). Truthfulness has, however, a more distinct opposite in lying, or in a fundamental mendacity. Not every untrue statement is a lie. In the realm of art, in jest, in the deception of children or of the sick or of enemies, an untrue statement is occasionally permissible or even desirable. But a lie is an untruth told with the purpose of injuring another or of gaining an unwarrantable advantage for one's self, or both. Mendacity is the habitual inclination to untruthfulness, arising either from such a purpose, or from such an indifference to truth as excludes the purpose of being of service to others through truthfulness.

75¹ Matt. v. 23, 24.

with them at all, or to what extent.² The exercise of rectitude is, however, always imperative.

76. Perfection, which, on the foundation of the grace of God and in conformity to the redemption through Christ, consists in the exercise of religious and moral virtues and in the performance of the duties of love regulated by our moral calling (§ 50), is necessarily accompanied by a feeling of blessedness (§ 47). But in so far as individuals have succeeded in attaining this height of Christian character-building, and in maintaining it in the conflict with their own sin and with patience under external limitations, they will, because of their increased sensitiveness of feeling, be the very ones to judge themselves full of defects and imperfection. Therefore, these will be the very ones to refuse to organize an association of the perfect, so as to form a narrower circle of the same within the community of worship.¹ But Christian faith, certain of eternal life (§ 45) through the reconciliation in

75² Matt. vii. 6.

76¹ Such an order appeared originally in Buddhism, then in Manicheism, then was applied in the estimate of Christian monasticism, and finally appears again in Pietistic circles. In all these similar manifestations, there is prominent a religious tendency toward an abstract denial of the world, which in varying degrees is common to these religions and tendencies. At the same time it is true, that a separation of the "perfecti" from the "auditores" (as they are classified in Manicheism) only appears when at bottom there is a strong tendency to a ceremonial-legal conception of religion.

Christ, and maintaining this blessing in the exercise of righteousness as well as in sanctification (§ 47, 2), rests upon the hope that the perfecting of the kingdom of God as the highest good will be realized upon conditions which extend beyond this world of experience (§ 8).

77. Christ and the apostles looked forward to the coming of this end and of these conditions in the near future; following the Old Testament prophets, they looked for the divine judgment of the world as an event upon this earth perceptible to the senses, by means of which the way was to be prepared for the dominion of Christ over the kingdom of God on earth.¹ This epoch was to be introduced by the resurrection of the believing dead and the visible reappearance of Christ Himself.² This special form of future expectation has not maintained itself in the church, though still held in sectarian circles. The hope cherished in the church gives up the expectation that this earth will be the scene of Christ's dominion, while it holds fast the practical truths of the divine judgment, and of the separation of the blessed and the lost, as well as the final attainment of the highest good in the case of the

¹ Mark viii. 38; ix. 1; 1 Pet. iv. 7; Jas. v. 8, 9; 1 John ii. 28; 1 Thess. iv. 15; 1 Cor. x. 11; xv. 52; Heb. x. 35-37. Compare, on the other hand, 2 Pet. iii. 4-9.—Rev. xix. 11-21; 1 Pet. iv. 5; Heb. x. 30, 31; 2 Cor. v. 10; Matt. xxv. 31-46.

² 1 Thess. iv. 16, 17.

former.³ Since a consistent eschatological theory cannot be gained from New Testament data, the hints of the New Testament as to the condition of the blessed and of the lost lie beyond the possibility of a clear presentation.⁴ The important thing, however, is not the satisfaction of curiosity, but the assurance that no one is blessed except in union with all the blessed in the kingdom of God.

77³ Conf. Aug. I. 17: "Christus apparebit in consummatione mundi ad judicandum et mortuos omnes resuscitabit; piis et electis dabit vitam aeternam et perpetua gaudia, impios autem homines et diabolos condemnabit ut sine fine crucientur."

⁴ Here belongs the expectation of continued existence in a body corresponding fully to the spirit (1 Cor. xv. 35-53; 2 Cor. v. 1; Phil. iii. 20, 21); further the destiny of those who are not saved, of whom it seems uncertain whether they shall suffer endless punishment or be annihilated (Mark ix. 43-48; Rev. xix. 20; Rom. ii. 9, 12; ix. 22; Phil. iii. 19; Rev. xvii. 8, 11; Matt. vii. 13).

PART FOURTH.

THE DOCTRINE OF PUBLIC WORSHIP.

78. Prayer is not simply an act and a need of the individual believer (§ 54), but is also intended as well for a public exercise.¹ Prayer is the most spiritual form of divine worship. Therefore, in the perfect religion of Christianity, it has replaced all material offerings and sacrifices which in other religions are used in the service of God.²

79. In the conception of prayer as a whole, petition and thanksgiving are not equally important parts. For otherwise the error would be encouraged that self-seeking petition may serve as justifiable worship of God, and that one has to return

78¹ The same community which, in mutual moral action, forms the kingdom of God, is through reconciliation with God at the same time destined to unite itself in public worship (§ 9, 2).

2 The fruit of lips which confess God's name is the sacrifice of praise (Heb. xiii. 15; compare 1 Pet. ii. 5), which occasionally, even in the Old Testament, is recognized as the opposite of, and the most complete substitute for, material sacrifice (Hos. xiv. 2; Ps. l. 14, 23; li. 15-17; cxvi. 17; Isa. lvii. 19).

thanks to God only when his petitions are heard. Instead, prayer is represented as a whole and under all circumstances as thanksgiving, praise, recognition and worship of God.¹ The "confession of His name" is thus the recognition of God as our Father, inasmuch as He has revealed Himself as such through His Son² and shown Himself such in the direction of our lives (§ 54, 1). Petition is a variety of the prayer of thanksgiving. For the humble and unselfish recognition of God, or thanksgiving, gov-

79¹ The word "prayer" is a real hindrance to the recognition of this fact, since the first thought which it suggests is that of petition. But one only needs to look through the Psalms, which in Hebrew are called "tehilim" (songs of praise), to recognize the norm of the matter in the statement above.

² The calling upon God as our Father through Jesus Christ (§ 12) distinguishes Christianity from all other religions, including the Jewish. For although God stands in the Old Testament as the Father of the chosen people Israel, which is His Son (Ex. iv. 22; Hos. xi. 1), it is first through Christ that the right is given to the members of His community to regard themselves individually as sons or children of God, while He designates the Israelites as strangers, i.e., as servants of God (Matt. xvii. 24-27). Accordingly, it is characteristic that Paul, in the opening of his epistles, identifies himself with the community he addresses, in giving thanks to God as our Father and as the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, and does so on the ground of the existence of the Christian religion in the community (1 Thess. i. 2-5; 2 Thess. i. 3, 4; Gal. i. 3-5; 1 Cor. i. 4-9; 2 Cor. i. 3-7; Rom. i. 8; Col. i. 3-6; Eph. i. 3-6; Phil. i. 3-7; compare Acts ii. 11, 47).

erns in all cases the petitions which the need of the one who prays brings before him.³ This indicates also the limits within which we may be confident that our petitions will be heard (§ 55). Public prayer, especially, cannot be a prayer of petition unless one is sure that what is desired will serve not only our need but also God's glory. Thus is assured the hearing of such petitions as are offered in the name of Jesus Christ,⁴ i.e., which are directed to the obtaining of the blessings which stand in direct relation to the purpose of the revelation through Christ. The right and the duty of mutual intercessory prayer is thus pre-eminently established.

80. The prayer which Christ taught His disciples at their request¹ offers a characteristic confirmation of Paul's direction that every prayer is to be accompanied with thanksgiving, and is the key

⁷⁹ ³ Phil. iv. 6; 1 Thess. v. 16-18.

⁴ John xiv. 13, 14; xv. 16; xvi. 23, 34.

⁸⁰ ¹ For various reasons the text of this prayer and the occasion for it as given in Luke xi. 1-4, is to be preferred to the text and the context in Matt. vi. 9-13. In the former the prayer consists of five petitions: Πάτερ, ἀγιασθήτω τὸ ὄνομά σου, ἐλθάτω ἡ βασιλεία σου. Τὸν ἀρτον ἡμῶν τὸν ἐπιούσον δίδου ἡμῖν τὸ καθ' ἡμέραν, καὶ ἅφες ἡμῖν τὰς ἀμαρτίας ἡμῶν, καὶ γὰρ ἀντοι αφίομεν παντὶ ὀφελοντι ἡμῖν, καὶ μὴ ἐισενέγκης ἡμᾶς εἰς πειρασμόν. What is added in Matthew proves to be only an enlargement of the second and fifth petitions. For the coming of the kingdom of God consists in the fact that God's will shall be done on earth as in heaven (Ps. ciii. 21), and being delivered from evil is identical with being kept from temptation.

to the sense in which the confession of God's name is to be understood as a sacrifice of praise. For, in the first place, all the petitions of this prayer are clearly subordinate to the recognition of God as our Father, and are comprehended in this confession of His name. Further, every petition includes in itself the recognition of the fact that the blessings to which in varying measure they relate are assured by God to the praying community. The desire that God's name may be hallowed presupposes that God has brought His being and His power to the knowledge of man,² and therefore that the hallowing of His name, or the recognition of Him,³ is in the same measure possible. The petition that God's kingdom may come presupposes on the lips of His disciples that this kingdom is made real by Christ in the full sense in their own circle (§ 5, 2). The prayer for daily bread presupposes the assurance that God cares for the maintenance of the one who prays;⁴ and for him who has won by toil the bread he needs the petition bears the character of a thanksgiving for the blessing enjoyed. The petition for the forgiveness of sins in no sense gives expression to a just claim on God's favour, because it is conditioned upon our forgiveness of others. This condition

² Is. xxix. 23; Ezek. xxxvi. 23.
³ Ps. ix. 10; lxix. 36; Deut. xxviii. 58; xxxii. 3; Is. xxx. 27; 1. 10).

⁴ Matt. vi. 31, 32.

signifies rather that we are engaged in the characteristic work of that community (§ 6, 2) which is brought together through the forgiveness of sins, or reconciliation with God (§ 38). The petition for continued or ever-to-be-renewed application of this gift presupposes therefore a recognition of its universal establishment for the community. Finally, the petition that we may be spared temptation from any relation into which we may be brought to the world, or may be delivered from the evil likely to arise out of it, is inconceivable apart from a recognition of God's direction of the world and of His loving purpose to direct it for the best good of His children.

81. United and public prayer is the characteristic mark of the unity of Christians as the *εκκλησία* or church. For although this community is also destined to the ethical realization of the kingdom of God, yet this activity has no direct materially measurable manifestation (§ 9, 2). Yet public prayer as the manifestation of the religious worship of God is not only in itself the object of the church, but serves also to secure the homogeneity of believers in the task of the kingdom of God. Apart from this fact, the confession of the name of God as of our Father in public prayer is that which distinguishes the character of the church as the religious community of Christ. In its exercise all Christians are priests.¹

81¹ Priests are those who are permitted to draw near to God (Num. xvi. 5). In this sense the Israelites were originally a kingdom of priests (Ex. xix. 6). The exer-

Also the confession before men of Jesus as Christ, or as our Lord, is that which distinguishes this community as historically established by Christ.²

82. As every religion depends in some sense upon a divine revelation, no religious community maintains its peculiar character without resting upon the repetition of similar revelations, or upon the original revelation as held in remembrance and to be reproduced in speech. It is especially necessary to the existence and authentic maintenance of the Christian community as a religious body, that its public activity in worship be regulated by a common and openly controlling remembrance of its Founder and of the revelation of God as represented through Him (§§ 19, 25). Therefore, the Christian community as a religious body, or as the church, has its characteristic also in the word of God or in the gospel. By this we understand the revealed and gracious divine will, which has as its

cise of this right was then limited in being restricted to the mediation of the sacrifice by the official Levitic priests. In Christianity this condition is done away with, since in its community only the sacrifice of prayer is offered; thus all Christians are priests (1 Pet. ii. 5-9; Rev. i. 6; v. 10; Heb. vii. 19; x. 22; xiii. 15).

81² Matt. x. 32, 33; Rom. x. 9; 1 Cor. xii. 3; Phil. ii. 11. This confession of the church corresponds both to its historical peculiarity and to its universal human destiny. By this recognition Christians are to distinguish themselves from all other religious communities, but at the same time are to extend their community until it embraces humanity.

end the kingdom of God, and which therefore includes the right understanding of Christ,—that He makes actual the grace and truth of God (§ 22), and as the reconciler of sinners with God founds and represents the community of the kingdom of God (§ 42). All this content of knowledge is called the word of God, being set forth in the form of the will of God, and of His purpose that we should belong to the kingdom of God (§ 5), and possess freedom over the world (§ 45). So constituted, the word of God is effective not only for the gaining of knowledge, but also for the corresponding stirring of the feelings and the will, and is therefore effective for personal conviction, and as the motive and measure of that worship of God which forms the essential active characteristic of the Christian community (§ 81). With such content and such effectiveness the word of God, even as spoken by men, has its value as God's word.¹

83. The two acts of baptism and the Lord's Supper, which Christ instituted, and whose observance has been maintained by the piety of the Christian community, are in their identical repetition also characteristics of the unity of the Christian church.¹ These, in their visible form, are acts of worship on the part of the community, and are not conceivable outside of the same. Accordingly, they are of the

82¹ Mark iv. 14; John v. 24, 38; viii. 31; xiv. 23, 24; Luke x. 16; Acts iv. 29; 1 Pet. i. 23-25; Rom. i. 1; 1 Cor. xiv. 36; Col. i. 25; 1 Thess. ii. 13.

83¹ Eph. iv. 4-6; 1 Cor. x. 17.

same nature as public prayer, and like this are acts of confession on the part of the community.² But inasmuch as the Lord's Supper has reference to the sacrificial death of Christ, in which is included the founding of the community (§ 42), this act of worship on the part of the community is at the same time an assurance of the continuance of the forgiving grace of God by virtue of which Christ founded

83² 1 Cor. xi. 26; Matt. xxviii. 19. The marks of the unity of the church, indicated in §§ 81-83, are not similar in nature to one another, and no one of them ought to be emphasized in a one-sided manner. The preaching of the divine word in the church must be estimated with reference to its object, namely, that the church may be united in the prayer-confession of God through their Lord Jesus Christ, and the two acts instituted by Christ fully attain their divine sacramental value only when they are performed as acts of worship on the part of the community. Thus the definition of the church in the Confessio Augustana, I. 7: "the gathering of all believers among whom the gospel is purely preached and the holy sacraments are administered according to the gospel," is incomplete, because it lacks the characteristic of united [identisch] prayer. But further, a right understanding of the matter would not be reached if the word of God, prayer, sacraments, were only enumerated side by side as similar characteristics of the church. For the contrast must be maintained between the word of God and the prayer of the community, in order to recognize the reciprocal relation between the two, and it must be made clear, in the case of baptism and the Lord's Supper, that the reciprocal relation between the act of the community and the gracious gift of God are expressed in one and the same act.

the community. This is true also of baptism, in so far as it has reference to the revelation of the Father through the Son and through the Holy Spirit bestowed upon the community (§ 46). Upon these considerations rests their value as sacraments or means of grace.

84. The Catholic conception of the church makes the value of the common Christian faith and of public worship to depend upon the recognition of the special canons of the Catholic Church. Now a right appreciation of the community or church of Christ belongs necessarily to the religious conception of Christianity as a whole. This involves not only a right appreciation of the community in its relation to the kingdom of God, as its highest good and its common task (§ 5), but also in its relation to the word of God, that is, as a community of faith and worship (§ 82), which maintains the efficacy of the revelation of God in Christ. Therefore it is necessary, even according to the Evangelical view, to believe in the church as possessing these characteristics by sharing in its worship. But in the Evangelical sense one believes thus in the church without reference to the authorized forms in which it may otherwise exist.¹ For,

84¹ Belief here has reference to the church as the union of believers in the Holy Spirit and as the sphere of the forgiveness of sins (§ 38, 1). This belief recognizes these determinations of value as belonging to the church and recognizes the church in these relations as a reality whose existence is assured by God. Authorized forms, how-

although the religious elements of the church could not have become historically effective without the mediation of authorized forms, yet the appreciation of the communion of faith and prayer, in which the Christian church universal really consists (§ 86, 2), is perfectly indifferent to the church canons which vary in its different divisions.

85. The Christian church, which, according to its nature and proper destiny, is understood by the characteristics already given as the fellowship of believers in one and the same divine worship, began as such its public history on Pentecost.¹ But it did not attain to permanence without developing within itself other functions than those which are primarily characteristic of it. For example, the ordering of fellowship in public worship and the propagation of the same in succeeding generations, led of necessity to the establishing of an official class, whose privileges over the community called for governmental as well as moral obedience.² This organization of the Christian community attained, however, a larger scope than the original exigency demanded, because the Christian church found itself placed in the midst of a society whose moral institutions were determined either by the pagan or

ever, are not value-factors for religious faith, and thus it ignores them in establishing the religious value of the church.

¹ 85¹ Acts ii. 1-11.

² 1 Thess. v. 12, 13; 1 Cor. xvi. 15, 16; 1 Pet. v. 1-5; Heb. xiii. 17.

the Jewish religion, and whose legal institutions left no place for the Christian community as a religious body. The latter was therefore necessitated, by historical circumstances, not only to develop its morals in contrast to surrounding society, but also to protect them by legal regulations and to intrust the execution of these to the officials of the church service. As early as the Apostolic age the Christian church began, by free-will offerings and regular alms, to attain to economic independence, to decide questions of private justice among its members and to develop a new marriage code;³ it continued this development in exercising the punitive right of excommunication against unworthy members, and in recognizing the bishops as the divinely appointed organs of these judicial forms. In these functions the Christian church, holding itself distinct from the Roman Empire, became itself a state without national foundations; as such a state it was after three centuries recognized in the Roman Empire, and the Roman Catholic Church emphasizes now more strongly than ever its claim to the divine establishment of this organization. On the other hand, according to the Evangelical view, all attributes of a state nature are excluded from the conception of the church. Yet inasmuch as this fellowship of worship as such is in need of authorized form, this is

85³ 1 Cor. vi. 1-6; vii. 10-17.

limited essentially to the maintenance of the preaching office.⁴

86. The unity of the worshipping community of Christ is such an essential part of the view of the world which belongs to the Christian religion,¹ that the splitting of the church into a multitude of divisions and sects, and the ceaseless continuance of controversy among the same, forms a great hindrance to the convincing power of this religion. Yet, in the first place, this very fact is a proof of the significance of Christianity as the religion of humanity. For the divisions and strifes of the church are occasioned by the fact that all possible religious, moral and intellectual tendencies of prechristian humanity are to be brought into union with Christianity. This phenomenon therefore which is possible to no national religion, which does not appear in Buddhism and only to a very limited extent in Mohammedanism, is a proof that Christianity attracts to itself all in-

85⁴ Conf. Aug. I. 5. The fact is here overlooked that the preachers of the divine word are at the same time the leaders of public worship, i.e., those who offer prayer for the congregation. Now as prayer is an activity in whose exercise all Christians are priests (§ 81, 1), there can be no objection to calling those who offer the public prayers also official priests. In so doing the right of the Catholics to limit this title to the sacrifice of the mass would be denied, since in the Evangelical sense to the priest belongs no other sacrifice than that which belongs to all, the sacrifice of the lips,—prayer.

86¹ John x. 16.

tellectual elements of culture, even at the risk of its own deformation. Besides this occasion of divisions, in the second place, the unity of Christian worship as a matter of fact may be recognized in all divisions and sects in that they without exception make official use of the Lord's Prayer,² and thereby maintain the *intention* of a pure understanding of God's word. Nevertheless, divisions arise because variations, now in the different forms of worship and now in the understanding of God's word, are regarded as necessary grounds of separation. Thus in the different divisions we have differences not only in the kind but also in the grade of their presentation of Christianity. When, therefore, in that branch of the church to which one naturally belongs he is conscious of sharing in a higher grade of Christian development than were possible in other branches, he is under moral obligation just

86² Baptism and the Lord's Supper, in spite of their original intent (§ 83, 1), unfortunately can no longer be called actual characteristics of the unity of the church. The Lord's Supper is almost everywhere without hesitation made the confessional sign of churchly schism. Baptism also is no longer what Luther considered it, a common characteristic of all sects. In the Greek Church, which practises a threefold immersion, the sprinkling of the Western church is not so fully recognized that Latin Christians may not be rebaptized at the option of the individual priest. The numberless sects of Baptists do not recognize infant sprinkling as baptism at all. And lately the Roman Catholics are departing from the former recognition of heretical baptism, and occasionally rebaptize converts from Protestantism.

there within his own church to fulfil the common duties of Christianity, both the religious, those pertaining to public worship and the ethical.

87. The fellowship of worshippers becomes at the same time a school, in that it expresses its understanding of the pure word of God, or the religious view of the world peculiar to Christianity, in universal statements of truth or dogmas.¹ Variation in dogma (conception of doctrine, order of instruction) are not the only possible sources of church division. The Eastern and Western Catholic Churches were originally one in doctrine, but separated because of differences in worship, church custom and government. On the other hand, the great dividing of the Western Church, even in worship, is the result of difference in doctrinal conceptions. An Evangelical Christian interprets this to mean that he receives a riper development of Christianity than is offered in the Catholic Church (§ 45, ₅). The positive interest of Evangelical Christians in the doctrinal teaching of their Church, which is the natural consequence of this, is regulated by two conditions. First, the doctrinal teaching of the church must be governed and respectively justified by Scripture. Secondly, doctrinal teaching always marks the church as a

87¹ The earliest document of the kind, the so-called Apostles' Creed, cannot rightly be regarded as the uniform confession of the *whole* church. For in the Greek Church it is neither in official use, nor is it generally known, since there its place is occupied by the Nicene-Constantinopolitan formula of the Rule of Faith.

school. It brings confusion, therefore, when the doctrinal teaching is recognized as exclusively the "Confession of the Church," without regard to that which is set forth in §§ 79-81. For churchly systems of doctrine since the Reformation can only be appropriated through a fundamental theological training; theological training, however, cannot be expected of the members of the church as such. Membership in the Evangelical Church is rather to be determined by what constitutes Christian perfection according to Evangelical teaching (§ 50, ₂). By this means the distinction is also made clear between the Christianity of the Evangelical Church and all sects (as well as sectarian tendencies within the Evangelical Church) which aim toward the determining of Christian perfection by other conditions than those laid down in the Augsburg Confession.

88. The properly limited and privileged preaching office (§ 85, ₄) has as its object the moral leading of the community toward the attainment of the ends aimed at in its public worship. The principle of the German Reformation that the religious-ethical authority of the preaching office was not a legal-political authority, nor to be confounded with such,¹ is maintained without difficulty, since a local

88¹ Conf. Aug. II. 7: "Non commiscendae sunt potestates ecclesiastica et civilis. . . . Secundum evangelium seu de jure divino nulla jurisdictione competit episcopis ut episcopis, hoc est, quibus est commissum ministerium verbi et sacramentorum, nisi remittere peccata, item cog-

Evangelical parish is constituted a *parish* by its property and the administration of the same, and a *church* by the maintenance of the office of the word and the administration of the sacraments. The official preaching of the divine word (§ 82) may, as occasion demands, take the form of rebuke of errors and immoralities on the part of certain individuals, and under certain circumstances the local church may be obliged to deny to individuals the privilege of sharing its worship. But even this exercise of the natural right of a community is properly understood as a moral force, and as the application of moral compulsion.—The Evangelical Church acquires a legal character in the proper sense of the term, including the right to administer external compulsion, only when the many local communities wish to become a unity and at the same time to stand forth as a corporation privileged by the state. This calls for a legal organization with a gradation of offices, as well as for the superintendence of those holding office in the interest of the whole; the legal compulsion, however, which is necessary thereto, cannot be exercised by the church as such, but only by the state,² which recog-

noscere doctrinam, et doctrinam ab evangelio dissentientem rejicere, et impios, quorum nota est impietas, excludere a communione ecclesiae, *sine vi humana, sed verbo.*"

88² Luther, "To the German Nobility": "Since secular officials are ordained of God, to punish the wicked and to protect the good, they shall be suffered to exercise their

nizes and protects the church as a public corporation. For as the legal representatives of a Christian people the authorities [Organe] of the state cannot be indifferent to the church. In Germany, at least, historical circumstances brought it about that in the sixteenth century the magistrates, as representing the churches under their jurisdiction, bestowed upon them their legal organization, and assured its execution by special state-church officials. This introduced everywhere at first a confusion of religious and legal authority, since under the influence of Middle-Age views the chief object of the state was made to be the direct furthering of the Christian religion and its morality. On the other hand, under Calvinism, several forms of church constitution were developed, which were independent of or indifferent to the state. Of these forms, however, the synodal constitution of the old French Church was not possible without forming a state within the state and in contrast to it. Independence in England and America gave up the legal organization of the church as a whole, making the local churches sovereign, and establishing only a moral bond between them. Finally, in Scotland, a synodal church constitution arose, partly in union with the state and partly independent of it, whereby a church absolutely identical in worship and faith is divided in polity.

office unhindered throughout the whole body of Christendom, regardless as to whom it may affect, be it pope, bishops, priests, monks, nuns or whomsoever it may."

The state government of the church in Germany is a condition of the union of the churches of the different Evangelical provinces, and cannot be judged and depreciated by the example of the conditions in America and Scotland. According to Evangelical doctrine, there is no exclusively ideal form of church government, and the course of Protestant history in Germany justifies the assertion that the maintenance of the unity of the provincial churches by the state has protected the Evangelical Church against being split into sects and won back into Catholicism. But it is true that the state government of the church is to be defended in a very different way from that formerly used. For it cannot be inferred either from the assumed religious object of the state, nor from a fictitious transfer of the Catholic Episcopal office to the princes, nor from the extent of state sovereignty as such. Still the government of the church by the princes as an independent addition to their sovereignty is comprehensible, since the national state, for the sake of the spiritual well-being of the people, must maintain the Evangelical Church as a whole, and since all public administration which involves compulsion falls within the sphere of the state. And such administration is necessary, because it would not be of advantage to the Evangelical Church itself that by a legal independence it should form a state within the state, and its independent religious end would be injured if it should be forced into this course. And by this government

of the Evangelical Church by the princes the fundamental distinction is preserved between religious and legal authority in the church. For, on the one hand, by the existence of state officials the pastors are spared the necessity of extending their office to the government and administration of the whole church, and thus impairing their moral authority, and on the other hand, the princes are to be trusted to maintain the peculiar character of the Evangelical Church, both in worship and in doctrine, and not to impose anything upon it contrary to the gospel. How far it will be possible by the establishing of synods to strengthen the existing church government, and to preclude the danger of the dissolution of the national church, is at present still undecided.

89. Baptism (immersion) into the name of the Lord Jesus, or of Jesus Christ, or into the name of the Father, Son and Holy Spirit,¹ is in its visible form an act of the community, by which it pledges the individuals uniting with it to the revelation of God to which it owes its existence. This pledging includes the renewing and purifying of the spiritual life, which is symbolized in the washing of the body, and which is to be really understood as acceptance into the circle of forgiveness or reconciliation.² The

¹ Acts ii. 38; viii. 16; x. 48; xix. 5.—Rom. vi. 3; Gal. iii. 27.—Matt. xxviii. 19.

² Acts ii. 38. Many passages of the New Testament which are generally understood as referring to the Christian baptism of the individual, do not have reference to

rite, however, is not to be understood merely as the confession of the individual who enters as a believer into the community, but as a sacrament, because it is an act of the community, since the existence of the community depends upon the revelation of the Father through the Son, and as such assures to the one newly received the peculiar blessing of this revelation. This value of the act is clearly expressed especially in the baptism of infants.³ Although this practice rests only on very old tradition, and on no word of Christ or practice of the oldest community, yet it has its justification in connection with religious and moral education within the church; on the other hand the principle of the Baptist sects that only adults, and such as can be recognized as sanctified and regenerated, may be baptized, rests on the mistaken supposition that one can attain to the formation of Christian character outside of the community.

90. The Lord's Supper in its visible form is an act of the whole community (and of the individual as a member of the community), by which it

this, but to the general renewing of man by the Spirit of God, which is symbolically referred to in the Prophets as cleansing and quickening through water (John iii. 5; Tit. iii. 5; compare Ezek. xxxvi. 25, 26; Is. xxxii. 15; Joel ii. 28, 29).

89³ Conf. Aug. I. 9: "Pueri per baptismum oblati deo recipiuntur in gratiam dei." Here the baptism of children is rightly represented as a consecrating of them by the community, which act is effective because of the relation of the community to God.

thankfully recognizes the worth of Christ's life-offering for the establishment of the community.¹ As Christ Himself, however, set forth the value of His coming death to the community of His disciples as the sacrifice of the New Covenant (§ 38, 1), the constant repetition of the Lord's Supper in the same form becomes analogous to the sacrificial meal of the Old Testament. And since, further, the community founded through the sacrificial death of Christ stands in the relation to God brought about by the forgiveness of sins or reconciliation, the act is not only an act of confession on the part of the community, but also a sacrament. This value of the act to the individual believer is apparent from two related reasons. First, the community within which he partakes of the Lord's Supper guarantees to him the forgiveness of sins, to which forgiveness the community owes its existence.² At bottom, however, Christ Himself guarantees this to him, in so far as the act is repeated through which in advance He appropriated to the community the reconciling efficacy of His death. Accordingly, the Lord's Supper has the practical value of quickening the tenderness of moral feeling, of directing the life from the motive of reconcilia-

90¹ Cor. xi. 23-26; Mark xiv. 22-24; Matt. xxvi. 26-28; Luke xxii. 19, 20.—² Cor. x. 16, 17.

² Lutheri Catech. major, V. 32: "Jam totum evangelium et fidei articulus: credo ecclesiam sanctam catholicam, remissionem peccatorum, virtute verbi in hoc sacramentum conclusus est et nobis propositus."

tion toward humility, trust and patience (§ 50), and finally of arousing the sense of fellowship in the community.

Christian churches of different confessions are divided as to how the body and blood of Christ, symbolized by the bread and wine, are connected in the act of the Lord's Supper with these elements. The Catholic doctrine asserts the change of the natural elements of bread and wine into the body and blood of Christ, while retaining the appearance of bread and wine; the Lutheran doctrine asserts the spaceless coexistence of these substances within the space of the natural elements; and both teach that the body and blood of Christ are partaken. The Calvinistic doctrine teaches that the administering of the body and blood through Christ for spiritual participation concurs in time with the partaking of the bread and wine. The controversy between these doctrines can be settled neither by an appeal to the words of Christ at the instituting of the Supper, nor to the later explanation of Paul. And especially is this true, since none of the confessional doctrines takes the fact into consideration that the broken bread and flowing wine make present the body and blood of Christ under the characteristics of His violent death. Finally, it is without question that Christ established this sacrament in order that all might unite in it, and not in the expectation that they would divide as to its meaning and content, and so separate from one another in its celebration.

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